(No. 1.)

THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO MR. THORNTON.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1869. SIR, On the day of Mr. Motley's arrival in London, on the 31st of May, he requested to see me unofficially at my private residence. At the interview which took place on the following day the conversation was general, and Mr. Motley said that he preferred not to enter upon matters of business, as his instructions had only been delivered to him when he was on the point of embarcation at New York, and he had not yet had time sufficiently to consider them.

I assented, of course, to the postponement desired by Mr. Motley.

His tone was very friendly, and we met as old acquaintances.

Mr. Motley called upon me this morning by appointment, and said that as he had now been in London some days, his Government would be desirous to hear from him, and he wished therefore to make known to me the general tenour of his instructions, which were of a most amicable character, and he had no hesitation in assuring me that the wish of the President and Government of the United States was, that existing differences between the two countries should be honourably settled, and that the international relations should be placed on a firm and satisfactory basis.

I assured Mr. Motley of the perfect reciprocity of feeling that existed on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Motley then proceeded to say that he was empowered to conclude a treaty on the naturalization question upon the principle recorded in the protocol signed by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson, and I expressed my fear that some delay must take place in this matter, not from any unwillingness on the part of Her Majesty's Government to settle the question, but from the great pressure of business now before Parliament, which would make it almost impossible to pass a Bill in the course of the present Session which affected such various interests, and was certain to lead to protracted discussion. The delay, however, was not likely, I thought, to be of such importance to the Government of the United States as their main object-viz. the renunciation of our old doctrine of indefeasible allegiance--had been achieved by the protocol, with the general approbation, to the best of my belief, of the British public.

Mr. Motley said that in the recent short Session of the Senate there had not been time to take action on the San Juan Convention, and that its consideration had been postponed without any objection to it having been raised.

The Claims Convention, Mr. Motley said, had been published prematurely owing to some accident which he could not explain, and that consequently long before it came under the notice of the Senate it had been unfavourably received by all classes and parties in the United States. The time at which it was signed was thought most inopportune, as the

late President and his Government were virtually out of office, and their successors could not be consulted on this grave question. The Convention was further objected to because it embraced only the claims of individuals, and had no reference to those of the two Governments on each other; and, lastly, that it settled no question and laid down no principle.

These were the chief reasons which had led to its rejection by the Senate, and Mr. Motley added that although they had not been at once and explicitly stated, no discourtesy to Her Majesty's Government was thereby intended. Mr. Motley then proceeded to say that in the present state of excitement which existed in both countries, his Government was of opinion that to reopen the question would be inexpedient, as it could not be approached with the calm deliberation which was essential to its satisfactory solution, and he wished, therefore, to defer discussion on the subject.

I said that Her Majesty's Government would have no difficulty in complying with the wishes of the United States' Government in this respect, though I did not consider that the excitement to which he had alluded was great in this country, but I thought it would be very objectionable indefinitely to postpone a settlement, and to treat the matter as a quarrel held in suspension, to be revived only when circumstances might make it the interest of either party to do so.

Mr. Motley assured me that I need be under no such apprehensions, as his Government merely desired, for the reasons he had just stated, that a definite time should be allowed for angry feelings to subside. Mr. Motley laid great stress upon the opportunity that would be afforded to two great maritime nations like England and the United States to lay down some general principles of international law, particularly with refe rence to the rights and duties of neutrals in war, that might be of advantage to the civilized world.

I said I could give no better proof of the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to meet that of the United States on this ground than the fact that I had myself made a somewhat similar proposal to Mr. Adams (as might be seen in the papers laid before Parliament), who, however, had shown no disposition to entertain it.

Mr. Motley said that his Government did not question the right of England or any other country to confer bellige.

rent rights, but that the Government which acted in that manner must do so at its own risk and responsibility; and upon his proceeding to make some further remarks on the subject, I took the liberty of observing that although I was quite prepared to defend the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, and the complete and honest neutrality it had observed throughout the war, yet if discussion was not to take place at present, I thought it desirable not to enter upon such matters.

Mr. Motley, in a friendly manner, agreed that it would be the better course. Mr. Motley entered at some length upon the responsibility weighing upon men who were charged with the maintenance of friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States, and said he did not disguise from himself the difficulty of replacing them on a sound and equitable footing, as, in regulating international affairs, passions and sentiments must be taken into consideration, and intense feeling with regard to the questions at issue between the two countries existed in the United States.

I assured Mr. Motley that my earnest desire, as representing Her Majesty's Government, would be to co-operate with him in effecting a settlement of existing differences in a manner honourable to both countries, and he must be well aware that war with the United States would be abhorrent to the feelings of the English people.

States, which I read to your Lordship yesterday. Renewing, &c.,

JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.

(Enclosure.)

MR. FISH TO MR. MOTLEY.
Department of State, Washington,
September 25, 1869.

Sir,-When you left here upon your mission the moment was thought not to be the most hopeful to enter upon renewed discussion or negotiation with the Government of Great Britain on the subject of the claims of this Government against that of Her Majesty, and you were instructed to convey to Lord Clarendon the opinion of the President that a suspension of the discussion for a short period might allow the subsidence of any excitement or irritation growing out of events then recent, and might enable the two Governments to approach more readily to a solution of their differ

ences.

