offence. (Willes, J., Fisher v. Jones, 13 C. B. Rep., N. S. 501; 32 L. J., M. C. 177.)

First, the persons to whom the statute applies.] This question depends chiefly on sect. 19. The act "is to be taken as applicable to those persons only who strictly contract as labourers, that is, to such as enter into a contract to employ their personal services and to receive payment for that service in wages." (Parke, B., in Riley v. Warden, 2 Exch. Rep. 59; 18 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 120.) In that case it was held that a person contracting to make a cutting on a projected line of railway, at a certain sum per cubic yard, and employing others with whom he himself worked in making the cutting, was not within the act; so a person agreeing to load ironstone at so much per ton, and employing men to do the work under him and from time to time working personally, but not having stipulated for his own personal labour, was held not to be within the act. (Sharman v. Sanders, 13 C. B. Rep. 166; 20 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. P. 99.)

This was followed by the case of a collier (in Staffordshire called a charter master or butty collier) employed by a colliery or mine owner to get coal or ironstone from a mine, and to be paid at a certain rate per ton on the coal got by him, he having liberty to employ, and almost necessarily employing others under him. In most cases a charter master or butty collier has partners (hence the term "butty") who work with him, although they may or may not be parties to the agreement or undertaking entered into with the colliery proprietor or mine owner.

In the first case of this kind before the courts, it appeared that the collier was bound to give his personal services in the performance of the work, and Patteson, J., held that he was within the Truck Act. (Weaver v. Floyd, 21 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 151.)

In the subsequent case of Bowers v. Lovekin (6 E. & B. 584; 25 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 371), the agreement was made verbally by the colliery agent with the butty colliers to get ironstone at so much a square yard. No particular quantity was stipulated to be gotten in any specified time. The butty colliers employed a number of men under them. They were themselves treated as working men, by having their wages bill rendered weekly, by being served with notice of the regulations of the colliery in respect to workmen's rules, and one of them having been dismissed for absence and then taken on again as any other workman, and they engaged to bestow their personal labour in the work. The Court of Queen's Bench (Lord Campbell, C. J., and Coleridge, Erle, and Crompton, JJ.) were of opinion that the butty colliers were "artificers" within the Truck Act, upon the ground that personal labour was required of them. Lord Campbell also inclined to think that the statute included cases where personal labour was not stipulated for; and Erle, J., expressed a stronger opinion to that effect, namely, that the act was not confined to cases where the workman engaged to give his personal services, but that it applied to contracts for work by the piece when it was consistent with the contract that the party should work personally, and he has actually done so. That case

was followed by Ingram v. Barnes (7 E. & B. 115; 26 L. J., Q. B. 82), now the leading authority on the subject, where it was held by the majority of the Court of Queen's Bench (Lord Campbell, C. J., and Coleridge and Wightman, JJ.; Erle, J., dissenting) and affirmed on appeal (7 E. & B. 132; 26 L. J., Q. B. 319), that a labouring man who entered into a written contract with a railway contractor to make as many bricks as the contractor required, taking the clay and finding all labour in preparing it, the railway contractor finding all materials and paying so much a thousand for the bricks when finished, was not within the Truck Act, on the ground that there was no contract to do the work personally. Erle, J., in the court below, adhered to his opinion in Bowers v. Lovekin, that a contract is within the act, although the party contracting has the option of doing the work by himself or others, if he actually works himself, so as to make the performance as well as the contract within the act. In the court of appeal, during the argument some of the judges referred to the Master and Servant Act, and put the question whether, supposing the brickmaker had deserted his work, he could have been sent to prison under the Master and Servant Act, or whether he could have enforced payment of his wages under that act, and Cockburn, C. J., expressed a clear opinion that he could not have so recovered his wages. The court distinguished Bowers v. Lovekin, on the ground that there was a contract for personal labour. Lawrence v. Todd (see ante, p. 114) came next, under the now repealed Master and Servant Act, 4 Geo. 4, c. 34. That case was in the Common Pleas, and two of the judges who concurred in the judgment of Erle, J., namely, Williams and Willes, JJ., were members of the court of appeal in Ingram v. Barnes. Lawrence v. Todd has been followed, however, by the case of Sleeman v. Barrett (2 Hurls. & C. 934; 33 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 153), where it was held by the Court of Exchequer that butty colliers working under verbal contracts made with a colliery owner, generally by the day but also by the ton or yard, they not being allowed to underlet the work or to work elsewhere, but doing it as they liked, and in fact working manually themselves and employing men under them, for whose wages they were responsible, were not within the Truck Act. Pollock, C. B. (who expressed his dissent from the opinion of Erle, J., in Bowers v. Lovekin), founded his judgment, not so much on the question of a man personally labouring, as on the distinction between a contract for labour and a contract for the result of labour or the effect that labour is to produce (as a contract for the removal of a large quantity of clay): Bramwell and Channell, BB., rested their judgments partly on the ground that there was no contract with an artificer for labour to be paid wages, and Martin, B., resting on the authorities.

