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3. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Repair, Covenant for by the
Tenant, When not Waived.-The fact that the landlord did some re-
pairs to the leased premises not in pursuance of any agreement to re
pair is not an admission of liability or obligation to repair on his
part, when the lease under which the tenant entered stipulated that
he should do the repairing. (Mass.) Dalton v. Gibson, 218.

LIBEL.

1. LIBEL.-Written or Printed Publications, Caricatures, Pictures
or Effigies which falsely tend to bring a person into public disgrace,
contempt or ridicule are libelous. (Wis.) Wandt v. Hearst's
"Chicago American," 959.

2. LIBEL "Suicide Fiend."-A newspaper article fasely stat-
ing that a certain person is a suicide fiend, has attempted suicide
twenty-five times, and would usually go to the hospital and ask to be
pumped out, is libelous as tending to bring such person into public
ridicule and contempt. (Wis.) Wandt v. Hearst's "Chicago Am-
erican," 959.

3. LIBEL'Suicide Fiend"-Picture Published with Article.-
If a newspaper article, accusing a certain person with being a
"suicide fiend," is accompanied by a picture in such a way as to be
in effect a statement that it is a picture of the person referred
to, both together constitute a libel, although the published article
gives as the name of the person referred to a name other than that of
the person whose picture is published, and although the latter may
have been damaged in the estimation of friends. (Wis.) Wandt
v. Hearst's "Chicago American," 959.

Per se.-To

4. LIBEL-Publication of Indebtedness-Libel
write and publish of one, not a trader or merchant and not of or
concerning his business affairs, that he is indebted to another, and,
though able to pay, has neglected or refused to do so, is not such
an impeachment of his honesty, nor does it import such degradation
of morals or character, nor so expose him to public hatred or ridicule
nor so tend to disgrace him, that it can be said as matter of law or
by a presumption of evidence, that such publication is libelous per se,
and must necessarily occasion damage and pecuniary loss to him, and
he is not entitled to recover therefor without proof that the publica-
tion was actuated by malice and that he has suffered actual damages.
(Utah) Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 796.

5.

LIBEL-Publication of Indebtedness-Libel Per se.-To write
and publish of a certain person, who is a candidate for office, that
he owes a debt to the publisher and has not paid it, is not of itself
sufficient to make the publication libelous, when such person is not
engaged in business, or when it is not said of or concerning him in
the conduct of his trade or business, but such words may become
libelous by proof of extraneous circumstances if special damages are
shown. (Utah) Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 796.

6.

LIBEL-Candidate for Office.-The fact that one is a candi-
date for office affords in many instances a legal excuse for publishing
language concerning him as such candidate, for which publication
there could be no legal excuse if he did not occupy the position of
such candidate, and to publish of one candidate for office that he is
honest does not carry the implication that another candidate, dis-
paringly spoken of, is dishonest. (Utah) Nichols v. Daily Reporter
Co., 796.

Note.

Libel, basis of action for, 804.

by charging dishonest action or the betrayal of a trust, 810.
by charging acts tending to expose one to hatred or contempt, 811.
by charging a newspaper with insincerity, 812.

by charging officers with corruption or unfitness for office, 815.
by charging one with being a bastard, 810.

by charging one with being a common liar, 812.

by charging one with being a confidence man, 811.

by charging one with being guilty of inhuman conduct to man or
beast, 811, 812.

by charging one with a criminal disposition, 814.

by charging one with cowardice, 810.

by charging one with expulsion from church, 809.

by charging one with fanaticism, 810.

by charging one with insolvency, 817.

by charging one with lack of knowledge, skill, or integrity, 816.

by charging one with political corruption, 814, 815.

by charging one with poverty, misery, etc., 811.

by charging one with the commission of a crime, 813.

by charging one with want of honesty, 812.

by expressions of belief or suspicion, 808.

by imputing corruption or other dishonesty, 809.

by imputing want of chastity to a woman, 809.
by insinuations, 808.

by ironical language, 809.

by words of interrogation, 809.

by words reflecting on social character, 809.

charge of crime, what is a, 808.

constitutionality of statutes undertaking to limit the amount or
right of recovery for, 803.

construction of words alleged to be libelous, 807.

damages recoverable for must be the natural and proximate re-
sult of the words used, 805, 806.

damages, when presumed from, 804.

distinction between statements concerning a man in his individual
and in his business capacity, 817.

necessity for the words used to relate to the plaintiff, 806.
need not name plaintiff or other party affected by, 806.

officers, words respecting which amount to, 815.

persons the subjects of how may be pointed out or designated, 806.
reputation is property, 803.

test of words which are actionable per se, 804-807.

the whole of the libelous article must be construed together, 807.
unlicensed business, persons conducting, when cannot maintain an
action for, 817.

words actionable per se, distinction as to between libel and slan-
der, 805.

words actionable per se, general tests of, 804-806.

