Bank of Australasia v. Nias (a), that the plaintiff cannot impeach the judgment here on such grounds, and that whilst it stands unreversed this action cannot be maintained. The declaration being thus, in our opinion, bad, and the defendants therefore entitled to our judgment, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the pleas. Judgment for the defendants. (a) 16 Q. B. 717. 1861. CASTRIQUE v. BEHRENS. MEMORANDA. In this Vacation a patent of precedence was granted to George Hayes, Serjeant at law, to have place and precedence at the Bar next after Archibald John Stephens, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel. In the same Vacation the following gentlemen were appointed Queen's Counsel. William Dugmore, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn. William Anthony Collins, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn. Henry Mills, Esq., of the Middle Temple. The Hon. Adolphus Frederick Octavius Liddell, of the Inner Temple. 1861. MEMORANDA, William Baliol Brett, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn. John Burgess Karslake, Esq., of the Middle Temple. And Thomas Wheeler, Esq., of the Middle Temple, was called to the degree of the coif. He gave rings with the motto "Non sine labore." END OF HILARY VACATION. INDEX ΤΟ THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ACCIDENT. Insurance; Master and Servant, III. ACTION. Action in superior Courts. I. Pleadings in. Pleading. II. Costs in. Costs. III. For fraudulently causing plaintiff IV. For false imprisonment, Liability V. For falsely and fraudulently causing maliciously and without reasonable ADMIRALTY. The principle that, in an action for Has not jurisdiction to take cognizance BANKRUPT AND INSOLVENT. halves; the payment being, until then, inchoate and conditional. It is therefore open to the sender, at any time before sending the second halves, to disaffirm the transaction and redemand the first halves from the receiver, who is liable to an action for refusing to return them. Smith v. Mundy, 22. BANKRUPT AND INSOLVENT. I. Disqualification of bankrupt or insolvent for office of Assistant to Saddlers' Company, 42. Charter. II. Privilege of bankrupt from arrest before final examination. Certificate of Commissioner withdrawing protection. Stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. ss. 112. 257., Schedule B a. Detainer by subsequent creditor, of bankrupt taken under invalid ca. sa., when good and when not. The examination of defendant, a bankrupt, commenced on 6th November, and was adjourned to 3rd December, 1860. On 29th November the bankruptcy Commissioner, at the instance of O., a creditor of defendant, who had proved his debt, issued a certificate, under The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 257., Schedule B a, withdrawing protection from defendant. O. sued out of the Court of Exchequer a ca. sa. upon this certificate, under which the sheriff arrested defendant on 1st December. In January, 1861, defendant being still in custody under that ca. sa., the Commissioner granted plaintiff, also a creditor, a similar certificate, under which a ca. sa., sued out of this Court, was in the same month lodged with the sheriff, as a detainer against defendant. Held, discharging a rule calling on plaintiff to shew cause why defendant should not be discharged from custody as to this last ca. sa., that defendant was legally detained in custody under it. That, assuming that stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 112. gives a bankrupt an absolute statutory protection from arrest till the day fixed for his final BILL OF EXCHANGE. examination, so that the original arrest of defendant was illegal, the detainer lodged by plaintiff was nevertheless good, not having been lodged until after defendant's privilege from arrest had ceased. That the principle applicable to such cases is, that whenever an arrest by a detaining party would have been good, a detainer by him, being equivalent to an arrest, will be good also, unless it appears that the first arrest was a wrongful act of the sheriff himself, or that there was some collusion between the detaining party and the creditor making the arrest, or between the detaining party and the sheriff. Bateman v. Freston, 578. seizure of the goods of the person by whom ""such bill of sale shall have been made, and against every person on whose behalf such process shall have been issued, be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever, so far as regards the property in or right to the possession of any personal chattels comprised in such bill of sale, which at or after the time" "of executing such process," "and after the expiration of the said period of twentyone days, shall be in the possession or apparent possession of the person making such bill of sale." Held that, under this enactment, the assignee of goods assigned by a bill of sale has twenty-one days from the date of the bill of sale, within which he may either file the bill of sale or take the goods out of the apparent possession of the assignor. That, therefore, the title of such assignee to the goods is not defeated by their seizure, while in the apparent possession of the assignor but before the twenty-one days have expired, under a fi. fa. issued against the goods of the assignor by an execution creditor. Marples v. Hartley, 610. 2. What is a sufficient description of the residence and occupation of assignor. Falsa demonstratio. Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. s. 1. requires a description of the residence and occupation of the person making a bill of sale of personal chattels to be filed with every such bill of sale; in order to the validity of the bill of sale as against creditors of that person. G. & H., printers carrying on business in copartnership in New Street, Blackfriars, in the city of London, but not sleeping there, having made a bill of sale of the partnership goods, the description filed with the bill stated that they were printers and copartners, residing at New Street, Blackfriars, in the county of Middlesex. Held that the description was sufficient, and the bill of sale valid for that no creditor of G. & H. could have been misled as to their identity with the persons described, had the description merely specified New Street, |