The question of what facts constituted a contract within the Truck Act came again before the Court of Common Pleas (Montague Smith and Brett, JJ.) in Pillar v. Llynvi Coal and Iron Company, 38 L. J., C. P. 294; L. R., 4 C. P. 752. The plaintiff was a tinman, the defendants were a company raising coal and making iron. The plaintiff was verbally employed by the defendants, and worked for several years. His engage

ment was to work either at piece work or by day, at the defendants' option, the piece work being the making of kettles, &c., at fixed prices, out of materials supplied by defendants at varying prices; the day work being the repairing of the defendants' buildings. The plaintiff was paid like the other workmen employed by the defendants, that is to say, by intermediate "draws," with accounts made out about every eight weeks; but he was at liberty to perform the piece work at his own house, and at times worked for other persons. It was held that the plaintiff was obliged to give his personal services, and was therefore an artificer within the act. In giving judgment, after considering this and other questions, Sir M. Smith said: "It was contended for the defendants that the plaintiff was not a workman but a tradesman, and therefore not an artificer, but on a review of the evidence we draw a different inference from the facts, and come to the conclusion that he was an artificer within the meaning of the act." After referring to the 25th section, the learned judge proceeded: "These are very large words, but we have not to construe them unaided, and we must be guided by the judicial interpretation which has been already given to them. It is unnecessary to comment on the other cases which were cited, and it is sufficient to refer to the leading authority of Ingram v. Barnes. The result of that decision is that a man is not an artificer within the act unless the employer has, by the contract of hiring, a right to require his personal work and labour in return for 'wages;' of course as wages are defined by the act. With respect to the piece work, it appeared that the plaintiff was at liberty to make the articles at his own house; and it was contended for the defendants that it followed from this that he might employ others to work upon them. It also appeared that he occasionally worked for other people. Having regard to these facts and to the mode in which the materials were supplied and charged to him, it was contended that the plaintiff was employed in the character of a tradesman and did not contract for his personal labour. Undoubtedly these views require to be considered in coming to a conclusion as to the true nature of the contract; but after giving due effect to them, we think they are outweighed by the rest of the evidence, which, on the whole, satisfies us that the personal labour and skill of the plaintiff was the essence of the contract."

Illegal payments.]-With regard to what are illegal payments under the statute, it has been held that giving "shop notes" in payment of wages, those notes being exchanged for goods, constituted a payment in goods under sect. 3, by the delivery of the notes, so as to make the offence complete at the time of the delivery of the notes, and thus give justices power to convict under sect. 9, although the place where the goods were delivered was not within their jurisdiction. (Athersmith v. Drury, 1 E. & E. 46; S. C. nom Ashersmith v. Drury, 28 L. J., M. C. 5.)

So where the payments were made thus: There were pay days every eight weeks or so, and intermediate draw days; on the draw days cheques for small amounts were given on a bank nine miles from the works; on the pay days accounts were made out in which the cheques were entered as cash advanced, certain deductions made, and the balance, if any, paid in

