Parke, B., 3 M. & W. 253; Dunlap v. Thorne, 1 Richardson 217; but he has no lien upon a horse brought to the inn by one not a guest, Binns v. Pigot, 9 C. & P. 208, 38 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 82; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 491; nor upon a piano known by the inn-keeper to be not the property of the guest but of another, Broadwood §c. v. Granara, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 443.

Formerly there were doubts whether the inn-keeper had in any case a lien on the goods of a third person brought to the inn by a guest. In the first case the judges were divided equally. Skipwith v. J. S. 1 Bulst. 170; 3 Id. 271. In the next there were three in favour of the lien to one against it. Robinson v. Waller, 3 Bulstr. 262, 1 Roll. Rep. 449, Poph. 127. The doctrine that the lien exists is regarded as reasonable, even though the guest had stolen the horse. Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866. That is, unless at the time when the horse was delivered into the custody of the inn-keeper he knew that the person who brought him was not the owner but a mere wrong-doer. Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172, 14 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 176; Fox v. McGregor &c. 11 Barbour 43. Most of the decisions are with respect to horses. But there is a like lien for the keep and care of a carriage as for the keep and care of a horse. Turrill v. Crawley, 13 Adol. & El. N. S. 197, 66 Eng. Com. Law Rep.

It was said by Popham, C. J., that after the horse has eat as much as he is worth, the inn-holder upon a reasonable appraisement may sell him. The Hostler's case, Yelv. 66. But it was afterwards decided in England that an inn-keeper has no power to sell horses except within the city of London. Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 556; 2 Kent's Com. 642. In New York it is considered that the remedy to enforce the lien is by action in the nature of a bill in chancery. 1 Cowen's Tr., 2d edi., 299; 11 Barbour 43.

TITLE V.

RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST A WRONG-DOER.

CHAP. 51. General rules as to the action for damages sustained by one person from another's wrong.

52. Action for an assault on or a false imprisonment of the plaintiff. When action lies for imprisonment or other trespass at sea.

53. Action by a husband for criminal conversation with his wife.

54. Action by a master or father for injury to a servant or child.

55. Action for seduction.

56. Right of master to service of apprentice. Action against

apprentice for desertion; or against another for concealing or harbouring an apprentice or slave, or for enticing a servant or slave to leave his master, or for carrying off a slave.

57. Action against a judge or clerk of a court; or against a justice.

58. Action against any officer having a public duty to perform, for damage sustained by his refusal to perform that

duty.

59. Action for a trespass committed by an officer acting under instruction of the executive or under a decision of a court martial or under an assessment of taxes.

60. Action against an officer for refusing at an election to receive the vote of a legal voter; or for making a false or double return.

61. Action against a sheriff for permitting an escape, or for any other neglect of duty, under execution or other legal process.

62. Action for an unlawful or excessive distress or levy; or for remaining on premises of tenant or debtor an unreasonable time.

63. Action for a malicious prosecution or a malicious arrest or proceeding in a civil suit or an abuse of process.

64. Action for slander or libel.

65. Action for a fraudulent representation.

66. Action for waste.

67. Action for a trespass upon land.

68. Action for damage from or to the cattle of one on the land of another.

VOL. II.-35

69. Action for injury from an animal kept by the defendant with knowledge of its mischievous propensity.

70. Action for an injury from a defect or obstruction in a highway or for injury by or to an animal therein, or for injury from negligence in riding, driving or navigating. 71. Action against carriers of persons.

72. Action for the disturbance of a right of way; or for the disturbance of a ferry franchise.

73. Action for injury from defendant's so building as to ob struct plaintiff's lights.

74. Action for a nuisance caused by the filth on the defendant's premises, or by the foul state of his drains, or by other acts of his corrupting the air or water.

75. Action for disturbing plaintiff's right to a flow of water in its natural course over the surface.

76. Action for injury to plaintiff's property from fire caused by negligence on another's premises.

77. Action for injury in withdrawing support of plaintiff's soil or house.

78. Action against a joint stock company or a city or town for injury to plaintiff's property arising from the defendants' casting dirt or stones on it, or from their not keeping their road, canal or dam in proper order.

79. How far a municipal corporation, or any trustees, commissioners or other officers are liable for acts done in the execution of a public duty.

80. How far defendant is liable for a wrong done by a servant, agent or contractor, or done upon the defendant's fixed property.

81. How far a master is liable to a servant for an injury sustained in the master's service.

CHAPTER LI.

GENERAL RULES AS TO THE ACTION FOR DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY ONE PERSON FROM ANOTHER'S WRONG.

