either party, if there is any discrimination, but notice must be given before such withdrawal.

Article 8, the vital and now the most notorious part of the treaty, states that the parties having not only desired in entering into this convention to accomplish "a particular object," but also "to establish a general principle," by treaty stipulation they agreed to extend their protection to any other communication by canal or railway across the isthmus which is now proposed whether at "Tehauntepec or Panama." In granting, however, their joint protection it is always understood that the parties, constructing or owning the said canal or railroad, shall impose no other charges or conditions of traffic than the said governments shall approve as just and equitable; and that the same canals or railroads being open to the citizens and subjects of the United States and Great Britain on equal terms shall also be open on like terms to the subjects of any other state willing to grant the same protection.

There does not seem to be much obscurity in the terms of this treaty, but difficulty began almost at the beginning in construing it. The principal difficulty arose over the question: whether the condition that neither party was to exercise any sovereignty or control over any part of Central America was retroactive or only prospective? Great Britain claimed that it related to subsequent acquisitions of colonial rights, while our nation claimed that England should at once abandon all rights that she then claimed in Nicaragua. This contention went on until our terrible civil war of 1861 began. We then had other questions engaging us. England in the contentious stage seemed more anxious than we for the abrogation of the treaty. It was plain that America did not have the funds for the canal at that time; that England would not furnish the capital; and

that England not being anxious to yield all colonial control in Central America, would as soon abandon the treaty. In the early days America was determined not to give up the treaty, but to hold England to the contract. We cared not for colonies, but did care to keep England from isthmian ownership, and this was the corner stone of the original compact.

It is quite evident in looking backward that we had an inordinate desire to have a canal, but had not the courage or ability to attempt so great a task. We, like all predecessors on the isthmus, could plan, survey and speculate, and yet baffle at doing the work. It was an immense task, and, by many strong men, deemed wholly impossible. Up to the time of our civil war we had neither the money nor the necessary machinery for completing such a work. Even the Panama canal has taken enormous and almost fabulous sums of money and the combined labors of both France and the United States. One failed and the other coming on the scene fresh and vigorous has by a desperate struggle finally gained the canal. What would have been the result from 1850 to 1880 had our nation undertaken to build the Nicaragua canal? It could have resulted in nothing but failure! But the Clayton treaty was a sufficient bone of contention during one half a century to keep American and English diplomats "in business" while matters were brewing to bring about funds and appliances to construct a canal somewhere on the isthmus. Instead of America losing by the treaty she gained allshe kept England from extensive colonizing in Central America. The Clayton treaty gave us far greater use than abuse. It was not given up by us until the proper time came, and this happened in 1901.

While we were urging England to observe the treaty she was as vigorously calling for arbitration

which we in every instance declined. These diplomatic sparrings for advantageous position in the Central American problem is all, most clearly, shown in official letters of the following Secretaries of State: Marcy in 1853, Buchanan in 1854, Cass in 1858, Seward in 1866, Fish in 1872, Evarts in 1880, Blaine in 1881, Frelinghuysen in 1882, 1883 and 1884. These are to be found at length in Wharton's International Law, vol. 2, at page 184.

If the treaty was even violated by England, or conditions had so changed that there was no further consideration for it, still this could only be a reason why it should be changed or abrogated. It does not seem that America was ever willing to take its chance and abrogate the treaty entirely. Both nations seem to have found consolation and benefit in it, and would not absolutely abandon it. It was not a failure in the beginning, for it was secured by America's very keen and broad lawyer and statesman-John M. Clayton. Very few of that day were his equal. The fact that we held fast to the treaty for 50 years is proof of this statesman's ability. Why continue to battle over this old treaty since we surely got our whole desire in 1901 by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty? If we did not; why not?

A canal was really begun by Americans at Nicaragua under a charter granted by Congress in 1889. The Maritime Canal Company was organized with Hiram Hitchcock of New York, president; the total capital was $250,000,000. Work was begun at Greytown, June 8, 1890, but the stringency of 1893 caused the failure of the construction company. And the work still remaining in abeyance the franchise from Nicaragua expired in 1899. Thus the Nicaragua canal so far as actual construction work is concerned came to its end. But the battle went on in Congress most vig

orously between Panama and Nicaragua with Senator Morgan as the persistent, inveterate champion of the Nicaragua route. Bunau-Varilla and the French advocates of Panama most ingeniously and successfully gained the victory for Panama. This whole contest is clearly and graphically described in Bunau-Varilla's great book on Panama, bearing the date of 1913. This work is comprehensive and a storehouse of canal history.

CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL GRANT AND THE CANAL.

Ulysses S. Grant was the most successful of American generals, hence the greatest American general; for in war nothing counts but success; the struggle from "start to finish" is always for victory.

What had General Grant to do with Panama? In 1852 he sailed from New York with his regiment for California and marched across Panama almost on the line of the present canal. Some of the troops being attacked by cholera they were left behind in charge of Lieutenant Grant. He thus had the opportunity to fully realize the possibilities of an isthmian canal. He was not brought into prominent official relations with the nation until the Civil War of 1861.

His great generalship brought him to the Presidency in 1868, and again in 1872. While President in 1869 he gave attention to the subject of a canal "by America under American control." He held that no European government should hold such a work; and he appointed an Inter-oceanic Canal Commission, composed of army and navy officials. This commission directed four different surveys to be made: First, at Atrato on the Isthmus of Darian; second, at the Isthmus of Tehauntepec; third, at Nicaragua; fourth, at Panama from the mouth of Chagres river to Panama City. This route was recommended by the surveying party for a lock canal but not for a sea-level canal, on account of the floods in the Chagres river.

The Canal Commission went on gathering data until 1876 when it reported to President Grant in favor of