cash; the cheques were always taken to the defendant's shop, where they were exchanged; they were exchanged in the proportion of four shillings in the pound in cash, the rest in goods, and it was well understood that a workman not taking them to the shop would be discharged. The deductions made from the plaintiff's wages were for the materials supplied for his piece work, certain coal he wanted, and doctor's sick and school fund. It was held that the payment by cheque was a subterfuge, and that the plaintiff did not freely consent to receive them; and therefore, so as to make a good payment under sect. 8, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of wages paid in goods; that he could not, however, recover the deductions for materials and coals; fourthly, that as there was no writing as required by sects. 23 and 24, he could recover as respects the deductions for doctor's sick and school fund. (Pillar v. Llynvi Coal and Iron Company, cited ante, p. 244, on another point.) Even if the artificer might have had payment in money had he been so pleased, it does not make the payment valid; nor does a subsequent payment of the wages in cash avoid the penal consequences attaching to an illegal payment. (Wilson v. Cookson, and Fisher v. Jones, 13 C. B. Rep., N. S. 496, 501; 32 L. J., M. C. 177.)

Deductions from Wages.]-Great difficulty has been found in determining the effect of the act, and more especially of sects. 23 and 24, on the question as to deductions from wages permitted by the act. In the first place a difficulty has arisen in determining what constitutes a "stoppage or deduction" from fixed wages, as distinguished from items subtracted in order to arrive at the wages payable. It had been held by the Court of Queen's Bench that the then usual deductions in the hosiery manufacture, namely, (1) frame rent, (2) machine rent, (3) a sum for the use of the factory and for standing room, (4) a sum for winding the yarn, (5) fines for absence, (6) gas, and (7) firing, might be treated, not as deductions from wages of so much a dozen for the manufactured article, but that the real wages were ascertainable after these items were calculated; and that, therefore, they were not stoppages or deductions to which the act applies, and, consequently, not matters requiring a written agreement or contract. (Chawner v. Cummins, 8 Q. B. Rep. 311; 15 L. J., Q. B. 161.) But in the subsequent case of Archer v. James (2 B. & S. 94; 31 L. J., Q. B. 153), the judges in the Exchequer Chamber were equally divided on the question as to the mode of treating the claims in respect of the rent and other matters above-mentioned. The legislature subsequently settled it by passing an act preventing stoppages in the hosiery manufacture, by enacting that no deduction or stoppage of any description shall be made except for bad and disputed workmanship. (See 37 & 38 Vict. c. 48, post.) The safer course for courts of summary jurisdiction to adopt will be to treat this last-mentioned act (as interpreted by judicial decision, see post, p. 292), not as engrafting an exception on the earlier Truck Act, but as declaratory of the true meaning of the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37.

In cases where a written agreement or contract is necessary to make a deduction legal within sect. 23, it is sufficient if the agreement permits de

ductions for the subject-matter described, without specifying the amounts to be deducted in respect of them. (Cutts v. Ward, L. R., 2 Q. B. 357; 36 L. J., Q. B. 161.) In that case it was further beld, that even assuming that a contract to supply medicine or medical attendance must be in writing under the section, there need not be an actual supply if the written contract stipulated for the deduction of a certain sum weekly in consideration of an undertaking to supply if required.

It seems that from the language of the section, "that such stoppage or deduction shall not exceed the real and true value of such fuel, materials, tools, implements, hay, corn and provender," that what the legislature contemplated was a sale out and out, not a contract for hiring materials, under which, for example, the master supplied his own materials, and the men engaged to pay him money as a security against breakages. Such a contract would not be within sect. 23, but would come within the scope of the prohibitions in the rest of the act. (Blackburn, J., Cutts v. Ward, supra; and see per Bramwell, B., Archer v. James, supra.)

5 & 6 WILL. 4, c. 27.

An Act to continue and amend certain Regulations for the Linen and Hempen Manufactures in Ireland.

A temporary act, confined to Ireland, but continued (so far as it has not been repealed) from time to time. See the Expiring Laws Continuation Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 72).

The 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 27, was repealed by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 91, so far as relates to the embezzlement of materials, and to manufacturers and weavers; and sects. 9, 15, 27 to 30, and 38 were expressly repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1874.

It was amended by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 68, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 47.

7 WILL. 4 & 1 VICT. c. 67.

An Act to amend an Act of the Fifth Year of His Majesty King George the Fourth for consolidating and amending the Laws relative to the arbitration of disputes between Masters and Workmen.

[See the statute in Lovesy's Law of Arbitrations between Masters and Workmen.]