C desires to enforce the subsequent performance, that the defendant, after the decision and award of damages for the past, will not perform his part of the contract in future. It follows that a subsequent breach by reason of a continued absence can be the subject of another claim, to which the first order is no bar. This has been expressly so decided in reference to the Master and Servant Act, 1867, by the Court of Queen's Bench, in the case of Cutler v. Hague (b). In that case a workman had agreed to serve his employer in Sheffield for five years at piece work, at the usual prices allowed by those in the same trade for similar work. At the end of two years he gave notice, in concert with his trade union, that the prices of work would, from a certain day, be increased twenty per cent., the same as given in Birmingham, and in case of non-compliance he should suspend himself from service. He accordingly ceased to work, and absented himself. He was summoned, and the police magistrate assessed the damages sustained between the absenting and the issuing of the summons at 117. 8s., and ordered the workman to pay that sum and costs. The amount was paid after an order for imprisonment had been drawn up; but the workman did not return to his work, and he was again summoned, when the magistrates ordered him to fulfil the contract, and to enter into his own recognizance and to find two sureties for its fulfilment, and in default of finding security, to be committed to prison for three months, or until he found security. This order was not complied with, and the defendant went to prison. On his liberation he continued to absent himself. The Court of Queen's Bench held, affirming the opinion of the police magistrate, that neither of the above orders was a bar to a third order for damages for a subsequent breach, by reason of the continued absence (c). (b) 43 L. J., M. C. 124. (c) Cutler v. Hague was a case taken up by the union, and the fact that the law proved too strong for the workman, was the cause of great dissatisfaction and strong ex Although that case was decided under the former and now repealed statute, it appears to be applicable to the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, subject to this observation, that now there can be no imprisonment for neglecting to obey an order for performance, as an undertaking to perform must be the voluntary act of the defendant. Effect of Order on Proceedings in other Courts.]—On general principles it is clear that when proceedings are instituted under this act, and a decision arrived at, those proceedings will be a bar to any action or suit whether in the superior courts or in the county courts. So, also, if any disputes have been referred under the pressions on the part of officers of the union previous to the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench upholding the view I had taken. The facts, as fairly admitted by the secretary of the union in giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Labour Laws, were, that the man was a clever workman, and his employers were very anxious to secure his services for a length of time; that prices in the trade were not raised at Sheffield, and that no evidence was given before the magistrate of a rise elsewhere, and that the loss to the employers was undoubtedly a serious one, and that several other persons would be kept out of work if the defendant's work were not done, and that the magistrate fully investigated the question of actual damage. The secretary stated that the workman was a man of "a very dogged determination," and impressed with the conviction that he was right and the magistrate wrong. (First Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Laws Minutes of Evidence.) I was not aware at the time I gave evidence before the Commission of the way in which the decision of myself and other magistrates (for I did not deal with the case on the intermediate hearing) had been spoken of, or I should have entered fully into the matter. The facts above admitted show, I apprehend, that when the secretary of the "Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress" cited this case of Cutler v. Hague, as an illustration "of the injustice and excessive cruelty" of the law, and as "where not only had the man to suffer imprisonment for three months for a morally justifiable act, but he has also had to suffer two subsequent prosecutions for the same offence, to the eternal disgrace of English law" (see Appendix, Part IV., to Second Report of the Labour Law Commission), he wrote (although I fully believe in perfect sincerity) in entire misconception of law and fact. 5 Geo. 4, c. 96, or under "any act extending or amending the same," that reference will be a bar to proceedings under "The Employers and Workmen Act, 1875." It has been expressly held that if a servant has already taken proceedings in the county court for recovery of his wages, or for damages by reason of his discharge, and a judgment has been given against him, he cannot go before the magistrates (d). § 9. Apprentices. The procedure with regard to apprentices and their masters remains for a concise notice. The jurisdiction given by the Employers and Workmen Act in disputes between an apprentice and his master is confined to "an apprentice to the business of a workman, as defined by this act (e), upon whose binding either no premium is paid, or the premium (if any) paid does not exceed twenty-five pounds, and to an apprentice (d) Routledge v. Hislop, 29 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) M. C. 90. In that case a female servant in husbandry, hired for a quarter of a year for 5l., on being discharged before the end of the quarter, immediately sued her master in the county court for 67. 68. 