LICENSES.

See Constitutional Law.

LIENS.

See Mechanics' Liens; Railroads, 9.

In General.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

1. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-Married Women.-If the owner
of property is a married woman at the time possession thereof is
taken by a third person, the statute of limitations does not run
against her during her coverture. (Mo.) Bucher v. Hohl, 492.

2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreign Corporations.-A cor-
poration, though created by the laws of another state, is deemed to
be present in the state where it is continuously doing business, and
with whose laws it has complied, and it is entitled to the protection
of the statute of limitations of such state, if it has an agent there
and is amenable to personal service of the process of the courts of
that state. (N. Dak.) Colonial etc. Mtg. Co. v. Northwest Thresher
Co., 642.

3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Tolling of Statute-Burden of
Proof. If plaintiff's pleadings and evidence show that the cause of
action accrued more than ten years before the commencement of
the action, the burden of proof is on him to show that the running
of the statute has been suspended a sufficient length of time to
avoid the statutory bar of limitation pleaded by the defendant.
(N. Dak.) Paine v. Dodds, 674.

4. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS--New Trial. If the evidence
tends to show that the action is barred by limitation as to one or
more unequal parts of the land which is undivided, and not barred
as to other parts, but fails to disclose as to which parts the statu-
tory bar is complete, and such uncertainty in the proof is due to the
fact that neither the trial court nor counsel deemed such proof
material, a new trial will be ordered. (N. Dak.) Paine v. Dodds,
674.

Foreclosure Proceedings-Absence from State.

Proceedings.—An

5. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreclosure
action to foreclose a real property mortgage is an action in personam
and not in rem, and the absence from the state of the person against
whom the cause of action accrues stays the running of the statute
of limitations. (N. Dak.) Colonial etc. Mtg. Co. v. Northwest
Thresher Co., 642.

6. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreclosure of Mortgage.-An
action to foreclose a real estate mortgage is a remedy distinct from
remedies by which the creditor may enforce the personal obligation
for the mortgage debt, and the foreclosure action and the right there-
to may become barred by limitation, even though the mortgage debt
is not so barred. (N. Dak.) Colonial etc. Mtg. Co. v. Northwest
Thresher Co., 642.

7. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Right of Mortgagor's Grantee to
Plead on Foreclosure.-The grantee of a mortgagor may avail himself
of the plea of the statute of limitations as a defense to an action
to foreclose the mortgage, although the debt is neither discharged nor
barred as against the original mortgagor. (N. Dak.) Colonial etc.
Mtg. Co. v. Northwest Thresher Co., 642.

8. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreclosure Proceedings.-An
action to foreclose a mortgage of real property is not one in rem,
but is in personam against those interested in the mortgaged prop-
erty adversely to the mortgage, and the absence from the state of
the person against whom the cause of action accrues tolls the statute

of limitation as to him during his absence. (N. Dak.) Colonial etc.
Mtg. Co. v. Flemington, 670.

9. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.-Right to Foreclose a real es-
tate mortgage may be barred by limitation, even though the debt
still exists and the remedies for its collection from those personally
liable therefor are not barred. (N. Dak.) Colonial etc. Mtg. Co.
v. Flemington, 670.

10. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Right of Mortgagor's Heirs to
Plead on Foreclosure. The failure to appoint an administrator of
the estate of a deceased mortgagor and debtor does not prevent the
statute of limitations from running in favor of the mortgagor's
heirs against an action to foreclose the mortgage. (N. Dak.)
Colonial etc. Mtg. Co. v. Flemington, 670.

11. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreclosure Proceedings.—An
action to foreclose a real property mortgage is a proceeding in per-
sonam and not in rem, and within the operation of a statute ex-
cepting from the period limited for commencing an action the time
during which the person against whom the cause of action has ac-
crued is absent from the state. (N. Dak.) Paine v. Dodds, 674.

12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreclosure - Proceedings
Grantee of Mortgagor.-Although mortgaged property has passed to
the defendant's grantor, subject to the mortgage, and is in equity
the primary fund for the payment of the mortgage debt, the de-
fendant is still entitled to avail himself of the plea of the statute
of limitations as a defense to an action to foreclose the mortgage.
(N. Dak.) Paine v. Dodds, 674.

13. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Tacking-Mortgage Foreclosure.
A grantee of mortgaged premises may add to the time that the
statute of limitations has run in his favor the time it has run in
favor of his grantor, in order to make up the aggregate period re-
quired to bar an action of foreclosure. (N. Dak.) Paine v. Dodds,

674.

14. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Foreclosure Proceedings-Ab-
sence from State. The absence of the mortgagor from the state after
he has parted with the title to the mortgaged property does not pre-
vent the statute of limitations from running in favor of his grantee.
(N. Dak.) Colonial etc. Mtg. Co. v. Northwest Thresher Co., 642.

15. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Absence from State. If a per-
son against whom a cause of action has accrued departs from and
establishes his residence out of the state, the statute of limitations
ceases to run in his favor from the date of his departure. (N. Dak.)
Paine v. Dodds, 674.

16. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Absence from State.-A statute
providing that only absence of one year or more from the state shall
toll the running of the statute of limitations refers to an absence
by one who has not established a residence out of the state. (N. Dak.)
Paine v. Dodds, 674.

New Promise.

17. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-New Promise.-An acknowledg
ment of a debt, in order to be sufficient to remove the bar of the
statute of limitations, must contain an unqualified and direct admis-
sion of a present subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing
to pay, and be unaccompanied by any circumstance or declaration
which repels the presumption of a promise or intention to pay.
(Mich.) Throop v. Russell, 314.

18. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-New Promise.-A letter by the
maker to the payee of a note against which the statute of limitations
has run, stating that the fact that the note has outlawed need not
enter into the matter, that he will try to raise a certain sum, less
than the face of the note, if the payee will surrender it, and that,
if in the future the latter needs any money, the maker of the note
will endeavor to give it to him, and is not "backing up or repudiating
anything," is a conditional promise and does not remove the bar of
the statute of limitations. (Mich.) Throop v. Russell, 314.

Part Payment.

19. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Part Payment.-A Judgment
for the recovery of money does not come within the rule that part
payment revives and continues in force a contract obligation for the
payment of money. (Minn.) Olson v. Dahl, 435.

20. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Part Payment of Judgment.—
A cause of action is merged in the judgment and becomes extinct, and
a part payment of the judgment, after the bar of the statute of limita-
tions, does not, by implication, revive the original indebtedness and
authorize an action to recover thereon. (Minn.) Olson v. Dahl, 435.

LIS PENDENS.

1. LIS PENDENS-When Applies.-If the relief sought in a suit
is for the recovery of the possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or
an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, or any other
judicial action affecting the title, possession or right to possession of
specific property, then the property is so directly affected by the
decree sought that it becomes subject to the law of lis pendens.
(W. Va.) Wingfield v. Neall, 882.

2. LIS PENDENS—Object of Rule.-The prime object of the rule
of lis pendens is to preserve the property, which is the subject of
litigation, in order to make it possible for the courts to execute
their final judgments and decrees. (W. Va.) Wingfield v. Neall, 882.
3. LIS PENDENS-Purchaser Pendente Lite.-To make a person
a pendente lite purchaser, within the rule of lis pendens, there must
be at the time of the purchase a pending suit. (W. Va.) Wingfield v.
Neall, 882.

4. LIS PENDENS-Writ of Error-Purchaser Pendente Lite.-A
writ of error is a new action, and one who purchases the subject of
litigation between the time of the entry of final judgment and the
suing cut of the writ is not regarded as a pendente lite purchaser
within the rule of lis pendens, but is considered a purchaser, without
notice. (W. Va.) Wingfield v. Neall, 882.

5. LIS PENDENS-Appeal-Purchaser Pendente Lite.-A statu-
tory appeal is a new action, and one who purchases the subject of the
litigation between the time of the entry of the final judgment
and the perfection of the appeal is not regarded as a purchaser
pendente lite within the rule of lis pendens, but as a purchaser
without notice. (W. Va.) Wingfield v. Neall, 882.

6. LIS PENDENS-Injunction-Purchaser Pendente Lite. If the
holder of a trust deed attempts to sell the land conveyed thereby
to pay delinquent installments of purchase money, and such sale is
enjoined, and, pending the litigation and before an appeal is per-
fected from the judgment granting the injunction, the land is regu-
larly returned delinquent for the nonpayment of taxes, and is legally
Am. St. Rep., Vol. 116-68

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