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CHAPTER II

THE TREATY OF PARIS

(1782-1784)

E may now stop to consider whether Jay was justified in the stand he took, and particularly whether his suspicions of French faith were well founded. His refusal to accept Oswald's original commission and to treat for an acknowledgment. of independence was probably wise. It amounted to a declaration that America should be treated with as an independent power, and that independence need not be considered in the negotiations as the price of peace. Too much can be made of this episode, for that America really secured better terms simply because her independence was acknowledged before treating may well be doubted. On the other hand, Jay was right, because he was technically so, but chiefly because an evidence of weakness would have damaged his cause. A dignified objection to being considered a delegate from rebellious colonies rather than a plenipotentiary from sovereign states was natural, legitimate, and useful.

The propriety and wisdom of Jay's conduct

1.75

toward France constitute a difficult and perplexing problem, which can be understood only after a careful study of many details. One needs to examine all the intricacies of the tangled skein of Revolutionary diplomacy before reaching a conclusion, and then he may find his opinion differing from the judgment of other investigators, for the decision rests on circumstantial evidence and depends on interpretation of personal conduct. First, it may be said that the episode of the Marbois letter, of which much has been said by historical writers, is of little importance. Suspicions have been thrown on its authenticity, but it was probably entirely genuine. Though written in a tone decidedly captious and unfriendly to America, and in that respect not altogether in harmony with other correspondence between Vergennes and his representatives, it was in general accord with French policy; and it is difficult to explain why Jay should have been surprised by it, for before he left America he knew very well that France did not think that the United States should make the possession of the fisheries the absolute condition of a satisfactory treaty.1

Concerning the purpose of Rayneval's mission, Jay was in a measure mistaken. Rayneval was sent to interview Shelburne with intent to discover whether certain communications made by Shelburne

1 Wharton, Dip. Corresp. of Am. Rev., V., 241; Doniol, Histoire de la Participation, IV., 177-182.

to De Grasse concerning the basis of peace were to be taken seriously and at full value. He was not formally instructed to discuss American affairs; but the fact of the matter is, he did discuss them and did not hesitate to speak disparagingly of the American claims. No harm was done the American cause, however, for the result of his work was probably to convince Shelburne that, as he had already suspected, the French and Americans were in disagreement. Thus Rayneval encouraged a natural desire on the part of the English to win the United States from attachment to France, and also inspired them to offer favorable terms to the persistent commissioners at Paris. It is not to be wondered at, nevertheless, that Jay believed that Rayneval's purpose was to injure the American cause and assist that of Spain and France. He showed considerable sagacity as well as independence of judgment; in light of the evidence before him he was, perhaps, justified in acting as he did.

And yet in his suspicions of France Jay was only partly right. If we free our minds from the oldfashioned notion that France entered the war and poured out her blood and treasure for the gratification of America and from an amiable zeal for American principles, and if we see that her chief object was to weaken England and to restore in

1 Wharton, Dip. Corresp. of Am. Rev., V., 821; Doniol, Histoire de la Participation, V., 132; Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, III., 263

some measure her own prestige, then the action of France takes on a different aspect, and we do not so lightly charge her ministers with cunning, duplicity, and falsehood. Of course, she was not wasting her substance to please America, and nothing but simple self-complacency would have imagined that such was her object. For some years before the summer of 1782 the French had been bearing the burden of the war. To accuse France of treachery under such circumstances, because she was insistent that the United States must not make a separate peace, or because she did not wish Congress or the commissioners to set terms and conditions that would prolong the war, is to misunderstand the difficulty of her position and to judge of her conduct solely from the viewpoint of American desire. It is necessary to remember that France. was the leader in a great European war for which she was responsible; and she had good reason for contending that America should not be regardless of the interests of the other combatants.

As we have already seen, however, the problem had been much complicated by the fact that France had finally induced timorous, selfish Spain to join in fighting England, and, believing in the need of Spanish aid, had entered into an arrangement, which was not, to be sure, in direct variance with her pledges to America, but which rendered the consummation of peace more difficult. Indeed, in some slight measure this arrangement made the in

terests of the United States subordinate to those of Spain, all of whose feelings and instincts were hostile to the purposes of the revolting colonies.1 The terms of the treaty between France and Spain were not known in detail to our commissioners in 1782, but we can now see that France was embarrassed by the pressing demands of her European neighbor, who had entered the war with hesitation, had not contributed much to its success, and wished to come out of it with glory and the lion's share of the booty.

Under the circumstances it was impossible for Vergennes to act as if only American interests were to be considered. He seems to have been sincerely anxious for peace,2 for France was feeling sorely the burden of the war. He was, moreover, desirous of keeping the friendship of Spain, and, to satisfy her, was quite willing that the Americans should be hemmed in between the mountains and the sea. We must remember that the American claims were, to say the least, exceedingly bold, while Spain's demands for western land were not devoid of reason. There is no evidence that Vergennes had much at heart the narrowing of American territory; he wished, in order to bring peace and to appease Spain, that the claims of our commissioners should be kept just as low as possible. He was not at all anxious to see America playing a conspicuous rôle

1 Doniol, Histoire de la Participation, III.,
2 Ibid., IV., 544.

574-576.

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