that branch of the subject of taxation which concerns the power to sell lands. It is a matter for curious reflection, if not for more serious study, that not until now has the necessity been felt for a treatise of a general character upon the whole subject, and that during these two decades this branch of law has expanded in the direction of special subjects formerly but little noticed. Mr. Hilliard finds the subject of the sale of lands for taxes still possessing peculiar importance. An examination of his pages shows that the special topics of Exemption from Taxation, Place of Taxation, and Local Assessments for Improvement, have risen in importance since Mr. Blackwell wrote; and he has given them deserved prominence in his treatise, while assigning chapters to the questions respectively of taxes laid on Banks, on Railroads, and on Corporations generally.

The arrangement of the work into chapters, by topics is according to the usual custom of the author. With his method of analysis the profession are already well acquainted. The decisions are reproduced in their appropriate connection, and usually without any introduction of the author's personal views, though it is evident from his preface to the work before us that he has not failed to give some thought and reflection to the general tendency and progress of the judicial mind, and that possibly his own conclusions in reference to the subject might prove interesting.

Mr. Hilliard's works have a fair standing, though not generally ranking high. The present one will be well received by the bar, as it treats of a subject possessing both importance and interest, and exhibits researches into about 2500 reported cases; and Mr. Hilliard's citations are usually found correct transcripts from the text of the reports. So the book can scarcely fail to be of use to the profession, though he has not cited all the accessible cases.

The faults exhibited in the author's other writings are apparent here. A turgid style is observable, as in such sentences as these: "With reference to the form of taxation, it has greatly varied at different periods." (Pref.) "With regard to the statute law on the subject of taxation, it is as voluminous as the constitutional provisions are few and concise." (Pref.) "With regard to the direct taxing power of the legislature, its very broad extent is strongly expressed," etc. "With reference to the mode and rate of valuation in the taxing of railroads, railroad property should be assessed at its present, and not its prospective value." (p. 285.) Frequently a separate " section," distinct from all others, and regu

larly numbered, consists of a few words, or a mere note, without reference or citation of authority, as in these instances: "The mere vote of a tax is revocable.” (p. 15.) "The distinction between a tax and a debt has been often recognized.” (p. 16.) “The whole subject of the precise nature of a tax was fully decided in Massachusetts." (p. 18.) "Some English cases illustrate the nature and extent of this exemption." (p. 77.) "Railroad corporations are frequent claimants for exemption from taxation." (p. 258.) "In the conflict of authority some important distinctions are to be observed." (p. 351.) "Abatement sometimes turns upon points of time." (p. 436.) "Questions also arise as to party defendants." (p. 477.)

However pertinent may be these terse sentences, the taste of giving each of them the prominence of an entire "section" may well be questioned. Indeed, we do not see any use in Mr. Hilliard's plan of numbering separately the sections of each separate chapter. With such an arrangement his books are not and cannot be cited by sections, and the marking and numbering of the paragraphs as sections only tends to confuse the reader.

The purely factitious character of this numbering of sections is illustrated by the fact that, in frequent instances, the numbers are repeated on the same page, with the addition of letters, after the manner of codifiers and annotators who interpolate later matter into the new edition of an original text. Thus, on page 461, are sections 55 and 55a, 56 and 56a. But this is the first edition of the work, and we find throughout the volume, two sets of notes; the first designated by numbers, and the second by letters, the latter frequently containing a large amount of text derived from late decisions. It may be inferred from these circumstances that the author has made unusual haste to issue his book, "padding" it unduly, rather than re-arrange paragraphs already written, placed and numbered.

We are led to doubt the completeness of Mr. Hilliard's work, when we find no reference under the head of discriminative taxation of foreign corporations, to such important cases as Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 158, and Ducat v. Chicago, 10 do. 410; or find, in other cases meagre citations of authorities on disputed points of importance.

In one respect this volume is to be greatly commended, in that the author has made so many citations of the latest cases, as reported in the various law journals, to which he justly refers as "valuable

and entirely reliable law journals, which, with their other numerous merits, furnish the profession with decided cases often much in advance of the regular reports." (p. 269.) The profession will regret, however, that he does not tell them precisely where to find the case of Slack v. Tucker, credited broadly to the Albany Law Journal, at page 187, or the case of Jewell v. Steinburg, cited with like indefiniteness at p. 331. It is unsatisfactory that he should omit the name of the case reported at page 442, from 1 Cent. Law Jour. 262, and the volume of that journal from which he cites the case of Moore v. Chattanooga at p. 480. And with all due respect for the Central Law Journal we would have preferred to be told by Mr. Hilliard that, of the cases he cites from it, Tappan v. Merchant's Nat. Bank (p. 233) appears also in 19 Will. 490; Cannon v. New Orleans (p. 641) is also reported in 20 Wall. 577; and Chapman v. Templeton (p. 551) may be found also in 53 Mo. 463. Mr. Hilliard cites (at p. 359), Hitchcock v. Galveston, crediting it to Cent. Law Jour. 331, whereas it is found in the 2d vol. of that journal at page 331. He also credits (at p. 12) Grim v. Weisenberg Schl. Dist. to 37. Pa. St., instead of 57 Pa. St., 433. It may be said these are but typographical errors, which should be overlooked. But do not such errors testify of too great haste in the production of law books, and should we not expect to find a freedom from such errors in a veteran text writer?

