of receiving and, if requested, locking up baggage of persons intending to take passage in the next steamboat, it has been held, are in possession as carriers of baggage so received, and answerable for it in that character. Camden Co. v. Belknap, 21 Wend. 361.

When individuals who are carriers receive goods on an undertaking to carry and deliver them at a particular town, it matters not whether they use their own boats and vessels on all the route or those of others on part of it; their liability is none the less for that. Fairchild v. Slocum, 19 Wend 332. In England it has been decided that when a party brings a parcel to a railway station, knowing that the company only carry to a particular place, if the railway company receive it, and book it to a more distant place to which it is directed, prima facie they undertake to carry it to that other place and are liable for its loss. Muschamp v. Lancaster Railway Co. 8 M. & W. 426, 429. The English courts consider that it makes no difference that the company is to carry the goods only part of the way and that another company is to carry them the other part; nor that the agent of the latter company was directed when they reached the more distant place to send them to a house different from what according to the label on the package was intended when it was first taken. The agent assenting to this direction but by some negligence disobeying it and the goods being thereby lost, an action was maintained against the company that first received them. Scothorn v. So. Staffordshire Railway Co. 8 W. H. & G. 341. There will be occasion in a future chapter to advert to this rule, as it regards the transportation of persons, and to see whether in the United States it can be applied to a chartered company whose right to transport is only on its own road.

If a railway company provide for the delivery of luggage to passengers by employing porters to carry it across a platform, to the vehicles by which it is to be taken away, their liability as carriers continues until the porters have discharged their duty. Richards v. Railway Co. 7 Man. Gr. & Scott 839, 62 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 839.

The carrier's liability continues until he delivers the goods. Hyde &c. v. Trent & M. Navig. Co. 5 T. R. 389. He must deliver them according to the general course of trade. Golden v. Manning &c. 3 Wils. 429, 2 W. Bl. 916; De Mott &c. v. Laraway, 14 Wend. 225; Gibson v. Culver &c. 17 Id. 305. It may be a part of his duty when he carries a cargo to sell it and bring back the proceeds. If such be the usual course of business, the character of carrier continues until the proceeds are returned to the owner of the cargo; it

makes no difference whether the return cargo is in money or goods. Kemp v. Coughtry, 11 Johns. 109. A person may be a carrier of money as well as of other property. Carth. 485.

There is no general rule of law which governs the delivery of goods under a bill of lading, where such delivery is not expressly in accordance with the terms of the bill of lading, except that it must be a delivery according to the practice and custom usually observed in the port or place of delivery. Wardell v. Mouryllyan, 2 Esp. 693; Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bingh. N. C. 314, 33 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 372; S. C. 3 Man. & Grang. 687, 42 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 360. If the contract be to deliver to the consignee in a certain port, and the goods instead of being delivered to the consignee were placed on a wharf, such delivery is not sufficient, without shewing that it was a delivery to the consignee according to the usage of the port or that the defendants kept the goods on board (or on the wharf at their own risk) a reasonable time to enable the consignee or his assigns to come and get them. Bourne v. Gatliffe, 3 Man. & Grang. 687, 8; 7 Id. 865; 42 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 360; 49 Id. 865; 11 Clark & Fin. 45.

The liability of the defendants may often depend on the question whether they had the goods as carriers or warehousemen: there may be a loss which would fall on them as carriers if they were acting in that character, but would not fall on them as warehousemen if they were acting in the character of warehousemen. In Re Webb &c. 8 Taunt. 443, 4 Eng. Com Law Rep. 159. If defendants are not subject to the liability of common carriers for goods in their warehouse it is a good defence that they took reasonable care of the goods there and that the loss did not happen from the want of such care. Bourne v. Gatliffe, 3 Man. & Grang. 689, 42 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 360.

The goods being carried to the place to which the carrier undertook to carry them, and the owner having no person there ready to receive them, on their arrival, they are put in the carrier's warehouse and while therein are consumed by an accidental fire; the loss will fall on the owner. Garside v. Trent Navigation, 4 T. R. 581. The depositaries will not be responsible for a loss in their warehouse unless they be guilty of negligence or want of ordinary care. Thomas v. Boston & Prov. R. Co. 10 Metcalf 472.

14. The carrier's lien.

At common law a carrier has a lien for the carriage price of

the particular goods; but not a lien for a general balance unless by contract express or implied. Rushworth &c. v. Hadfield &c. 7 East 224. Sometimes the carrier gives notice that all goods shall be considered subject to a lien not only for the freight of the particular goods but also for any general balance due from the respective owners. Such a notice cannot have the effect of creating a lien on the goods of one man for a balance due for carrying the goods of another. The same person may be the consignee of all; but if the last goods are not owned by him but by the consignor, they are not to be retained for freight on other goods which belonged to the consignee or to other consignors. Wright v. Snell &c. 5 Barn. & Ald. 350, 7 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 127.

CHAPTER L.

OF THE INN-KEEPER'S LIEN; AND THE ACTION AGAINST HIM

FOR PROPERTY OF HIS GUEST.