You have informed me that Lord Clarendon saw no objection to this course, and agreed with you that it would be well to give time for emotions which had been excited of late to subside. The President is inclined to believe that sufficient time may have now elapsed to allow subsidence of those emotions, and that thus it may be opportune and convenient at the present conjuncture to place in your hands, for appropriate use, a dispassionate exposition of the just causes of complaint of the Government of the United States against that of Great Britain.

In order to do this in a satisfactory manner, it is necessary to go back to the very beginning of the acts and events which have, in their progress and consummation, so much disturbed the otherwise amicable relations of the two Governments.

When, in the winter of 1860 and 1861, certain States of the American Union undertook, by ordinances of secession, to separate themselves from the others, and to constitute of their own volition, and by force, a new and independent Republic, under the name of the Confederate States of America, there existed, as between Great Britain and the United States, a condition of profound peace; their political relations were professedly and apparently of the most friendly character, and their commercial and financial relations were as close and intimate, in fact, as they seemed to be cordial in spirit, such as became the two great liberal, progressive, and maritime and commercial Powers of the world,

associated as they were by strong ties of common interest, language, and tradition.

The Government of the United States had no reason to presume that the amicable sentiments of the British Government would be diminished or otherwise prejudicially affected by the occurrence of domestic insurrection within the United States any more than those of the latter had been impaired by the occurrence of insurrection in British India, or might be impaired by such occurrences elsewhere in the dominions of Great Britain.

Least of all could the Government of the United States anticipate hostility towards it, and special friendship for the insurgents of the seceding States, in view of the inducements and objects of that insurrection, which avowedly, and as every statesman, whether in Europe or America, well knew, and as the very earliest mention of the insurrection in the House of Commons indicated, were the secure establishment of a perpetual and exclusive slaveholding Republic. In such a contest, the Government of the United States was entitled to expect the earnest good will, sympathy, and moral support of Great Britain.

It was with painful astonishment, therefore, that the United States' Government received information of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, which had already been made on the 6th day of May, 1861, and was announced on that day in the House of Commons by her Ministry, and followed by the issue, on the 13th of May, 1861, of a proclamation which in effect recognized the insurgents as a belligerent Power, and raised them to the same level of neutral right with the United States.

The President does not deny-on the contrary, he maintains-that every sovereign Power decides for itself, on its responsibility, the question whether or not it will at a given time accord the status of belligerency to the insurgent subjects of another Power, as also the larger question of the independence of such subjects, and their accession to the family of sovereign States.

But the rightfulness of such an act depends on the occasion and the circumstances; and it is an act like the sovereign act of war, which the morality of the public law and practice requires should be deliberate, seasonable, and just, in reference to surrounding facts; national belligerency, indeed, like national independence, being but an existing fact, officially recognized as such, without which such a declaration is

only the indirect manifestation of a particular line of policy.

The precipitancy of the declaration of the Queen's Government, or, as Mr. Bright characterized it," the remarkable celerity, undue and unfriendly haste," with which it was made, appears in its having been determined on the 6th of May, four days prior to the arrival in London of any official knowledge of the President's proclamation of the 19th of April, 1861, by reference to which the Queen's proclamation has since been defended, and that it was actually signed on the 13th of May, the very day of the arrival of Mr. Adams, the new American Minister, as if in the particular aim of forestalling and preventing explanations on the part of the United States.

The prematureness of the measure is further shown by the very tenour of the proclamation, which sets forth its own reason, namely, "Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederates States of America." Moreover, it is not pretended by the proclamation that war exists, but only a "contest," in reference to which it is not unimportant to note that the language used is such as would fitly apply to parties wholly independent one of the other, so as thus to negative, or to suppress at least, the critical circumstance that this bare commencement of hostilities, this incipient contest, was a mere domestic act of insurrection within the United States.

But that which conclusively shows the unseasonable precipitancy of the measure is the fact that on that day, May 13, 1861, and indeed until long afterwards, not a battle had been fought between the insurgents and the United States, nor a combat even, save the solitary and isolated attack on Fort Sumter. Did such a bare commencement of hostilities constitute bellige. rency? Plainly not.

There was at that time no such thing as a population elevated into force, and by the prosecution of war, which Mr. Canning points out as the test of belligerent condition. The assumed belligerency of the insurgents was a fiction -a war on paper only, not in the field -like a paper blockade, the anticipation of supposed belligerency to come, but which might never have come if not thus anticipated and encouraged by the Queen's Government.

Indeed, as forcibly put by Mr. Adams, the Queen's Declaration had the effect of creating posterior belligerency, in

stead of merely acknowledging an actual fact; and that belligerency, so far as it was maritime, proceeding from the ports of Great Britain and her dependencies alone, with aid and co-operation of subjects of Great Britain.

The Government of the United States, that of Great Britain, and other European Powers, had repeatedly had occasion to consider this question in all its bearings.