The manner in which Mr. Hilliard frequently cites cases is calculated to lead to mistake and confusion on the part of students and practitioners. Abbreviations of long named cases are in vogue in these economical days. But what shall we say of such citations as Taylor v. Board (p. 422), Goodrich v. Compound (p. 354), Keesee v. Civil (p. 4), Fire v. County (p. 217), British v. Commissioners (p. 208), or Union v. Lincoln (p. 266)?

The Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. The Mayor, etc. of New York, 8 N. Y. 241, would be abbreviated by Mr. Wallace to "Insurance Co. v. New York," on the principle of dropping the first name in reporting, and retaining only the last. But Mr. Hilliard makes it "The Sun v. New York." (p. 217). Would he report the case of Doe v. Roe, under the style of John v. Richard? We can recognize the cases cited by the text writers only in the dress given them by the official reporter. In Mr. Hilliard's volume, many of them appear as masqueraders.

The index covers forty pages, not very closely printed, and will need many additions to make it complete and satisfactory.

The typographical and mechanical execution of the work are in the handsome style for which the publishers are famous. P.

BIGELOW ON ESTOPPEL. A Treatise on the Law of Estoppel. By MELVILLE M. BIGELOW. Second Edition. Boston: Little, Brown, & Company. 1876.

It is not our purpose to review at length a work already so well and favorably known to the profession as Bigelow's Estoppel. Considering the vast number of reports to which resort must be had for the law on this subject and that the profession for whose use it is intended, is widely scattered throughout forty states and several territories, with no access in most cases to full libraries, the plan on which this wok is constructed is judicious and greatly enhances its usefulness. It not only states principles, but it illustrates their applica tion. This illustration consists in brief statements of adjudged cases, with quotations from the opinions of the court. Many subjects in the law are so extensive as not to admit of being thus treated within a reasonable compass. But the subject of Estoppel is limited, and all that is essential in the law concerning it can be fully presented in a single volume, so as to give not only deductions from the cases or the principles which they establish, but also a brief outline of the leading adjudications and the lang age of the judges, on the material points. This is a feature, in a law work, of great value to the body of the profession who cannot, in ordinary practice, consult, to any great extent, the reports. Long quotations from opinions ought, in general, to be avoided, and given, if at all, in the notes and not in the text; and this plan has, in the main, been pursued by the author.

Every lawyer who has been long at the bar, and every judge who has had much experience will, we think, quite readily agree with the statement that some of the most difficult and perplexing legal problems arise upon the law of estoppel. On many points, and unfortunately those which arise most frequently, the law is, we regret to say, in anything but a satisfactory condition. Take for example, the case of a judgment. Of what matters is it conclusive? Does it conclude such matters only as were actually litigated or which the plaintiffs declaration or bill, or the pleadings as framed, brought into controversy, or does it extend to all matters which, though not actually litigated yet might have been? The authorities are not uniform, and the broad view which seems to have the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States (Aurora City v.

West, 7 Wall. 82; Beloit v. Morgan, Ib. 619) has not met with universal approval.

The cases are well presented by Mr. Bigelow and the state of the law is accurately mirrored.

This prin

Estoppel in pais has in modern times come to be a doctrine of extensive scope, and properly understood and carefully applied, it is a useful agency in the administration of justice by estopping parties to insist upon mere technical rights when these would, in the particular case, defeat the right and work inequity. ciple, from the nature of the grounds upon which it rests, pervades the entire law, and consequently its application is limited to no court and to no class of cases. It extends, with modifications of course, to corporations, public and private, as well as to natural persons. Indeed the doctrine is most salutary when applied to

corporations.

We have examined Mr. Bigelow's treatment of estoppel as applied to corporations, and while the subject is carefully presented, and the law correctly stated, it is not as fully gone into, considering its importance, as might have been advantageously done. Take for example the subject of estoppel with reference to insurance companies. The case of the [Union Mutual] Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 1871, is not cited. That case lays down a principle of great importance, and is inconsistent with many judgments to be found in the reports, including those of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. It asserts against the companies a principle of estoppel required by justice and fair dealing; and coming from the Supreme Court it will go far towards settling the law on the subject throughout the country.

But we may not enlarge. The author's industry and research have been such that it will be found that the instances are rare in which he has omitted an important case from a leading court directly bearing upon the topics he discusses.

The differences between this edition and the first, although but a few years have elapsed, show how rapidly the law of estoppel is changing and growing.

Upon the conclusiveness, or rather the want of conclusiveness of the record of judgments of sister states as to jurisdictional facts, about which there have been so many conflicting views in the state courts, we notice that the author cites the recent cases of the Supreme Court of the United States, which authoritatively settle the question. We refer of course to Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Knowles v. Gas Light Co., 19 Wall. 58.

J. F. D.