6d. damages for discharging her before the determination of the contract. A verdict was given for the defendant, and the servant, after the expiration of the quarter, summoned the master before the magistrates for the full wages, alleging in the summons that she had been discharged without just cause and that she was always ready to complete the service, and that the defendant refused to pay her the wages justly due for the time she was hired, amounting to the sum of 51. The magistrates decided in favour of the complainant; but, upon a case stated, the Court of Queen's Bench held the judgment in the county court to be a bar to the proceedings before the magistrates, on the ground that the matter for the consideration of the justices was, in truth, the same identical matter which had been decided by the judge of the county court, namely, whether the discharge was wrongful and without cause. (e) What is the meaning of “the business of a workman as defined by this act?" See the definition, ante, pp. 110, 111 Probably what is meant is the business of an employer of a workman within the meaning of the act, and if this effect is given to the words, some complicated questions may be avoided. bound under the provisions of the acts relating to the relief of the poor" (f). Disputes between such an apprentice and his master, arising out of or incidental to their relation as such, may be heard and determined by a court of summary jurisdiction (g), the court having the same powers as if the dispute were between an employer and a workman; and also the powers to make an order directing the apprentice to perform his duties, and also power when it rescinds the indentures to order the whole or part of the premium to be repaid (h). It seems to be clear, notwithstanding the same powers (f) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90, s. 12. The act does not extend to apprentices to the sea service, nor does it take away or abridge any local or special jurisdiction touching apprentices. Id. s. 13. It would be out of character with a concise sketch of the procedure of the courts of summary jurisdiction to attempt to present a view of the rights of parties under deeds of apprenticeship. The repeal of nearly all the statute law relating to ordinary apprentices (see post, pp. 200—205), coupled with the new jurisdiction, will probably give rise to several questions. The only statutes apparently now in force specially relating to other than parish apprentices are 54 Geo. 3, c. 96, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 7. The only part of the former act of present moment is sect. 3, which enacts that "any justice or justices of the peace may hear and determine any complaints that may arise respecting any apprenticeships in like manner as if they had been made under the act hereby in part repealed" (viz. 5 Eliz. c. 4, now wholly repealed). The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 7 (included in the schedule to the Master and Servant Act, 1867 but expressly preserved, see post, p. 203), merely recites 20 Geo. 2, c. 19; 33 Geo. 3, c. 55; 4 Geo. 4, c. 29 (all repealed); and 32 Geo. 3, c. 57, relating to parish apprentices, and that doubts had been entertained whether those acts applied where no money was paid on the binding of the apprentice, and enacts that those recited acts shall so apply. As to apprentices to bankrupts, see 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, post, APPENDIX. The effect at common law of instruments of apprenticeship cannot be discussed here. As to the jurisdiction over parish apprentices, some work on the poor laws, where the numerous statutes and cases are collected, must be consulted. For a general view, historical and legal, of apprenticeships and local privileges, see an excellent and interesting article in the " Penny Cyclopædia." (g) Id. s. 5. (h) Id. s. 6. See, in the Chancellor's rules, forms of order on apprentice to perform duties, and of order rescinding contract of apprenticeship, post, p. 187. are given as in the case of a workman, that an apprentice's consent to an order for performance and security is not to be asked for or accepted, an order directing performance of duties being with propriety substituted. It may be also confidently stated in conformity with the effect of previous provisions giving summary jurisdiction in the case of apprentices, that orders for wages or damages may be made after the termination of the apprenticeship in respect of breaches committed during the term (i). Enforcement of Order for Performance of Duties.]— "Where an order is made directing an apprentice to perform his duties under the apprenticeship the court may, from time to time, if satisfied after the expiration of not less than one month from the date of the order that the apprentice has failed to comply therewith, order him to be imprisoned for a period not exceeding fourteen days” (k). The words "from time to time" indicate a power to make an unlimited number of orders of imprisonment after one order for performance. Although the Act and Rules and Forms are silent on the subject, it seems on general principles that the apprentice should be summoned and heard upon any application for an order of imprisonment (1). (i) See The Queen v. Proud, Law Rep., 1 C. C. R. 71; 36 L. J., M. C. 62. In that case perjury was alleged to have been committed on the hearing of a claim made for wages on an apprenticeship indenture after the termination of the apprenticeship. An objection was taken that magistrates' jurisdiction under 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 2, applied to the Act of 1867, with respect to differences and complaints between masters and apprentices, was gone when that relation ceased to exist, and that, therefore, he had no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon this complaint. The objection was overruled. Martin, B., observed to counsel during the argument: "Supposing the sum of 5s. to be due for wages for the last week of the service, according to your contention the apprentice cannot go to the justice, but must sue in the county court. The act could not have intended that." (k) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90, s. 6. See the Lord Chancellor's rules, for form of order of committal of apprentice, Form No. 13. (1) See ante, p. 145, note (u), and the next page, as to procedure against a person covenanting in the indenture. |