It was perceived that the recognition of belligerency on the part of insurgents, although not so serious an act as the recognition of independence, yet might well be prejudicial to the legitimate Government, and therefore be regarded by it as an act of unfriendliness. It was a step, therefore, to be taken with thoughtfulness, and with due regard to exigent circumstances. Governments had waited months, sometimes years, in the face of actual hostilities without taking this step.

But circumstances might arise to call for it. A ship of the insurgents might appear in the port of the neutral, or a collision might occur at sea, imposing on the neutral the necessity to act. Or actual hostilities might have continued to rage in the theatre of insurgent war; combat after combat might have been fought for such a period of time; a mass of men may have engaged in actual war until they should have acquired the consistency of military power to repeat the idea of Mr. Canning-so as evidently to constitute the fact of belligerency, and to justify the recognition by the neutral. Or the nearness of the seat of hostilities to the neutral may compel the latter to act. In either of these contingencies the neutral would have a right to act; it might be his sovereign duty to act, however inconvenient such action should be to the legitimate Government.

There was no such fact of necessity, no such fact of continued and flagrant hostilities, to justify the action of Great Britain in the present case. Hence the United States felt constrained at the time to regard this proclamation as the sign of a purpose of unfriendliness to them and of friendliness to the insurgents, which purpose could not fail to aggravate all the evils of the pending contest, to strengthen the insurgents, and to embarrass the legitimate Government; and so it proved-for as time went on, as the insurrection from political came at length to be military, as the sectional controversy in the United States proceeded to exhibit itself in the organization of great armies and fleets,

and in the prosecution of hostilities on a scale of gigantic magnitude, then it was that the spirit of the Queen's Proclamation showed itself in the event, seeing that, in virtue of the proclamation, maritime enterprises in the ports of Great Britain, which would otherwise have been piratical, were rendered lawful, and thus Great Britain became, and to the end continued to be, the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the insurgent confederacy.

The

A spectacle was thus presented without precedent or parallel in the history of civilized nations. Great Britain, although the professed friend of the United States, yet in time of international peace permitted armed cruisers to be fitted out and harboured and equipped in her ports, to cruise against the merchant ships of the United States, and to burn and destroy them, until our maritime commerce was swept from the ocean. Our merchant vessels were destroyed piratically by captors who had no ports of their own in which to refit or to condemn prizes, and whose only nationality was the quarter-deck of their ships, built, despatched to sea, and not seldom in name still professedly owned in Great Britain. Earl Russell truly said, "It so happens that in this conflict the Confederates have no ports except those of the Mersey and the Clyde, from which they send out ships to cruise against the Federals." number of our ships thus directly destroyed amounts to nearly 200, and the value of property destroyed to many millions. Indirectly, the effect was to increase the rate of insurance in the United States, to diminish exports and imports, and otherwise obstruct domestic industry and production, and to take away from the United States its immense foreign commerce, and to transfer this to the merchant vessels of Great Britain. So that while in the year 1860 the foreign merchant tonnage of the United States amounted to 2,546,237 tons, in 1866 it had sunk to 1,492,223 tons. This depreciation is represented by a corresponding increase in the tonnage of Great Britain during the same period to the amount of 1,120,650 tons. And the amount of commerce abstracted from the United States and transferred to Great Britain during the same period is in still greater proportion. Thus, in effect, war against the United States was carried on from the ports of Great Britain by British subjects in the name of the Confederates. Mr. Cobden, in the House of Commons, characterized by these very words the acts permitted

or suffered by the British Government : -"You have been carrying on war from these shores against the United States," he said, "and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country greater than would have been produced by many ordinary wars."

The gravity of these facts may be appreciated by considering what had happened at other periods. In the latter period of the war of the French Revolution, Great Britain was compelled to strain every nerve to maintain herself against the power of Napoleon. In such straits, by a sort of war in disguise, she trespassed on the rights of neutrals, with special prejudice of the United States, to the result at length of solemn war between the two nations. But neither in the events which preceded that war, nor in the events of the war itself, did the United States suffer more at the hands of Great Britain than we did during the late rebellion, by the aid, direct or indirect, which she afforded to the Confederate insurgent States. For while, on the ocean, our merchant marine was destroyed by cruisers sent out from Great Britain, and our military marine was mainly occupied in watching and counterworking blockade runners fitted out in Great Baitain by official agents of the insurgents, on the land it was, in like manner, the munitions of war and the wealth drawn by the insurgents from Great Britain which enabled them to withstand, year after year, the arms of the United States.

In the midst of all this, remonstrances of the Government of the United States were prompt, earnest, and persistent. Our Minister in London appealed to the international amity of the British Government; he called on it to discharge its obligations of neutrality, he invoked the aid of the municipal law of Great Britain.

Ample proofs of the wrong committed were submitted to the Queen's Government. Indeed, these wrongs were open, notorious, perpetrated in the face of day, the subject of debate and of boast even in the House of Commons.

The Queen's Ministers excused themselves by alleged defects in the municipal law of the country. Learned counsel either advised that the wrongs committed did not constitute violations of the municipal law, or else gave sanction to artful devices of deceit to cover up such violations of law. And, strange to say, the Courts of England or of Scotland up to the very highest were occupied month after month with judicial niceties and technicalities of statute