1. Principle as stated by Lord Campbell. Action may lie though wrong be unintentional.

Lord Campbell observes that by the law of Scotland, as well as by the law of England, and he believes by the law of every civilized country, where damage is sustained by one man from the wrong of another, an action for compensation is given to the injured party against the wrong-doer. 9 Clark & Fin. 310. An action may lie though the wrong was unintentional; as in the case of the defendant, who, having a loaded gun,

told a person to take the priming out and send him the gun by a girl. This was done; yet afterwards the girl presenting the gun at a child and drawing the trigger, the gun went off the defendant was held responsible for the injury that ensued. Dixon v. Bell, 1 Stark. 287, 2 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 392, 5 M. & S. 198. "It may," says Bronson, C. J., "be laid down as a general rule, that when one does an illegal or mischievous act, which is likely to prove injurious to others, and when he does a legal act in such a careless and improper manner that injury to third persons may probably ensue, he is answerable in some form of action for all the consequences which may directly and naturally result from his conduct; and in many cases he is answerable criminally as well as civilly." Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio 465.

2. Action for a nuisance lies for him who is hurt by it. It lies against the continuer as well as the creator of the nuisance. It lies though the nuisance be a public nuisance.

In an action for a nuisance, it is not material when it was erected; it lies for him that is hurt by it. Westbourne v. Mordant, Cro. Eliz. 191; Roll's Abr., Nuisance, K. 2; Thompson v. Gibson, 7 M. & W. 461. It lies against those concerned in erecting it, S. C.; and those who continue it. Though it was erected in the time of the devisor, yet if it be continued afterwards, an action for it may be maintained by the devisee; for its continuance is as the new erecting of such a nuisance. Some v. Barwish, Cro. Jac. 231.

When the premises on which the nuisance exists descend to, or pass to, an heir, devisee or grantee, if he on request made does not reform the nuisance but suffers it to continue, the party to whose prejudice and damage it is may maintain an action for it against him. Penruddock's case, 5 Rep. 100, b.

Although the matter complained of be a public nuisance, yet an action will lie therefor if there appear to be special damage to the plaintiff. Iveson v. Moore, 1 Ld. Raym. 486; 1 Salk. 15. The grievance was considered not of this description in Hubert v. Groves, 1 Esp. 149. This case was remarked on in Rose &c. v. Miles, 5 Taunt. 705, 4 M. & S. 101. The latter case has been followed, Greasly v. Codling &c. 2 Bingh. 263, 9 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 407; Henley v. Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bingh. 91, 1 Bing. N. C. 222; 27 Eng. Com. Law Rep. The law is, that a party who has sustained any peculiar injury beyond that which affects the public at large, may maintain an action for redress. Williams's case, 5 Rep. 73; Wilkes v. Hungerford Market, 2 Bingh. N. C.

281, 29 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 336; Rose v. Groves &c. 5 Man. & Grang. 613, 44 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 323. Cases may be put in which it may be difficult to draw the line between substantial and imaginary damage; but for a sufficient special injury, peculiar to the plaintiff, and not common to all the citizens, his action will lie, notwithstanding the defendant may be liable to answer upon an indictment for the public nuisance. Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147.

3. Action may lie though the matter be punishable by stalute.

The unlawful act may be a misdemeanour punishable by statute. Yet a party grieved may maintain an action for the particular damage to him by reason of that act. Harrison v. Berkeley, 1 Strobhart 525. In Virginia there is an express declaration by statute to that effect. The provision in the Code, p. 589, c. 148, § 6, is as follows:

Any person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed, unless the same be expressly mentioned to be in lieu of such damages.

4. Whether commission of felony stays or merges civil remedy.

Allusion has been made (ante, p. 500) to the rule of the law of England that before the party injured by a felonious act can seek redress for it, the matter should be heard and disposed of before the proper criminal tribunal, in order that the justice of the country may be first satisfied in respect to the public offence. Huggins v. Butcher, 1 Brownl. 205, Yelv. 89; Cooper v. Witham, 1 Lev. 247; 12 East 413. The whole extent of the rule is that until the matter is so heard and disposed of, the party shall not sue the felon, or sue others with him in a proceeding to which he is a necessary party and wherein the claim appears by the plaintiff's shewing to be founded on the felony. The rule does not preclude an action against defendants none of whom had any interest or share in the felonious act; certainly the action is not precluded when before it was brought the felon had suffered the extreme penalty of the law for the commission of the same felony or another of the like nature. Stone &c. v. Marsh &c. Law Rep. 252; Marsh Nor does the rule pre

6 Barn. & Cress. 551, 13 Eng. Com. &c. v. Keating, 2 Clark & Fin. 286. vent an action against the felon himself, when before the ac