It may be an inquisitorial power, and liable to abuse; but great inconvenience would result from its absence. To advert again to the language of the Act. By sect. 5 the overseers and others, who are to be called upon to make returns, are to return, inter alia, the name of the surveyor, or the name or names of the person or persons by whom, and the manner in which, the valuation was made. Now the surveyor or other person would not necessarily be a public officer, and, unless under the words "any other persons whomsoever" in sect. 7, the committee would have no power to take their evidence. These words are extremely wide. I should be unwilling to strain doubtful language in a matter of this kind; but it would be straining plain language to hold that "whomsoever" refers only to persons mentioned in the Act. Moreover, the section goes on to provide that the witnesses are to produce, not only all parochial and other rates and assessments, but also other documents in their custody or power, relating to the value of the property. It, therefore, appears to me that the Legislature have intentionally given power to this committee of gentlemen to exercise this somewhat arbitrary jurisdiction, if necessary; guarding its exercise by the requirement that the witnesses are to be summoned by the order in writing of the committee, which, it is to be assumed, will not be issued vexatiously and without due reason. Although I entertained some doubt in the course of the argument, I have now come clearly to the conclusion that the justices were wrong.

HILL J. I am of the same opinion. The question is, whether we are to construe the words in sect. 7, "any other persons whomsoever," according to their

1861.

The QUEEN

V.

DOUBLEDAY.

1861.

The QUEEN

V.

DOUBLEDAY.

plain general acceptation, or are to limit them to such persons as are mentioned in the 5th section, and have in their custody or power such documents as are there specified. After hearing the argument on both sides, and on full consideration, I am clearly of opinion that we must give to the words their plain and general meaning. The intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words of a statute, and not from any general inferences to be drawn from the nature of the objects dealt with by the statute; Fordyce v. Bridges (a). The statute before us, after repealing former Acts, enacts by sect. 2 that it shall be lawful for justices in Quarter Sessions, as often as they may deem it necessary, to appoint a committee of their body "for the purpose of preparing a basis or standard for fair and equal county rates, such basis or standard to be founded and prepared rateably and equally according to the full and fair annual value of the property" "rateable to the relief of the poor in every parish, township, borough, or place." These words shew that the object of the Legislature was that the basis or standard for the county rates should be founded on the full and fair annual value of the property to be assessed; and not solely on the amount at which such property was actually assessed to the poor-rate. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that the statute should receive a construction which will give effect to this object. By sect. 5 the duty is imposed upon certain specified public officers, of making certain written returns, when required by the committee. Mr. Mellish has attempted to account for the introduction of the words "other persons” in sect. 7

(a) 1 H. L. Ca. 1.

by supposing them to relate to such of these officers as
are not expressly mentioned in that section. But, as
my Brother Crompton has pointed out, one of the duties
imposed by sect. 5 on the officers there specified is to
return to the committee the name of the surveyor who
makes the valuation. It must evidently have been
intended that the committee should refer to this sur-
veyor, if necessary, for further information; but if Mr.
Mellish's construction of sect. 7 is correct, they would
have no power to summon him before them. The rea-
sonable construction of sect. 7 is that it is intended
to enlarge the powers already given to the committee
by sect. 5, by authorizing them to call before them, not
the persons, only, enumerated in sect. 5, but also "any
other persons whomsoever;" and to compel the produc-
tion by the witnesses, not only of the parochial and
other rates, assessments, valuations and apportionments,
but also of all other documents which any witness may
have in his custody or power, and which relate to the
true value of the property. No other documents but
those which are of that nature can be called for; and
such documents are most material to the due exercise of
the duty of the committee. The section, further, gives
the committee power to examine the witnesses on oath,
touching either the rates, assessments, valuations and
apportionments, or the value of the property.
It may

be said that these powers are to a certain extent inquisi-
torial; but I see nothing absurd or oppressive in the
committee being invested with authority to acquire the
best information available. Sect. 13 enacts that a copy
of the basis or standard, when prepared, is to be sent to
every parish, and submitted to its vestry; by sect. 14,
objections to the basis or standard may be sent to the com-

1861.

The QUEEN

V.

DOUBLEDAY.

1861.

The QUEEN

v.

DOUBLEDAY.

mittee, either by the parish officers, or by any person
affected by it; and by sect. 17 it may, after its allowance,
be appealed against to Quarter Sessions, by any parish
officer or inhabitant parishioner, on wide and various
grounds there enumerated. The Act, therefore, pro-
viding so many safeguards against an abuse of their
powers by the committee, I see nothing unreasonable,
unjust, or improper in giving to the words of
sect. 7, "any other persons whomsoever," their plain
general meaning, according to which they include the
respondent in the present case. I am, consequently,
of opinion that the justices came to a wrong decision.
The case must be remitted to them with that expression
of our opinion.

Appeal allowed, without costs; and case
remitted to the justices.

Saturday, January 19th.

Stat. 6 G 4. c. 129. s. 3. constitutes it an offence

punishable by conviction,

by threats or intimidation,

or by molesting or in any way obstructing another,"

to "force or endeavour to

WALSBY, appellant, against ANLEY, respondent.

CASE

ASE stated by a Metropolitan Police Magistrate,
under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

On 9th June, 1860, the appellant was convicted by
the magistrate, under stat. 6 G. 4. c. 129. s. 3., for
unlawfully, on 16th May, 1860, within the Metropolitan
police district, in the county of Middlesex, by threats
endeavouring to force the respondent, then and there

force any" "person engaged in carrying on any trade or business," "to limit" "the number or description of his" "workmen."

Held, that a threat by a workman to his employer, made in pursuance of a combination (which is illegal) between that workman and fellow-workmen to carry it out, that all the workmen so combining will immediately leave work unless the employer discharges other workmen who are then in the same service, renders such workman liable to conviction for the above offence.

ET

carrying on the trade of a builder, to limit the description of his workmen; and was ordered to be imprisoned for one calendar month, with hard labour.

It was proved, by the respondent and other witnesses, that the respondent carried on the trade of a builder in Whitecross Street, Middlesex, and that he employed about a hundred workmen. In the year 1859 there had been a strike of workmen employed in the building trade, and the respondent then resolved not to employ, and did not employ for some time, any workmen who declined to work under what was called the declaration. It was well understood in the building trade what this declaration was; it being to the following effect. "I declare that I am not now, nor will I during my engagement with you become, a member of, or support, any society which directly or indirectly interferes with the arrangements of this or any other establishment, or the hours or terms of labour; and that I recognize the right of employers and employed individually to make any trade engagements on which they may choose to agree."

On the day named in the conviction the respondent had in his employment two or more men working under this declaration. On that day the defendant and two of the other workmen brought to the respondent a paper signed by the defendant and about thirty other workmen, of which the following is a copy. "At a meeting of the joiners in the employ of Mr. Anley, Tuesday evening, May 15th, 1860, it was resolved, that Mr. Anley be given to understand that, unless the men who are working under the declaration in his shop be discharged, and we have a definite answer by dinner time to that effect, we cease work immediately." The

1861.

WALSBY

V.

ANLEY.