Roberts et al. v. Rogers. 4. The court erred in allowing the administrator credit for the payment of claims barred by the statute of limitations. 5. The court erred in allowing the administrator credit for the payment of claims not properly proven or probated as required by the statute. 6. The court erred in allowing the administrator credit for $235 paid to Michael Rogers, on a receipt for the collection of a note which was barred by the statute of limitations, and without proof of the collection of the money by the deceased. The material facts of the case upon which the decision of the court was made, are contained in the opinion. Glenn, for appellants. The appellee, in this case, went to Texas, and brought the property to this State before administration. On administration, the administrator presented an account in his own favor and Rogers for the sum of $2,826, which was allowed for $1,687. The estate was only worth $4,000. The first claim was for $2,826, leaving only a modest balance of $1,174 for the heirs. The conscience of the probate judge could not stand this; so he only allows the parties within a fraction of one half the estate, for bringing the remaining half within the jurisdiction of his court; a reward of merit, I suppose. This is the coolest piece of plunder and robbery which has met my observation in many a long and merry day. In the first place, the claim was illegally allowed. No one was present when it was allowed. None of the heirs were notified of it. There was no proof made of any such contract with them, nor was any proof made to show that these services were rendered. In the next place, the claim itself was illegal, and the court was not justified in allowing it. It was a contract to bind the estate, made after the death of decedent, and now sought to be enforced by the administrator for his own benefit. In the next place, the amount allowed was most enormous, so much so as to shock the mind when mentioned. For this reason the case must be reversed. On these points, first and second, I cite the court to the fol Roberts et al. v. Rogers. lowing authorities: Henderson v. Illsley, 11 S. & M. 9; Glenn v. Thistle's Ex., 1 Cushm. 53; Pinson v. Williams, Ib. 68. S. A. D. Steele, on the same side, Cited and commented on Satterwhite v. Littlefield, 13 S. & M. 302; 23 Miss. 64; Hutch. Code, 682, § 13. No counsel for appellee. Mr. Justice FISHER delivered the opinion of the court. This was a bill of review filed by the appellants in the probate court of Wayne county, to open the final settlement made by the appellee as administrator of the estate of Henry F. Rogers, deceased. Among other things, it is alleged, that the administrator paid sundry claims against the estate, which were barred by the statute of limitations. This allegation is met by the answer and proof introduced on the part of the administrator, showing that the intestate left the State about the year 1839 or 1840, and never returned to it again. The counsel of the appellants, however, contend, that while this might have operated to stop the running of the statute, if pleaded against the creditor, it cannot avail the administrator, as he voluntarily paid the debts. An administrator is only bound to interpose the statute of limitations to defeat a recovery, when under the facts which are known to exist, it can avail as a successful defence. In making voluntary payment he only assumes upon himself the responsibility of showing, in any future contest with the distributees, that the debts, though paid under no legal compulsion, were nevertheless such as could have been legally enforced against the estate. He is to be regarded as in no worse position than the creditor was at the time of payment. It is next alleged, that the administrator was allowed the sum of $1,688 for expenses incurred and services rendered in bringing the property of the estate, amounting to about $4,000, from the State of Texas to Wayne county, prior to the grant of letters of administration on the estate; and that such charge is not only unreasonable, but is wholly unsustained by any legal principle. Roberts et al. v. Rogers. We deem it unnecessary to make any comment upon the evidence introduced to sustain this charge, as it is clear that under no rule of law can it be sustained against the estate. While there was no evidence introduced with a view of showing the domicil of the intestate at the time of his death, yet it is manifest from all the proof that his domicil was not in Wayne county, but most probably in the State of Texas, where he died. Administration should therefore have been granted in that State, by the proper court, and the property administered there, and finally distributed, or otherwise disposed of according to the law of the intestate's domicil. The probate court of Wayne county certainly acquired no jurisdiction over the property until it was brought into that county; and having no jurisdiction over the property, or power to grant letters of administration, until it was brought within the limits of the county, the court could not for the same reason allow a claim for services rendered, or expenses incurred on account of the property, while it was subject to another jurisdiction. It may be true that in ordinary cases the probate court could and ought to allow a claim for