owner to reclaim his goods. Robinson v. Dauchy, 3 Barbour 30. In Virginia, the act in 1 R. C. 1819, p. 581, c. 155, provided that if the felon be convicted, the party robbed should be restored to his money, goods, or chattels. Whether or no larceny would have merged the civil remedy was argued, but not decided in Cook v. Darby, 4 Munf. 444. Now by the Code of 1849, it is provided that the commission of a felony shall not stay or merge any civil remedy. Code, p. 750, ch. 199, § 6. 7. What delivery to vendee will sustain his right against creditors of vendor, and subsequent purchasers from him. There By the common law, to complete the sale of a chattel, so that the vendee may hold it against a subsequent purchaser, ignorant of the former sale, a delivery is necessary. But as an actual delivery of the thing itself may not always be possible or convenient, a symbolical delivery is admitted as a substitute. There may be such delivery of a ship at sea, or of goods at sea. Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. 599. may be delivery of goods in a warehouse, by a delivery of its key; or of a receipt, or other regular documentary evidence of title. Wilkes &c. v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 335. The subject has been much considered in the supreme court of the United States. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 1 Peters 445. At the time of a contract in New York, articles in warehouses at Fort Wayne, in Indiana, being incapable of actual delivery, the supreme court held that the delivery of the evidences of title, with orders to the bailees endorsed thereon, was equivalent in the then situation of the property, to the delivery of the property itself. Reasonable diligence being used in giving to the warehouse-men notice of the transfer, though a creditor of the transferror laid an attachment before the notice was received, the title of the transferree was sustained against the attaching creditor. Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384. 8. Of the title to goods sent by a captain of a vessel, or by any other carrier. If a tradesman order goods to be sent by a carrier, though he does not name any particular carrier, the moment the goods are delivered to the carrier, it operates as a delivery to the purchaser; the whole property immediately vests in him; he alone can bring an action for any injury done to the goods; and if any accident happens to the goods, it is at his risk. Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 582. But when goods are delivered to the captain of a vessel, to be carried under a bill of lading, and that bill of lading indicates the person on whose account they are to be carried, they are to be delivered to that person, if the bill of lading should not be assigned, and if it should, then to his assignee. Wait &c. v. Baker, 2 W. H. & G. 1. The fact of making the bill of lading deliverable to the order not of the consignee but of the consignor, was decisive to shew that no property passed to the consignee; it being clearly intended by the consignor to preserve his title to the goods until he did a further act. Id. 708. A bill of lading deliverable to the consignor's order, being endorsed to the defendant as security for certain bills drawn on the consignee, such endorsement with power to sell the cargo in case of failure of payment, passed to the defendant a special property in the cargo; and by afterwards sending to the consignee the invoice with the bills and letters of advice, there passed to him the general property in the cargo subject to the special property. Under this arrangement, the consignee's right of possession did not arise till the bills were paid. Jenkins v. Brown &c. 14 Adol. & El. N. S. 496, 68 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 496. From the bill of lading, invoice, and other facts, it may appear that the goods were delivered on board to be carried on account and at the risk of some other person than the consignor. 2 W. H. & G. 709. Goods received on board the ship, as the property of a particular person, are generally regarded his property unless the delivery be qualified. Ogle v. Atkinson &c. 5 Taunt. 759, 1 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 255; Jordan &c. v. James, 5 Ohio 89. It has been decided that the property in goods is passed to the consignee when they are delivered on board the ship for him and the bill of lading is remitted to him duly endorsed, to him, Haille v. Smith &c. 1 Bos. & Pul. 563; or accompanied by an invoice stating that they are shipped on his account and at his risk, Walley v. Montgomery, 3 East 585; Core &c. v. Harden &c. 4 Id. 211. But in prudence a person taking a transfer of a bill of lading should make further enquiry as to the consignee's rights. Jackson v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 29. The bill of lading signed by the captain stating that goods have been shipped by the owner thereof to be delivered to the ship owners is not a contract which passes the property absolutely to them. Though it was then his pleasure that the goods should be delivered to them he may change his purpose before the delivery of the goods themselves or of the bill of lading to the party named in it, and may order the delivery, and transfer the property, to some other person, Mitchel v. Ede &c. 11 Adol. & El. 888, 39 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 260. 9. Of the vendor's or consignor's right of stoppage in transitu. Under certain circumstances goods may be demanded, by any one authorized by the consignors to receive them, from the persons in whose possession they are, while they are in their passage or transit from the consignor to the consignee. Bochtlingk v. Ingles, 3 East 396; Valpy v. Gibson, 4 Man. Gr. & Scott 865, 56 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 865. The right of a vendor to stop goods in transitu is bottomed on the case of Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atk. 248. The ordinary right of countermanding the actual delivery of goods shipped to a consignee is limited to the cases in which the bankruptcy or insolvency of the consignee has taken place. The Constantia, 3 Rob. Adm. 321; Westsynthius in re, 2 Nev. & Man. 644, 5 Barn. & Adol. 817, 27 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 201. But it is sometimes a question whether under the particular terms of the contract the consignors have not reserved to themselves some further power, 2 W. H. & G. 709; for example, the power of withholding the actual delivery of the thing until the consignees shall comply with a certain mode of payment. Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 2 Man. & Grang. 