Buckner and Stanton v. Calcote. chinery or contrivance the fraudulent transactions may have been effected, whether by a decree in equity or judgment at law, or otherwise. The discharges of defendants, then, having been obtained by fraud, are absolutely void, and they can claim no benefit or protection under the same from their liabilities. V. The claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. Courts of equity are not within the statute of limitations; but it has been invariably held that they will act in analogy and in obedience to those statutes, and apply them to the equitable remedies where the remedy at law in similar cases would be barred. Angell, Lim. ch. 3, § 1, p. 24. But this general rule has been qualified by general excep tions. 1. The rule is not applicable to cases of direct trusts. 2. It will not be applied, where a fraud has been perpetrated, but from the discovery of the fraud. As courts of equity are not embraced by the statute, and only apply it in analogy to the remedy at law, they never permit it to be applied, when to do so would be inconsistent with the fixed and uniform principle upon which the foundations of equity jurisprudence are based, namely, that a party shall never avail himself of any advantage acquired by his own fraud, and which it would, therefore, be against conscience that he should insist upon. Angell on Lim. ch. 3, § 6, p. 28, 2d ed. In Livermore v. Johnson, in this court, Chief Justice Smith says: "It has long been the settled rule in England, that when a party has been kept in ignorance of his rights by the fraud of the person sought to be charged, the statute shall not begin to run until after the fraud has been discovered. The reason assigned why the statute bar will not be applied in a court of equity in a case of that character, is, that it would be a violation of the principles of natural justice to permit a party to avail himself of lapse of time as a bar to the suit, who has by fraud kept concealed the rights of the complainant, and has thereby delayed him in the assertion of those rights. Hoveden v. Lord Annesly, 2 Sch. & Lef. R. 634. Such is, without doubt, the doctrine of courts of equity in this coun Buckner and Stanton v. Calcote. try. Story, Eq. 738; Lewin on Trust. 617; Carter v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 522. And such, unquestionably, is the law in this country. Angell on Lim. (and the cases cited), p. 188." In Hoveden v. Lord Annesly, 2 Sch. & Lef. 634, Lord Redesdale, in his very able and elaborate judgment, says: "Fraud is a secret thing, and may remain undiscovered. During such time the statute of limitations should not operate, because, until discovery, the title to avoid it does not completely arise." Again, in the same case, p. 634, " A court of equity is well warranted in avoiding the transaction, notwithstanding the statute of limitations, for pending the concealment of the fraud, the statute of limitations ought not in conscience to run, the conscience of the party being so affected that he ought not to be allowed to avail himself of the length of time; but after the discovery of the fact imputed as fraud, the party has a right to avail himself of the statute." Judge Story says: "Courts of equity not only act in obedience and analogy to the statute of limitations in proper cases, but they also interpose in many cases to prevent the bar of the statutes, where it would be inequitable and unjust. Thus, for example, if a party has perpetrated a fraud which has not been discovered until the statutable bar may apply to it at law, courts of equity will interpose and remove the bar out of the way of the injured party. A fortiori, they will not allow such a bar to prevail, by mere analogy, to suits in equity, where it would be in furtherance of a manifest injustice." 2 St. Eq., § 1521. A like rule is laid down in Angell on Limitations, ch. 3, § 6, p. 28. See, also, on the distinction between the rule in courts of law and equity on this subject, Angell on Lim. p. 188, ch. 18, § 1. In New York, this question has been carefully examined in the case of Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. R. 45. In the opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Spencer, it is said: "There is a marked and manifest distinction between a plea of the statutes of limitations in a court of law and a court of equity." In Connecticut, also, this doctrine has been carefully and elaborately considered, and a like result was reached by the court. Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. R. 435. Buckner and Stanton v. Calcote. The same rule is held on this subject in Virginia. 3 Leigh R. 732, 735, 738. So, also, in North Carolina, in Thompson v. Blair, 3 Murph. 593. The same doctrine is established in Tennessee. 6 Yerg. 90. In Kentucky, it is well settled, that in cases of fraud, the statute only begins to run from the discovery of the fraud. 3 J. J. Marsh. 15; 1 Ib. 40, 41; 3 Mon. 40; 4 J. J. Marsh. 77. And in Baker v. Dobyns, 4 Dana, 226, where a bill was filed to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, and it did not appear when the fraud was discovered, it was held, nevertheless, that the statute was not a bar. In Indiana, also, it is held, that in cases of fraud the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. 1 Blackf. R. 77. In Georgia, cases of fraud form an implied exception to the statute of limitations, both at law and equity. 