1860.

HEWER

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Cox.

We

office might be given as the residence of that attorney's clerk. That decision was approved and acted upon in Attenborough v. Thompson (a). [Wightman J. are all agreed that those cases are conclusive in your favour on this point.] Secondly, the situation of the place of residence is sufficiently stated, though not with strict accuracy. New Street, Blackfriars, is in the county of Middlesex, being in the city of London. Though the city of London is distinct, for some purposes, from the rest of the county, it is geographically within it. [Blackburn J. You may argue that "New Street, Blackfriars," would be sufficient, without the addition of "in the city of London ;" and that, therefore, the addition "in the county of Middlesex," could not mislead any one.] Yes: the test is, whether the description would give sufficient information, or would mislead. In Routh v. Roublot (b) Lord Campbell C. J. says "I lay down no rule but this, that the affidavit required by the statute must give such information as reasonable persons would require." Reasonable persons, dealing with the firm of Godson and Hogben, could require no further information of their residence, than that it was in New Street, Blackfriars. There is but one place within the limits of the county of Middlesex, which answers that description. There is therefore nothing untrue in the description as it stands; as there was in the case of Allen v. Thompson (c), where the assignor of a bill of sale was described merely as a "gentleman" by occupation, whereas he had a specific occupation, being a clerk in a public office. [Raymond, contrà, mentioned Collins v. Goodyer (d).] In that case it was held that Dorset Place, Clapham Road, Mid

(a) 2 H. & N. 559.
(c) 1 H. & N. 15.

(b) 1 E. & E. 850. (d) 2 B. & C. 563.

dlesex,' was not a description of the true place of abode of a deponent, within the meaning of a rule of this Court, Mich. 15. Car. 2, the Dorset Place in question being in Surrey. There, however, the wrong county was mentioned; moreover, the requirements of the rule of Court were more stringent than those of stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. s. 1.

Raymond, contrà. The requirements of the statute have not been complied with: and unless they are strictly complied with, the statute makes the bill of sale void against the creditors of the assignors. Whether therefore, or not, the inaccuracy of the description of the assignors' residence would mislead any one, the defendant, as execution creditor, is entitled to insist on his right to the goods. [Blackburn J. The question is, what is meant, in the statute, by a description of the residence of an assignor. Must it not refer to a description such as an ordinary man would understand?] Even adopting that view, ordinary men living at a distance from London, would be misled by the description in the present case. [Wightman J. Not so, if they made any inquiry.] A creditor is not bound to make any inquiry. The description "New Street, Blackfriars," is per se insufficient. There may be, and probably are, many other places in England called Blackfriars, besides that in the city of London. And an insufficient description cannot be cured by the addition of an inaccuracy. That which is incorrect cannot be said to explain. Collins v. Goodyer (a) is precisely in point for the defendant. No one could have been misled there, for there is but one

(a) 2 B. & C. 563.

1860.

HEWER

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Cox.

1860.

HEWER

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Cox.

Clapham Road, yet the Court held that the addition
Surrey" made the description untrue. The rule of
Court there under consideration required the true place
of abode of a deponent to be inserted in an affidavit.
So, by a description of the residence, in stat. 17 & 18
Vict. c. 36. s. 1., must be meant a true description of the
residence. If a false description of the residence is
given, the statute is not satisfied; and it is no answer to
the objection grounded on the statute, that the descrip-
tion is equivalent to a true one and cannot mislead.
Otherwise, the protection given by the Legislature to
creditors might in numerous cases be frittered away.
That the Act must be strictly complied with is well laid
down by Watson B. in giving judgment in Pickard v.
Bretz (a), where he says "Three things are to be
stated in the affidavit, first, the time the bill of sale was
made or given; secondly, the residence; and, thirdly,
the occupation of the party making or giving it. The
Legislature having passed an Act requiring these three
things to be done for the prevention of fraud, it is not
for the Courts to say that any one of them is immaterial.
I can well understand why the Legislature should
require a description of the occupation." I agree "that,
provided the affidavit shews the occupation by reference
to the bill of sale, that would be sufficient. But this
affidavit does not; it neither states what the occupation
is, nor whether the occupation mentioned in the bill of
sale is correct. We should fritter away the Act by
saying that this need not be done, when the statute re-
quires it." [Blackburn J. Those observations would
be in point if, in the present case, there had been no
description of the place of residence of the assignors.]
(a) 5 H. & N. 9.

Horace Lloyd, in reply. The protection to creditors contemplated by the statute is sufficiently afforded, if the affidavit satisfies the rule laid down by Lord Campbell C. J. in Routh v. Roublot (a).

(COCKBURN C. J. was absent.)

WIGHTMAN J. I am of opinion that there is a sufficient description in the affidavit, of the place represented as being the place of residence of the persons making the bill of sale, to satisfy the statute. The Act recites that frauds are frequently committed upon creditors by secret bills of sale of personal chattels. The object of the Legislature therefore was to afford creditors facilities for discovering whether any of the persons with whom they deal has made a bill of sale: and, in order to effect this object, it requires such a description of the residence and occupation of the person making or giving such a bill to be filed as shall enable that person's creditors to identify him and take precautions accordingly. Was, then, such a description filed in the present case? The two persons making this bill of sale carried on the trade of printers in partnership, and may, no doubt, be said to have resided in New Street, Blackfriars. It has been settled by previous decisions that a person may be said to reside at the place where he is to be found daily, although he sleeps elsewhere. The question is, whether the description of the residence itself is sufficient. It is described as New Street, Blackfriars, in the county of Middlesex, whereas there is no such street in that county, but there is in the city of London. Now all the cre

(a) 1 E. & E. 850.

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HEWER

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Cox.

ditors of these particular persons would be likely to know in what New Street, Blackfriars, they carried on business; and consequently, I think, and upon this I mainly found my decision, that New Street, Blackfriars, without more, would have been a sufficient description. To this description, however, an addition, untrue in fact, has been appended; namely, "in the county of Middlesex." But could any creditor be thereby misled? If not, we may disregard it. And I think that it could mislead no one. It is true that in Collins v. Goodyer (a) this Court held that the addition of a wrong county to the description of the place of abode of a deponent, in an affidavit to hold to bail, vitiated the description. That may have been a right decision, having regard to the wording of the rule of Court involved; the fact that personal liberty was in question may also, perhaps, have influenced the Court. It was given, however, many years ago; and, without expressing an opinion upon it, we need only say that the present is not a case in pari materiâ.

HILL J. I am of the same opinion. I agree with my brother Wightman that in order to gather the intention of the Legislature we must look at the recital in the statute. Now the recital is, that "Frauds are frequently committed upon creditors by secret bills of sale of personal chattels, whereby persons are enabled to keep up the appearance of being in good circumstances and possessed of property, and the grantees or holders of such bills of sale have the power of taking the property of such persons, to the exclusion of the rest of

(a) 2 B. & C. 563.