which would be not only superfluous (since the peace itself would include as to each of the High Contracting Parties all the Indian nations within the territory of the other), but also a direct and formal recognition of such Indian nations as independent powers, with which a Foreign Power could directly treat, a principle which the American Commissioners consistently refused to recognize and the elimination of which from the British sine qua non the Americans made an indispensable preliminary to the acceptance of any provisional article upon the subject of Indian pacification. 73 Article IX was believed by the American Commissioners to be only nominal, and was generally recognized in Great Britain as a complete abandonment of the original proposals advanced as a sine qua non by the British Commissioners. The Ministry refused to lay before either House the instructions to the British Commissioners, or the notes passing between the British and American Commissioners. Information was obtained, however, as to what had transpired in the conference of the Commissioners, and to the contents of their official notes prior to August 19, 1814, by reason of the fact that, when these notes were transmitted to the United States by the American Commissioners, they had stated that there was no hope of peace and that they were awaiting the formal communications, which would bring the negotiations to a close. These notes were made public by President Madison for the purpose of showing to the American people the unreasonableness of the British demands, and produced the salutary effect of uniting the states of the Union in determined opposition to the demands of Great Britain, and of silencing the faction which had up to that time opposed the war. When these negotiations, made public by President Madison, reached England, they caused spirited debates on the treaty in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons. He In the House of Lords the Marquis of Wellesley reviewed the negotiations and called upon the Ministry for the complete negotiations before consideration of the terms of the treaty." pointed out that the reason why the American Commissioners had no instructions upon the subjects of Indian pacification and boundary was because they had no reason to anticipate that 73 Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 538-544. * they would be called upon to cede a part of their own territory or to alter the relations existing between them and the Indians domiciled within their territory. He further directed attention to the fact that, while the negotiations at Ghent were in progress, treaties of peace had actually been concluded by the United States with many of the Indian nations, in whose behalf Great Britain was attempting to treat. He continued, "We demanded a cession of territory, on the ground that it formed the natural limit of Canada. This territory included the whole of the Lakes and a large stretch of ground on the other side But this point, in whatever way considered, whether as a sine qua non or not, was completely rejected-no attempt was ultimately made to insist on it-it formed no part of the present treaty. He was astonished that America should have been called upon to submit to the claim that was made; a claim which she would not have recognized without degrading her national honor, and sacrificing her national interests. No country had a right to make such a demand on another." * * * The Marquis then pointed out that, by the Treaty of 1783, the United States was given the same rights of sovereignty and soil over the territory within its boundaries, as defined by that treaty, as had formerly been possessed by His Majesty's Government, and that Great Britain could not, with any degree of justice, call for a new boundary for the Indians when, in fact, all power and control respecting them had been long before given up. He continued, "did the noble Lord forget that this territory, which he claimed for his independent Indians, was actually divided into American states-that it actually sent members to Congress that it was pledged for a share of the national debt?— And was it to be expected that they would consent to give a boundary thus out of their own bosom, against themselves? But the American Government had made frequent treaties with them, undoubtedly; and so had we done; but we had not, therefore, relinquished the full possession of our sovereignty. The fact was, that however the Americans might have been disgusted by the demands of our negociators, the Treaty restored things to exactly the same state in which they were before."74 Arguments similar to those advanced by the Marquis of Wellesley were advanced by Mr. Ponsonby, in the House of Commons. 74 Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 586-593. 7 A defense of the actions of the British Commissioners was made in the House of Lords by the Earl of Liverpool, and in the House of Commons by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Goulburn.76 A reading of these debates shows clearly that the only Indian tribes or nations, on whose behalf His Majesty's Government had attempted to treat and which they considered to be covered by the terms of Article IX, were the tribes or nations domiciled within the American borders, which occupied the northwestern portion of the United States. The Ministry contended that they had fulfilled their duty to the Indians by not leaving them at the mercy of the United States Government, and by obligating that government to restore them to the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they had enjoyed before the war. As was stated by Lord Castlereagh, in the House of Commons. "We owed to the Indians to replace them in a state of peace, and in the enjoyment of such possessions as they had before. This was done, and the result was at least so far advantageous to the Indians as to make their interests an object of regulations to a country which was capable of protecting them."77 The newspaper comments upon Article IX