'There is no lien on plates for the amount of the bill for printing from them. Bleaden &c. v. Hancock, 4 C. & P. 152, 19 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 317. Nor has a conveyancer or an auctioneer a lien upon a deed with which he has transacted some other business. Steadman v. Hockley, 15 M. & W. 553; Sanderson v. Bell, 2 C. & M. 304.

5. How lien which would otherwise exist may be excluded by the terms of the contract. How lien ceases when goods are parted with. Generally holder of lien has no right

to sell the goods.

A workman having bestowed his labour upon a chattel in consideration of a price or reward, can by law detain the chattel until the price is paid, whether it be the case of an agree ment for a stipulated sum or only of an implied contract to pay a reasonable price or sum. But if the parties contract for a particular time or mode of payment, the workman has not a right to set up a claim to the possession inconsistent with the terms of his contract. Chase &c. v. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180. When by the agreement the party is entitled to have the goods immediately, and the payment in respect to them is to take place at a future time, that is inconsistent with the right to retain the goods till payment. Crawshay &c. v. Homfray Sc. 4 Barn. & Ald. 50, 6 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 345.

The general doctrine is that liens are personal and cannot be transferred. The lien may accompany the goods when delivered with notice of it to one to hold as servant or bailee. But a defendant who sets up title in himself-a title acquired by a purchase from a tort feasor-cannot, when that title. proves unavailing against the true owner, avail himself of a lien of his vendor. McCombie v. Davies, 7 East 5; Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelin, 7 Cow. 680; Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. 607; Everett v. Saltus, 15 Id. 478. It certainly will not avail when it appears that the defendant himself had sold the goods before action brought. Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 273.

As a general proposition a right of lien gives no right to sell the goods. But when goods are deposited by way of security to indemnify a party against a loan of money, the lender's rights are more extensive than such as accrue under an ordinary lien in the way of trade. Pothonier &c. v. Dawson, 1 Holt 383, 3 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 135.

CHAPTER XLIX.

OF THE CARRIER'S LIEN;

AND THE ACTION AGAINST HIM FOR

GOODS COMMITTED TO HIS CARE.

1. Who are not carriers.

A plaintiff has failed in the attempt to convert into a carrier the keeper of a booking office, or a forwarder, who received goods and delivered the same in due course to a carrier. Upston v. Slark, 2 C. & P. 598, 12 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 280; Roberts v. Turner, 12 Johns. 232; or the owner of a cart into which goods were put under a contract that the owner of the goods should go with them and take care of them. Brind v. Dale, 8 C. & P. 207, 34 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 355; or parties who carry on the business of towing boats laden with goods, but do not receive the property into their custody, nor exercise any control over it, other than such as results from the towing of the boats in which it is laden. Caton v. Rumney, 13 Wend. 387; Alexander v. Greene, 3 Hill 19.

2. How far ferrymen are deemed carriers.

The courts of South Carolina have, on several occasions, laid down the duties of a person who undertakes to keep and maintain a ferry. Rutherfoord v. McGowan, 1 Nott & M. 17; Miles v. James, 1 McCord 157. It was at first decided that he is not a common carrier, 1 Nott & M. 17; but it has been since established that he is, Cook v. Gourdin, 2 Id. 19; Cohen v. Hume, 1 McCord 444.

If he neglect to have the landing in a complete state of repair for the reception of travellers; if proper and safe easements are not furnished for entering the boat; if from the narrowness or shortness of the boat, the want of necessary railing, or any other like deficiency, a loss be occasioned, it is admitted he will be liable for his negligence. Gantt, J.,

1 McCord 447. To convey passengers across a river, ferrymen had a steamboat, and between it and the landing place a slip; they were guilty of culpable negligence in providing the slip of so imperfect and insecure a construction, that without any negligence on the plaintiff's part, the rail of the slip gave way, and a concealed iron spike pierced and killed the

plaintiff's mare. For this negligence the ferrymen were held responsible in damages. Willoughby v. Horridge, 12 Com. Bench (3 J. Scott) 751; 74 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 751. But in South Carolina there have been cases of admitted liability for negligence, in which some of the judges were unwilling to hold that the liability of the ferryman was in the capacity of carrier. The drop appended to the flat not extending across it, in drawing a carriage on the flat-when the horses and two front wheels were in-a hind wheel slipt from the drop, the horse on that side got overboard, and drew after him the other horse and the carriage; the horses were drowned and the carriage injured. A majority of the court held that they were in the custody of the ferryman as carrier, and that he was liable in that capacity. In their opinion as soon as the ferryman signifes his assent to receive the horses and carriage of a traveller, they are to be considered as delivered: "if he say, drive on, or I am ready, having fixed his flat, he is from that moment to be considered as in possession, and the driver is to be considered as his agent for the purpose of getting the horses and carriage into the flat." Cohen v. Hume, 1 McCord 439. In England the simple circumstance of the defendants being ferrymen does not import an obligation on the ferrymen to take the trouble either of putting a carriage on board or discharging it out of the vessel on her arrival; but it may be such a ferry as that by usage the ferryman takes this obligation upon himself. Walker v. Jackson, 10 M. & W. 108.