812, 40 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 812. In this case the judgment of the common pleas was reversed; the exchequer chamber being of opinion, upon the facts, that there was not such condition precedent as the common pleas supposed there was. S. C., 7 Man. & Grang. 891, 49 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 891. If goods be sold on credit and the vendee become bankrupt or insolvent, or be likely to become so, the vendor may resume the possession of the goods while they are in the hands of a carrier or middleman in their transit to the consignee or vendee, Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick. 474, 5; Baker v. Fuller, 21 Id. 321; Hause &c. v. Judson, 4 Dana 11; Covell v. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. 613; Buckley v. Furniss &c. 15 Wend. 137; 5 Munf. 37; or if such middleman be the vendor's factor or agent he may retain possession. The factor or agent should pursue his principal's lawful instructions. The principal's order, operating as an indemnity to the agent, in addition to that arising from his possession of the goods, will be his guaranty for refusing to deliver them. Under circumstances the agent would also have a right perhaps to demand other security from the principal, which it would be incumbent on him forthwith to give, under pain of a right in the agent to go on and execute the contract by a delivery. Howatt & Co. v. Davis &c. 5 Munf. 34. In this case the agent having violated the principal's orders by delivering the goods to the vendee, was held liable in the event of the vendee's insolvency to the action of the principal for damages. The right to stop the goods is not defeated by the circumstance of the vendee having partly paid for them. If the vendee become insolvent before they are actually delivered to him, the vendor has a right to retake them unless the whole price has been paid. Hodgson &c. v. Loy, 7 T. R. 436. The part payment only reduces the vendor's equitable lien pro tanto when he gets the goods into his possession. Ferse &c. v. Wray, 3 East 93. Although a wagon load may have arrived and been delivered to the vendee, that does not deprive the vendor of the right of stopping what is still on the way. Buckley v. Furniss &c. 17 Wend. 504. The case of Slubey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. 504, in which a part delivery was considered as putting an end to the right of stoppage in transitu, was in truth nothing else than the delivery of the whole cargo; each part being taken with the intention to take possession of the whole, not to separate the part that was delivered from the remainder. Pollock, C. B., 14 M. & W. 36. Taunton, J. remarks that "a partial delivery is a delivery of the whole unless circumstances shew that it is not so meant." Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Adol. & El. 73, 29 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 36. Mr. Smith in his treatise on mercantile law, (book 4, chapter 1, § 3, page 554,) appends a quære to that dictum, and Pollock, C. B. thinks with very great reason. 14 M. & W. 37. The delivery of part, with intent to separate that from the remainder, has been held not sufficient to put an end to the right of stoppage in transitu. Bunney v. Poyntz, 1 Nev. & Man. 229, 4 Barn. & Adol. 571, 24 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 118; Miles v. Gordon, 2 C. & M. 504; Dixon v. Yates, 2 Nev. & Man. 177, 5 Barn. & Adol. 313, 27 Eng. Com. Law Rep.; Jones v. Jones, 8 M. & W. 431. The cases establish the doctrine in England that if the vendee takes possession of part, not meaning thereby to take possession of the whole, but to separate that part and to take possession of that part only, it puts an end to the transitus only with respect to that part and no more the right of lien and the right of stoppage in transitu on the remainder still continue. 14 M. & W. 28. Tanner &c. v. Scovell &c. The vendor cannot stop what has got into the actual possession of the vendee or his assignee. Ellis &c. v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464; Hammond &c. v. Anderson, 4 Bos. & Pul. 69; Harman &c. v. Anderson &c. 2 Camp. 243; Stoveld v. Hughes &c. 14 East 308; Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Pick. 284; Frazer & Co. v. Hilliard &c. 2 Strobhart 317; Mottram &c. v. Heyer, 1 Denio 483. He cannot stop goods delivered on board the vendee's own ship, to be carried for him and on his account and risk. Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 W. H. & G. 708; Noble v. Adams, 7 Taunt. 59, 2 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 25; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 314. There are cases in which packers and wharfingers are to be considered middle-men. Mills v. Ball, 2 Bos. & Pul. 457. But if a man be in the habit of using the warehouse of the wharfinger as his own, and make that the repository of his goods, the transitus will be at an end when the goods arrive at such warehouse. Chambre, J., in Richardson v. Goss, 3 Bos. & Pul. 127; Ld. Alvanley, Id. 472. Goods have been held to have arrived at the end of their journey, though remaining in the packer's custody, where he is not merely a middle-man. Leeds v. Wright, 3 Bos. & Pul. 320. When there is no ulterior destination beyond his warehouse, the consignee having no warehouse to receive the goods but that of the packer, the transitus never could be at an end if it did not end there. Scott &c. v. Pettit, 3 Bos. & Pul. 472. On the same principle it is at an end by the act of the consignee's treating the goods as his own property, taking part to his own premises, and directing the other part to remain in the warehouse of the carrier: from that moment the latter ceased to be a carrier and became a mere bailee. Foster &c. v. Frampton &c. 6 Barn. & Cress. 107, 13 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 111. Generally the right of stoppage continues until the goods come into the consignee's actual possession at the termination of the voyage, unless he has previously sold them bona fide, and endorsed over the bills of lading to the purchaser. Stubbs v. Land, 7 Mass. 453; Isley &c. v. Stubbs, 9 Id. 69. A bill of lading, like a bill of exchange, giving the authority to endorse, when it is endorsed the property is generally vested in the assignee. It has long been determined that goods at sea may be so assigned. Evans v. Marlett, 1 Ld. Raym. 271; Wright &c. v. Campbell &c. 4 Burr. 2051; Caldwell v. Ball, 1 T. R. 216; Hibbert &c. v. Carter, Id. 745; Lempriere &c. v. Pasley, 2 Id. 485. If there be two or more bills of lading for the same goods, and there be endorsements to different par |