2. Another ground upon which the act must be sustained is that the right to maintain an action in any particular court is always subject to the legislative will. It is only when one is deprived of all rights to maintain an action for the redress of his wrongs that the statute would be obnoxious to the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Congress has uniformly exercised that power by providing in what courts suits may be maintained, and in no instance has such an act been held void. Among the many is the act of March 3, 1873, 17 St. 509, authorizing the Attorney General to institute suits against the Union Pacific Railroad Co. for certain acts in any circuit court of the United States. The constitutionality of this act was sustained in United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 98 U. S. 569. The Carmack amendment to the interstate-commerce act, approved June 29, 1906, 34 St. 595, authorizes an action against the receiving carrier, regardless of the fact that the loss or damage sued for was caused by a connecting carrier. Its constitutionality was sustained in Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186. The act of February 24, 1905, chapter 778, 33 Statutes 811, vested the exclusive jurisdiction of actions on bonds of contractors for the construction of public works in the courts of the district in which said contract was to be performed and executed. The validity of the act was sustained in United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 U. S. 199, 203; Hopkins v. Ellington & Guy, 246 U. S. 655; Ex parte Southwestern Surety Ins. Co., 247 U. S. 19. The Clayton Act, approved October 15, 1914, 38 Statutes 730, 737, section 12, expressly authorizes an action by the Government, not only in the district whereof the defendant corporation is an inhabitant, but in any district where it may be found or does business. Section 15 of that act authorizes service of process on other parties than the offending corporation, who are properly joined, in any district where found. The validity of these provisions was sustained in Southern Photo Material Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (D. C.), 234 Fed. 955.

Every State of the Union has provided by statute the venue for civil actions in its courts. In some States actions may be brought only in the county where the defendant resides; in some where the defendant resides or may be found; some actions can only be maintained in the county in which the cause of action accrued; others where the subject matter of the action is situated; and in some States actions may be maintained in the county where either plaintiff or defendant resides. The various acts are referred to in 22 Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice 790, et sequa.

In United States v. Crawford (C. C.), 47 Fed. 561, 565, Judge Parker said: "I have no doubt that Congress may provide for service of process out of the district, as this is a regulation of practice and subject to the legislative control." This was cited with approval

by Judge Morrow in United States v. American Lumber Co. (C. C.), 80 Fed. 309, and in Sidney L. Bauman, etc., Co. v. Hart, 192 Fed. 498, 113 C. C. A. 104.

3. Another ground upon which this provision of the act must be upheld is that the courts of the United States, inferior to the Supreme Court, are not established by the Constitution, but owe their existence and powers to Congress alone. That they possess no powers not granted by an Act of Congress was determined as early as 1809 in Bank of United States v. Devaux, 9 U. S. 61, and again in 1812 in United States v. Hudson, 11 U. S. 32, and uniformly adhered to ever since. A late case in which this ruling is reaffirmed is In re Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 455. That Congress may increase or diminish their powers, or abolish them, is beyond question. It has done so a number of times. The judiciary act of 1875, 18 Statutes 470, extended the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States materially; the act of 1887, 24 Statutes 552, contracted it; the Judicial Code, 36 Statutes 1087, increased it in some respects and in others decreased it. By that act, Congress abolished the circuit courts, and no one ever questioned the exercise of these powers by Congress. If Congress, by the act under consideration, has seen proper to authorize the contraction of the jurisdiction of the district courts, by limiting the courts in which actions may be maintained, it has only exerted the power which has been exercised ever since the enactment of the first judiciary act, in 1789, by the First Congress under the Constitution. Possessing this power, Congress may well determine in what courts actions may or may not be maintained.

The Constitution confers on the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction but "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make." In ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. 506, 514, it was held that Congress could deprive that court of appellate jurisdiction, and the repeal of an act of Congress granting appellate jurisdiction in certain causes deprived the court of the power to review judgments in such actions. This case has been followed as a correct interpretation of the powers of Congress in all cases involving this question, decided since. Murphy v. Otter, 186 U. S. 95, 109.

In Dolley v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (D. C.), 250 Fed. 142, Judge Booth passed upon an act similar to this and sustained it.

The contention that the statute is void because vesting administrative officers with legislative discretion or power is without merit. Selective Draft cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389.

It is therefore clear that the act, if it authorizes these general orders, is within the power of Congress under the Constitution.

DOES THE ACT OF CONGRESS GRANT THIS POWER TO THE PRESIDENT?

Counsel for plaintiff contend that it does not, relying upon that part of section 10 of the act which reads: "Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by or against such carriers and judgments rendered as now provided by law."

