and became unable to give protection the treaty would be avoided by this change of circumstance. A change of circumstance is not a rule that always revokes a treaty; but the most that can be said is that some changes in circumstances may abrogate a treaty.

It has been argued that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty is annulled because we secured title to the canal zone after the making of the treaty. But two nations were bound by that treaty-England and America. England did not abrogate it because we became owner of the canal lands. And America did not and cannot because in the very grant, that some now claim was a ground for revoking the treaty, we, the only one claiming that the treaty has ceased to operate through a "change of circumstance," in Article 18 of the Panama treaty, expressly recognized and ratified the very HayPauncefote treaty. We expressly agreed to operate the canal under the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

It is a very lame argument, even to suggest, that a treaty is not binding on us because we have most positively and solemnly reaffirmed it in a subsequent compact. How can the grant from Panama revoke the treaty when we in this grant declare that we will observe it?

A nation may in one treaty be grantee and in another it may be grantor; and in diplomacy it must be consistent. If it contends for a restricted grant as against the grantee in one case it cannot claim that a grantee's rights are to be enlarged in another instance. A nation will not be permitted to play "fast and loose" in matters of diplomacy, for international rules must be certain, invariable and consistent.

We are grantor in the English treaty and grantee under Panama. Shall we construe both in favor of the grantor?

But here is where all parties seem to get astray; they construe a treaty governing a public utility, by the rules which control ordinary commercial relations between nations. These are based on reciprocal dealings between the contracting nations. We did not build the Panama Canal because other nations build canals; and our treaties say nothing about reciprocation with any other canal or with other rates of charge. Transportation is not governed by tariff rules or rules governing barter and trade.

ECONOMIC VIEWS.

The labor and expense of taking coastwise and foreign ships through the canal are equal; the same for American or English ships. The kind of ship does not affect the labor or service, or the compensation. When a ship arrives at the canal, or a wagon at a toll gate, it is not a question where it hails from; the charge should be based on the service rendered not upon who is the customer.

A railroad company fixes its rate per head and not upon the color or occupation of the passenger, or the nationality of the patron. It is not usual to meddle with transit rates in a commercial treaty; if so, it is in a separate proviso. A treaty might require equal treatment, but if it expressly required discrimination or unequal treatment it would be a wonder!

The canal is not a class enterprise; its purpose is to pick up a ship in one ocean and launch it into the other. Would it not be strange to donate this service to one customer and not to another?

Many publicists hold that the equality, prescribed by the treaties, means equality in the conditions of treatment of all ships, being served by the canal, without regard to flag, origin or destination. The

words origin and destination illustrate the case most clearly. The work performed, the services rendered by the canal should conclusively determine the amount of tolls in every case. In feudal days discriminations were favored, but under modern theories of correct government discriminations are odious.

The thirteen colonies gained their territory and sovereignty by combat and the treaty of 1783. Florida, Louisiana, and the Panama lands and rights were acquired by treaties. The canal property now represents the sum of $400,000,000. These are not the kind of treaties that are revoked by a mere breach of conditions or by "change of circumstances" since the making of the treaty. Large vested and continuing interests in land are not to be taken from a nation only with its consent or by battle. Even forfeitures between individuals are not favored in the law. It is sheer folly to assert that a nation can be divested of its territory by mere legal construction of the terms of a treaty; still the holding nation should in honor observe and keep its promises. A nation does not have unlimited sovereignty, while subject to binding charges and servitudes, for the obligations may be enforced by and through the world's vis major.

Whatever may be gained, by treaty or by war, may be lost by the same process.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SPOONER LAW.

The Spooner Law was approved June 28, 1902, after we had come to realize that we could secure the French rights in Panama for $40,000,000. The President was authorized to buy these rights, also to secure the needed lands by a purchase from the Republic of Colombia. He attempted to buy from the latter but wholly failed. The opportunity came to purchase the same lands and right of way from Panama, claiming to be the successor to Colombia.

Technically the statute required the purchase from Colombia and not from Panama; but the President and in fact the country demanded the Panama canal and it should be secured, if at all, legally possible. The President made a treaty with Panama and purchased the canal zone from her, because of Colombia's continued refusal to make the grant. The President justified his course (which was not literally within the words of the Spooner act) by claiming that he was locating the canal on the line required by the law, and on the line of the French unfinished canal. The French rights located the canal and it could be nowhere else under that law. The only question was as to the technical name of the grantor; it was to be Colombia. The President moved around this by saying as Panama had seceded from Colombia he could not buy from the latter but, if buy at all, it must be from the successor.

There was a stronger ground than this; and it was the real course, in fact, that was pursued. The treatymaking power of our nation-the President and Senate

-did make a treaty with Panama by which the right to the canal zone was secured. The statute directed the President to buy the route from Colombia. But he did what he had the constitutional right to do independent of the statute-buy it by treaty from Panama if she owned it. Congress could not deprive him of his right of making the treaty, but might in any such case refuse to furnish the funds.

The canal right was contracted for by treaty and all was constitutional up to this point. The only question was, did the President have the authority to use $10,000,000 to pay to Panama when the order was to pay it to Colombia? All of the law-making body, except the House, consented to the purchase from Panama, by making the treaty. If money unlawfully was used to buy lawful property for the nation under great necessity and all was afterward abundantly recognized by Congress the whole deal so far as our national affairs are concerned has been affirmed and ratified. It has become, in a domestic sense, a closed incident and now only of historic interest. See Wilson vs. Shaw 204 U. S. Rep.

The important question now before us is, are we bound legally and morally to use the canal for the purposes for which it was acquired, and are we bound to abide by all of the provisions of the two treaties There ought to be but one answer to this question.

AN IMPORTANT DECISION.

The late case of Wilson v. Shaw before the United States Supreme Court, in 1906, being brought to test the right of the United States to build the canal and also to question the title acquired from Panama, is a case of momentous importance, and could not be omitted from a book giving a view to date of the canal controversy.