taking care of property, or rendering essential services for its preservation, before letters of administration could be granted, or a collector could be appointed. But whatever the rule may be in such cases, it is clear that it can have no application to the present case. The probate court of Wayne county, if it acquired any jurisdiction at all over the subject-matter, did not acquire it from the fact of the domicil, or property of the deceased being situate in that county, or other cause mentioned in the statute, but from the act of the administrator himself. Until he brought the property into Wayne county, there was nothing to administer on or to give the court jurisdiction in appointing an administrator. It is not our intention to decide any thing as to the proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the probate court in this case. The appellee appears to have been appointed on his own motion, and to have made and returned an inventory, and undertaken to account for the property through the action of the probate court. He ought not, therefore, to be permitted to go out of the record, which he himself has caused to be made, to Kidd v. Manley et al. show the invalidity of his appointment. The record not showing his appointment void, it will be treated as conclusive, so far as he is concerned, and estop him from denying or controverting the jurisdiction of the court. The item of $1,688 ought to be disallowed. If, as is contended, the administrator made a contract with the heirs before his appointment to bring the property from Texas, he must rely on his contract for compensation, and enforce it in the court having jurisdiction of such matters. It is not a claim either against the deceased, or growing out of the administration of the property, and cannot, therefore, be entertained by the probate court. Decree reversed, and cause remanded. THOMAS KIDD vs. THOMAS J. MANLEY et al. The act of congress of 27th March, 1804, provides that all records and exemplifications of office books, kept in any public office of a State, not appertaining to a court, shall be proved by the attestation of the keeper of said records or books, and his seal of office, if there be one, together with the certificate of the presiding justice of the court of the county or district in which the office may be kept, or of the governor, secretary of State, chancellor, or keeper of the great seal, that the attestation is in due form and by the proper officer, &c. Held, that the certificate of the clerk of another court as to the official character of the public register who certifies to the correctness of the copy of the deed of gift, and that it is a true and perfect transcript of the original, followed by certificates of the official character of that clerk, is not such an authentication of the deed as the law requires, to admit it as evidence. It is a cardinal rule of pleading in equity, that a party cannot be permitted at the hearing to show a title different from that set up in his bill; nor can proof be offered or relief granted upon facts not stated in the bill. Ox appeal from the superior court of chancery; Hon. Charles Scott, chancellor. The facts of the case are contained in the opinion of the court. Kidd v. Manley et al. G. S. Yerger, for appellant. It is clear that the deed is proved in accordance with the law of North Carolina. The proof of deeds in that State, is taken before the court, and the proof entered on the minutes. The indorsement on the deed, and the transcript filed, clearly prove this deed was proved as required by the law of North Carolina. 1 Rev. Stat. of N. C. 230, § 17, 18, 19, 22; Burgess v. Wilson, 2 Dev. 306; Horben v. Hughes, 1 Hawks, 48. In Tennessee, where the same law prevails, such proof held good. Love v. Shields, 3 Yerg. 406. An official certificate is always prima facie evidence, where the matter certified to is within the official duty of the officer. Gum v. James, 6 Mo. R.; Newman v. Doe, 4 How. 522. The certificate of the record, under the act of congress, is not only good, but is more specific than necessary. The certificate states it is a perfect copy from the minutes and the records, &c. In the case of Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408, 410, such certificate is held sufficient. The clerk's certificate is not under seal of court, but it states there is none. The act of congress only requires it to be under seal of court, where there is a seal. Laws U. States, 122. If the fact appear in the certificate of the judge, or of the clerk of the court, that there is no seal of court, his own seal is sufficient. Kerlland v. Smith, 2 Martin, N. C. 497; Allston v. Taylor, 1 Hayw. 395; Gray v. Brown, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 352. The certificate of the judge is also in due form, having all in it that the act of congress requires. Lee v. Gause, 2 Iredell, 440. It is manifest, then, that the deed is proved clearly. Upon the death of Robert Willis, his children were entitled, under this deed, as tenants in common. The defendants rely on the statute of limitations. There is no proof in the case that D. Willis ever had the slaves in his possession, claiming and holding them adversely to complainant. Potter, for appellee. There is no proof that the deed was ever duly proven and ad |