In the opinion of the court, all this quotation means is that any person having a cause of action shall not by reason of this act, or any regulation made thereunder, be deprived of the right to maintain it in a proper court if, under the State, Federal, or common law, he is entitled to a legal remedy. It does not mean, as claimed, that having a cause of action against the carrier he has the right to institute it in any forum in which he could have brought it before the passage of this act. To meet the exigencies existing during the war, Congress has granted to the President the power to say that one shall not maintain an action in a forum where the natural effect of selecting such forum will be, in the language of General Order No. 18, "That men operating trains engaged in hauling war materials, troops, munitions, or supplies, are required to leave their trains and attend court as witnesses, and travel sometimes for hundreds of miles from their work, necessitating absence from their trains for days and sometimes for a week or more; which practice is highly prejudicial to the just interests of the Government and seriously interferes with the physical operation of the railroads; and the practice of suing in remote jurisdictions is not necessary for the protection of the rights or the just interests of plaintiffs." That the exercise of the right to maintain actions in a forum distant from the place where the witnesses reside, will seriously interfere with the successful prosecution of the war can not be open to doubt. How are the soldiers drafted under the selective-draft act to be transported from the interior to the seaports, if the operation of trains is to be interfered with in this manner? How are munitions, clothing, food, coal, and other supplies necessary to carry on the war to be transported expeditiously if the employees, without whom trains can not be operated, are to be compelled to leave their employment to attend as witnesses at places, hundreds of miles away from where their duties require them to be, whenever a person has, or imagines he has, a cause of action against the carrier, and for his convenience, or in some instances, perhaps to prevent a proper defense, institutes the action in a court far distant from the district where the cause of action arose, and in a district other than that of the residence of the plaintiff at the time of the accrual of the cause of action? The fact that not only the plaintiff but his witnesses can more conveniently attend the court, if held at or near his home, or where the cause of action accrued, may well raise a doubt whether the selection of a foreign forum is always made in good

faith. The amendment of General Order No. 18 by General Order No. 18-A was evidently intended to prevent a change of residence for the purpose of enabling a suit to be brought at a distance from where the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, as is so frequently done to enable one to maintain an action in a national court, instead of in the courts of the State of which the plaintiff and defendant were both citizens at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.

But aside from this, statutes may not be construed by selecting some part thereof and disregarding other parts. For a proper construction of a statute the whole of it must be read together, to ascertain the legislative intent. In the language of Mr. Chief Justice White in Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co., 234, U. S. 188, 191, “We may not in order to give effect to those words virtually destroy the meaning of the entire context; that is, give them a significance which would be clearly repugnant to the statute, looked at as a whole and destructive of its obvious intent." The various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency. New Lapp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass Co., 91 U. S. 656, 662; Aaron v. United States, 204 Fed. 943, 123, C. C. A. 265.

Applying this canon of construction to the act and giving effect to every part of it, as is our duty, it is apparent at once how untenable. this contention is. That part of section 10 applicable to the matter in controversy reads: "Sec. 10. That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common law, except in so far as may be inconsistent with the provisions of this act or any other act applicable to such Federal control or with any order of the President." Another provision of the act is section 9: And the President, in addition to the powers conferred by this act, shall have and is hereby given such other and further powers necessary or appropriate to give effect to the powers herein and heretofore conferred."

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There is nothing in the general orders under consideration which deprives the plaintiff of her right to maintain an action against the defendant, but for reasons of public necessity, in a time of war, these regulations were made, because in the opinion of the President and Director General for good and sufficient reasons, they are necessary to prevent serious interference with the physical operation of railroads under the control of the Government and employed in the prosecution of the war. The act and regulations may well be sustained upon the ground that "Salus populi suprema lex est." "The welfare of the people is the paramount law."

The demurrer to the plea is overruled.

[Form A, October 22, 1918.-For companies without subsidiaries.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS

AND THE

COMPANY.

PREAMBLE AND RECITALS.

day of

This Agreement, made this 1918, between William G. McAdoo, Director General of Railroads, hereinafter called the Director General, acting on behalf of the United States and the President, under the powers conferred by the proclamations of the President hereinafter referred to, and the

Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State(s) of hereinafter called the Company :

Witnesseth that

(a) WHEREAS by a proclamation dated December 26, 1917, the President, acting under the powers conferred on him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, by the joint resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives bearing date April 6 and December 7, 1917, respectively, and particularly under the powers conferred by section 1 of the act of Congress approved August 29, 1916, entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes, took possession and assumed control at 12 o'clock noon on December 28, 1917, of certain railroads and systems of transportation, including the railroad and transportation system of the Company and the appurtenances thereof, and directed that the possession, control, operation, and utilization of the transportation systems thus taken should be exercised by and through William G. McAdoo, appointed Director General of Railroads; and

(b) WHEREAS the Congress of the United States, by an act approved March 21, 1918, hereinafter called the Federal control act, has authorized the President to enter into agreements with the companies owning the railroads and systems thus taken over for the maintenance and upkeep of the same during the period of Federal control, for the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement arising from or out of Federal control, including the compensation to be received or guaranteed, and for other purposes, as in said act more fully set out, and authorize the Pres