are also interesting, as showing what tribes or nations of Indians the provisions of this article were understood to include. The London Times, in the latter part of 1814 and the early part of 1815, in editorials on the Treaty of Ghent, remarked: * * “There was also an influence which we once possessed over the minds of our Indian allies, and which in war and in peace we have found to be of no mean value. We are told with respect to the latter, that there is a stipulation (how to be enforced we know not) that they are to be restored to all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they enjoyed, or were entitled to, before 1812: * if we mean really to protect the rights of our Indian Allies, we ought not to turn them over to some future arrangement between themselves and Mr. Madison, which is like setting an infant to play piquet with a professional gamester; but we should insist on being parties to the agreement, and guarantees of its execution. If we have improvidently neglected the interests of the Indians, how much more have we neglected those of the Colonists.78 * * * 76 Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 593-595, 598-600. 77Appendix, Vol. II, p. 603. they would be called upon to cede a part of their own territory or to alter the relations existing between them and the Indians domiciled within their territory. He further directed attention to the fact that, while the negotiations at Ghent were in progress, treaties of peace had actually been concluded by the United States with many of the Indian nations, in whose behalf Great Britain was attempting to treat. He continued, "We demanded a cession of territory, on the ground that it formed the natural limit of Canada. This territory included the whole of the * * * * * Lakes and a large stretch of ground on the other side But this point, in whatever way considered, whether as a sine qua non or not, was completely rejected no attempt was ultimately made to insist on it-it formed no part of the present treaty. He was astonished that America should have been called upon to submit to the claim that was made; a claim which she would not have recognized without degrading her national honor, and sacrificing her national interests. No country had a right to make such a demand on another." The Marquis then pointed out that, by the Treaty of 1783, the United States was given the same rights of sovereignty and soil over the territory within its boundaries, as defined by that treaty, as had formerly been possessed by His Majesty's Government, and that Great Britain could not, with any degree of justice, call for a new boundary for the Indians when, in fact, all power and control respecting them had been long before given up. He continued, "did the noble Lord forget that this territory, which he claimed for his independent Indians, was actually divided into American states-that it actually sent members to Congress that it was pledged for a share of the national debt?And was it to be expected that they would consent to give a boundary thus out of their own bosom, against themselves? But the American Government had made frequent treaties with them, undoubtedly; and so had we done; but we had not, therefore, relinquished the full possession of our sovereignty. The fact was, that however the Americans might have been disgusted by the demands of our negociators, the Treaty restored things to exactly the same state in which they were before."'74 Arguments similar to those advanced by the Marquis of Wellesley were advanced by Mr. Ponsonby, in the House of Commons. 74Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 586-593. A defense of the actions of the British Commissioners was made in the House of Lords by the Earl of Liverpool, and in the House of Commons by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Goulburn.76 A reading of these debates shows clearly that the only Indian tribes or nations, on whose behalf His Majesty's Government had attempted to treat and which they considered to be covered by the terms of Article IX, were the tribes or nations domiciled within the American borders, which occupied the northwestern portion of the United States. The Ministry contended that they had fulfilled their duty to the Indians by not leaving them at the mercy of the United States Government, and by obligating that government to restore them to the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they had enjoyed before the war. stated by Lord Castlereagh, in the House of Commons. As was "We owed to the Indians to replace them in a state of peace, and in the enjoyment of such possessions as they had before. This was done, and the result was at least so far advantageous to the Indians as to make their interests an object of regulations to a country which was capable of protecting them.”” The newspaper comments upon Article IX are also interesting, as showing what tribes or nations of Indians the provisions of this article were understood to include. The London Times, in the latter part of 1814 and the early part of 1815, in editorials on the Treaty of Ghent, remarked: "There was also an influence which we once possessed over the minds of our Indian allies, and which in war and in peace we have found to be of no mean value. We are told with respect to the latter, that there is a stipulation (how to be enforced we know not) that they are to be restored to all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they enjoyed, or were entitled to, before 1812: * * * if we mean really to protect the rights of our Indian Allies, we ought not to turn them over to some future arrangement between themselves and Mr. Madison, which is like setting an infant to play piquet with a professional gamester; but we should insist on being parties to the agreement, and guarantees of its execution. If we have improvidently neglected the interests of the Indians, how much more have we neglected those of the Colonists.78 * * * 76 Appendix, Vol. II, pp. 593-595, 598-600. 77Appendix, Vol. II, p. 603. |