stipendiary magistrate, should the act still be retained, would be a more satisfactory mode of trial (h).

On the other hand, the act was regarded by employers of labour as a very useful act. To its effect they attributed the, if not entire cessation of the practice of picketing, yet the alteration in its character which had rendered the relation existing between master and men much more satisfactory, and the adjustment of trade disputes much more easy (i).

(h) Second and Final Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Laws.

(i) ld. In reference to the evidence given on the part of employers before the Commissioners on this subject, the Report observed :"All their evidence was rather in the nature of an induction from their former experience of the intimidating and coercive effects of picketing, that its present altered character was entirely to be attributed to the operation of the act.

"Some part of the evidence given by the witnesses who objected to the act, was in reply to that part of the evidence of the employers of

labour, in which they had expressed their conviction that the better feeling which existed between labour and capital was very much to be attributed to the existence of this act, and explained the more peaceable relations, which they admitted now existed, to a better and daily growing understanding of the relation between labour and capital, to the introduction of the principle of arbitration, to the continued prosperous state of trade, and predicted that if the act should remain in force and trade become worse, the act would have to be more frequently put in operation."

CHAPTER IV.

THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY IN RELATION TO EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYED.

ALTHOUGH closely connected with the subject of the last chapter, the law of conspiracy in relation to employer and employed having been affected by the legislation of 1875, it is desirable to give separately a concise statement of its previous position.

Conspiracy has been concisely defined as an agreement to defraud or injure the public or any individual person (a), or, more fully expressed, "the crime of conspiracy consists in an agreement by two persons (not being husband and wife), or more than two persons, to commit a crime, or fraudulently or maliciously to injure or prejudice the public or any individual person" (b), and “ every agreement to defraud and despoil any other person of any property, and every malicious agreement with intent to injure or prejudice any other in his person, reputation, office, profession, occupation, state or condition in society, or to disturb or annoy him in the possession or exercise of any civil right, or to destroy or damage any of his property," is within the meaning of the above definition (c).

"The law protecting the relation of master and servant, employer and employed, from interference by third parties

(a) Fourth Report of Criminal Law Commissioners, 1848, under the Commission of 1845.

(b) Seventh Report of Criminal Law Commissioners, 1843.

(c) Ibid. "Conspiracy is the corrupt agreeing together of two or more persons to do, by concerted action, something unlawful, either

as a means or an end. The unlawful thing must either be such as would be indictable, performed by one alone; or not being such, be of a nature particularly adapted to injure the public or some individual by reason of the combination." New York Criminal Code Commissioners, cited 2 Bishop, § 172.

is supplemented by this common law relating to conspiracy. This law becomes applicable not only where two or more persons combine to do any act which is in itself an offence, and would be criminal if done by any one of them, but also in many instances in which the act which is the purpose of the conspiracy if done by one would not be criminal, as, for instance, where several, with the malicious intention to injure, combine to violate a private right, the violation of which by a single individual, though not criminal, would be wrongful, and would give a right of civil action to the party aggrieved (d).

"The first objection made to the existing law is that it is anomalous and inconsistent, as it enables men to be punished for things as criminal, which, if done by them singly, would not be criminal at all. Secondly, it is objected that this law makes men liable to be more heavily punished, under a charge of conspiracy, for things for which they would be liable only to a less severe punishment if done by each of them singly, as where men are charged with conspiring to do any of the acts made penal by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and to which a specific punishment is attached by that act.

"A third objection is, that by the application of the law of conspiracy men may be convicted and punished for acts which ought not to be dealt with as offences, and in respect of which the tendency of recent legislation has been to afford immunity from liability to punishment.

"It is suggested that the law of conspiracy should be amended by limiting the offence to cases in which the act, which is the subject of the conspiracy, would be a crime if done by any single individual. Why, it is said, should that be a crime in many, which in one is innocent? Every act must, in its nature, be either criminal or inno

(d) Second and Final Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Laws. It must be observed that the "existing law" spoken of in the

extract from this report necessarily refers to the law as existing previous to the Labour Laws of 1875.

cent. If innocent in A., how does it become criminal because B. joins in committing it?

"This argument is a very specious one, and at first sight seems to have reason on its side. But those who urge it appear to us to overlook the true ground on which the law is founded and the principle involved in it. Although it is true that an act may form the subject-matter of a charge of conspiracy which would not be a crime in a single individual, it is a mistake to suppose that an act in itself innocent can be made the subject of a charge of conspiracy if done by several. Conspiracy, in the form which we have here to deal with, always pre-supposes an act or an end in itself criminal or wrongful, or which if done by a single individual would give a right of action, or other civil remedy, as being a violation of another's right.

"Conspiracy may be divided into three classes:-First, where the end to be accomplished would be a crime in each of the conspiring parties, a class which offers no difficulty. Secondly, where the purpose of the conspiracy is lawful, but the means to be resorted to are criminal, as where the conspiracy is to support a cause believed to be just by perjured evidence. Here, the proximate or immediate intention of the parties being to commit a crime, the conspiracy is to do something criminal, and here, again, the case is consequently free from difficulty. The third and last case is, where, with a malicious design to do an injury, the purpose is to effect a wrong, though not such a wrong as when perpetrated by a single individual would amount to an offence under the criminal law. Thus, an attempt to destroy a man's credit and effect his ruin by spreading reports of his insolvency would be a wrongful act, which would entitle the party whose credit was thus attacked to bring an action as for a civil wrong; but it would not be an indictable offence. If it be asked on what principle a combination of several to effect the like wrongful purpose becomes an offence, the answer is— upon the same principle that any other civil other civil wrong, when

it assumes a more aggravated and formidable character, is constituted an offence, and becomes transferred from the domain of the civil to that of the criminal law. All offences, it need hardly be observed, are either in their nature offences against the community, or are primarily offences against individuals. As regards the latter class every offence against person or property or other individual right, involves a civil wrong, which would have entitled the person injured to civil redress, were it not that, owing to the aggravated nature of the wrong, and the general insecurity to society which would ensue from such acts if allowed to go unpunished, the state steps in and, merging the wrong done to the party immediately interested in the larger wrong done to the community, converts the wrong done by the infraction of individual right into a crime, and subjects the wrong-doer to punishment, to prevent, as far as possible, the recurrence of the offence. Thus the dividing line between private wrongs, as entitling the party injured to civil remedies, and private wrongs thus converted into public wrongs, in other words, into offences or crimes, is to be found in the more aggravated and formidable character which the violation of individual rights under given circumstances assumes. It is upon this principle that the law of conspiracy, by which the violation of private right, which if done by one would only be the subject of civil remedy, when done by several is constituted a crime, can be vindicated as necessary and just. It is obvious that a wrongful violation of another man's right committed by many assumes a far more formidable and offensive character than when committed by a single individual. The party assailed may be able by recourse to the ordinary civil remedies to defend himself against the attacks of one. It becomes a very different thing when he has to defend himself against many combined to do him injury. To take the case, put by way of illustration, that of false representations, made to ruin a man's business by raising a belief of his insolvency.