13 Geo. R. 371; 8 Ib. 511. In Missouri, any concealment which prevents a creditor from bringing a suit, bars the statute of limitations. 9 Mis. 402. In Pennsylvania, it was held, that where there is fraud, the statute does not run until the discovery of the fraud, nor necessarily from that time, when the party is ignorant that the facts constitute a fraud. Ferris v. Henderson, 12 Penn. (2 Jones), 49, 53, 54; 8 Watts, 12; 1 Ib. 401; 4 Yeates, 109. In South Carolina, too, it is held that the statute of limitations, in cases of fraud, only runs from the discovery of the fraud. 1 McCord, Ch. 314; 4 Dess. 480; 3 Ib. 223. The same doctrine is laid down in 2 Sum. R. 491, 551, 563; 1 Wood. & Minot, 111, 112; 3 Story, R. 740. In the case of Michod et al. v. Girod et al., 4 How. (S. C.) 561, the supreme court of the United States says: "There is no rule in equity which excludes the consideration of circumstances, and in a case of actual fraud, we believe no case can be found in which a court of equity has refused to give relief within the lifetime of either of the parties upon whom the fraud is proved, or within thirty years after it has been discovered, Buckner and Stanton v. Calcote. or become known to the party whose rights are affected by it." In the case of Prevost v. Graty, 6 Wheat. 497, 498, the supreme court of the United States uses equally forcible language: "The absence of the complainant from the State, and the late discovery of the fraud, fully account for the delay and apparent laches in prosecuting his claim." Hallet et al. v. Collins, 10 How. (S. C.) R. 174, 187. Numerous other cases might be cited, but they would all resolve themselves, at last, into that universal principle of equity, that a party shall not derive any benefit in that court from his own wrong, and where by his own fraudulent concealments or misrepresentations he has induced a party to delay the assertion of his rights, a court of equity, whenever it otherwise obtains jurisdiction of the case, will not give him the benefit of a delay occasioned by his own fraudulent misrepresentations and concealments. See also, on this subject, 2 Story, Eq. § 1522; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 5, p. 266 et seq.; Mitford, Eq. by Jeremy, 237; 6 Ves. 73. In no case of exclusive chancery jurisdiction, (and we have shown this to be such,) was it ever pretended that the statute of limitations would apply in cases of fraud, at least it would not run until from the period of the discovery of the fraud. And even in those cases in which it has been held that the statute applies to a court of equity, as well as to a court of law, in a case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is expressly held that fraud is an exception to the statute. In Breckenridge v. Churchill, 3 J. J. Mar. 15, the court says: "Where chancery and common law courts have concurrent jurisdiction, time is, generally, as inexorable a bar in chancery as at law. Fraud is an exception; for, limitation to a bill for fraud will not commence till the discovery of fraud." The same doctrine is held in South Carolina. 1 McCord, Ch. 314. In Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason, 143, Mr. Justice Story reviews the decisions at length, and held that fraud would avoid the statute both at law and in equity. Buckner and Stanton v. Calcote. Judge Story, also, at p. 152, 153, 155, reviews the case of Troup v. Smith, 20 J. R. 34, and says the ground of that decis ion at law was, that the statute did not apply to courts of equity, and in which the party might have been relieved. For, as Chancellor Kent has well said, length of time is no bar to a fraud in equity. Marks v. Pell, 1 J. Ch. R. 594. And in Blair v. Bromley, 2 Ph. Ch. 354, 6 Har. Dig. 611, 612, in a suit against a partner who had no knowledge whatever of the transaction, and who derived no benefit from the fraud of his partner, in a matter within the scope of the partnership, and the partner who committed the fraud had become bankrupt, and the partnership had also been dissolved more than six years, it was, nevertheless, held that the statute of limitations would only run from the discovery of the fraud. But it is said the original cause of action was in existence before the alleged fraud was committed, and therefore the statute ought to run, notwithstanding the subsequent fraud and concealment, and a case in 4 Cush. R. 208, is relied on. That was an action at law, and the decision was made upon the statute, and is in no sense an authority for the position contended for, when applied to a court of equity, in which, as all the cases show, the defendant is not allowed the benefit of the statute, when the delay in the assertion of the plaintiff's rights was occasioned by the fraudulent misrepresentations and concealments of the party himself. For, in such cases it would be against conscience to give the defendant the benefit of a delay occasioned by his own frauds. But, in the present case, so far as the rights of the complainant are derived from Oakey, it is a complete answer, to say that Oakey's right of action only accrued to him by the sale in bankruptcy; so that there was no time in which he could have sued on his claim, before the frauds and concealments of the defendants were committed. The discharges in bankruptcy having been obtained by fraud, are absolute nullities; they afford no protection to the defendants, they have no rights under such a discharge, nor can they claim any benefit from it, for, as was well said by Roberts, in |