1. Who is an inn-keeper; and how far he is liable.

Who is deemed an inn-keeper and how far he is liable for a horse or other property of a guest is treated of in Calye's case, 8 Rep. 32 a; The Six Carpenters' case, Id. 146 a; Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 177; Bennet v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273; Jones v. Osborn, 2 Chitty's Rep. 484, 18 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 398; Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306; Farnworth &c. v. Pashwood, 1 Stark. 249, 1 Holt's N. P. R. 209, 2 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 377, 3 Id. 75; Thompson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283, 5 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 285; Richmond v. Smith, 8 Barn. & Cress. 9, 15 Eng. Com. Law Rep; Armistead v. White, 6 Eng. Law & Eq. 349.

In a late case the judges of the court of queen's bench were divided in opinion upon the question whether the keeper of a boarding house was liable to a boarder for the value of goods stolen from the house, where facility for the theft was given by a servant's negligence in omitting to shut a door. Dansey v. Richardson, 3 El. & Black. 144, 77 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 144, 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 76. The principles in regard to the liability of an inn-keeper are more clearly established than those in regard to the liability of the keeper of a boarding house.

The inn-keeper like a common carrier, is regarded as insurer of the property committed to his care, and is bound to make restitution for any loss or injury not caused by the act of God, or the common enemy, or the neglect or fault of the owner of the property. This is not merely the law of England; it has been often recognized in the United States. Mason &c. v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280; Clarke v. Wiggins, 14 Johns. 175; Tonson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. 47; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barbour 560; Story on Bailm. § 477. The inn-keeper is responsible for money as well as goods of his guest. Kent v. Shuckard, 2 Barn. & Adol. 803, 22 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 186. And his responsibility, it is said, is not restricted to any particular amount of goods or money. 2 Kent's Com. 593. The proposition that he is liable for such sums only as are necessary and designed for the ordinary travelling expenses of the guest, has been pronounced in Massachusetts to be unsupported by authority. Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor &c. 7 Cush. 427.

Although the owner of the property was not himself the defendant's guest, and although the delivery of it to be kept was not by him but by his servant, the action may nevertheless be maintained in the owner's name. Mason &c. v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280.

An action on the case was maintained by a plaintiff who declared upon the common custom of the realm, that in common inns the inn-keepers ought to keep safely the goods of their guests, and all other goods brought into their inns; that the plaintiff's servant was lodged at the defendant's house, and having there a bag with £ 60 of the plaintiff's money therein, quidam malifactores, to the plaintiff unknown, the said bag of money, in default of the defendant and his servants took and carried away. Beedle v. Morris, Cro. Jac. 224, Yelv. 162. As the inn-keeper is liable only for things infra hospitium, and to passengers and wayfaring men as was ruled in Calye's case, 8 Rep. 63, it follows says Gibson, C. J., that the action was maintained not on the right of property but on the relation of inn-keeper and guest; and that the owner was allowed to treat the carrier as his substitute. Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 322.

When, as in Mason v. Thompson, the owner has never been at the inn, and never intends to go there as a guest, it seemed to Judge Bronson of New York, little short of a downright absurdity to say that in legal contemplation he is a guest. Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 490. But Mason v. Thompson is adhered to. 4 Cush. 114, 15. And the right of action is

maintained in the name of a party, who not only was not in fact, but in the nature of things could not be, the defendant's guest, to wit: in the name of a corporation. It is so maintained both in Maryland, Tonson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. 47; and Massachusetts, Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor &c. 7 Cush. 424. It is maintained upon the principle that if a servant is robbed of his master's money or goods, the master may maintain an action against the innkeeper in whose house the loss was sustained. Bac. Abr. Inns and Inn-keepers, C. 5. In the cases in Maryland and in the last Massachusetts case the plaintiff's agent was the defendant's guest.

It is no valid objection that the defendant kept a livery stable as well as an inn, when the evidence is satisfactory that the property was delivered as to an innkeeper; and when the property is harness, it is no objection that there was to be no separate reward for keeping it; the pay for keeping the horse including a compensation for taking care of the harness. son &c. v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280.

Ma

Sometimes there is a question whether the goods are within the curtilage. 2 Kent's Com. 592; Story on Bailm. 312; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282. It was resolved in Calye's case, 8 Rep. 32 a, that if the guest deliver his horse to the hostler, and request that he be put to pasture, which is accordingly done, and the horse is stolen, the inn-keeper is not responsible, the thing not being in the common law sense of the term infra hospitium. This exception has since prevailed. Within it was brought the case of sheep put to pasture under the direction of the guest, in Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642.

An inn-keeper has been exonerated from liability for money in his house, when it was confided to a particular person staying there, but not at the bar, nor in the capacity of servant. Sneider v. Geiss, 1 Yeates 34.

2. Inn-keeper's lien.

Notwithstanding what Lord Abinger calls the wide divaricating dictum of Eyres, J. in Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show. 268, and notwithstanding the precedent of a plea in 9 Wentw. Pl. 362, an inn-keeper has not the right to detain the person of his guest, or to take the coat off his back. Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248.

An inn-keeper being obliged to receive certain goods of his guest, has a lien thereon for his charges, The Hostler's case, Yelv. 66; Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 556, 8 Mod. 172; Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 67, 32 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 440;