In Massachusetts there is no doubt of the liability as carrier for a horse and wagon received by a ferryman, to be transported by him on a ferryboat; the ferryman accepting the exclusive custody of the same for such purpose, and the owner having, for the time being surrendered the possession to the ferryman. But if the traveller uses the ferry boat as he would a toll bridge, personally driving his horse upon the boat, selecting his position on the same, and himself remaining on the boat; neither putting his horse into the custody of the ferryman nor signifying to him or his servants any wish to do so; it is in that state held that the party thus driving his own horse upon the boat and retaining the custody of him, though he pays the ordinary toll, is, like the traveller on the toll bridge or the turnpike road, to use ordinary care in respect to his horse, and, if for want thereof the horse leaps overboard or is injured, such party must himself bear the loss thus occasioned by his own neglect. White v. Winnissimet Co. 7 Cush.

155.

3. Owners of coaches, vessels, steamboats and rail-roads; how they are liable as carriers.

How far a coachman was liable was a question in Middleton v. Fowler, Holt 130; 1 Vin. Abr. 220. It was ruled that if a coachman commonly carry goods and take money for so doing whether the goods be a passenger's or a stranger'she is in the same case with a common carrier. Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. 127; Dwight &c. v. Brewster &c. 1 Pick. 53. He is responsible as such for merchandize, Beckman v. Shouse &c. 5 Rawle 187; or for a passenger's baggage, Camden & Amboy Co. v. Burke, 13 Wend. 611. The effect of the owner's accompanying the baggage or sending a servant to look after it is noticed in Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 240. The liability of the carrier is not thereby affected with respect to property received into his possession and committed to his trust unless there be fraud on the owner's part. Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 257.

It has sometimes been said that the master of a vessel at sea is not within the term common carrier. Phillips on Ins. 250, cited in Aymar v. Astor, 6 Cow. 268. Notwithstanding the previous decisions in Colt v. McMechen, 6 Johns. 160, Stewart v. Rossell &c. 10 Id. 1, and Kemp &c. v. Coughtry &c. 11 Id. 107, the supreme court of New York without citing those decisions held in Aymar &c. v. Astor, that the court below erred in charging the jury that the owners of the vessel were common carriers. In this case the error was rather in the supreme court than in the court below. McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 193. By the law of England, the master and owners of a general ship are common carriers for hire and responsible as such. Laveroni v. Drury &c. 8 W. H. & G. 166, 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 510.

The owners of steamboats engaged in the carrying trade are liable as common carriers. McCall v. Brock, 5 Strobhart

123.

There are usually in a railway act some sections which have the effect of putting the railway company on the footing of common carriers. Palmer v. Grand Junction Railway Co. 4 M. & W. 749; 14 Com. Bench (5 J. Scott) 289, 78 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 289, 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 298. If the company be authorized to carry goods upon the railroad and to make reasonable charges therefor, then they are bound, in the character of common carriers, to carry for reasonable charges. Pickford v. Grand Junction R. Co. 10 M. & W. 422; Parker v. Great Western R. Co. 7 Man. & Grang. 288, 49 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 288.

4. Action lies for refusing to accept goods for place to which carrier professes to carry.

At common law a carrier is not bound to carry for every person tendering goods of any description, but his obligation is to carry according to his public profession. Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 484. A person may profess to carry a particular description of goods only, for instance, cattle or dry goods, in which case he could not be compelled to carry any other kind of goods; or he may limit his obligation to carrying from one place to another, as from Manchester to London, and then he would not be bound to carry to or from the intermediate places. Still, until he retracts, every individual (provided he tenders the money at the time, and there is room in the conveyance) has a right to call upon him to receive and carry goods according to his public profession. Parke, B., Johnson v. Railway Co. 4. W. H. & G. 373. Persons holding out themselves to be common carriers, take upon themselves an obligation to accept all goods which are reasonably offered to them for conveyance to and from the profess to carry, whether one of those realm or not; and they are liable to an action if they without sufficient reason refuse to take from one person goods of the description which they are in the habit of carrying for others. Crouch v. L. & N. W. Railroad Co. 14 Com. Bench (5 J. Scott) 255, 78 Eng. Com. Law Rep., 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 287.

places to which they places be without the

5. Whether hire must be agreed on to render carrier liable.

There needs no particular agreement for hire to render a common carrier liable, because when there is none the carrier may have a quantum meruit for it. Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. 129; Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wend. 340.

Indeed there may be no benefit to the carrier but the having another's money or goods in his possession, and being trusted therewith; yet taking the possession and entering upon the trust, there is upon the principle adverted to ante, p. 395, a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a faithful performance of the trust. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 919; Gibson v. Ingles, 4 Camp. 72; Bonham v. Laird, 4 B. Monroe 404; Parke, B., 8 W. H. & G. 39. But then upon the principle laid down in chapter 47, ante, p. 515, as to a gratuitous bailee, much more would be required to sustain the action against such a carrier than against one for hire. Southcote's case, 4 Rep. 83 b.