The only case which the learned counsel for the respondent was able to rely upon, as at all approaching the present, is the case of the Western Counties Manure Company v. Lawes Chemical Manure Company, L. R., 9 Ex. 218, 43 L. J. Ex. 171, in which case a declaration was held good which alleged the disparagement of the plaintiff's goods by stating that they were inferior to those sold by the defendants. In that case special damage was alleged in the declaration, and I think that that allegation was regarded by both the learned Judges who were parties to the decision as material and essential. In the earlier case of Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624, 13 L. J. Q. B. 120, a statement was complained of which distinctly disparaged the plaintiff's goods. It cautioned the public against them, it pointed out to the public that they were not likely to realize the purpose for which they were designed, and the allegation was that" the defendant published a libel of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning him in his said. trade and of and concerning his design as follows." In that case there was no allegation of special damage; there was a demurrer to the declaration, and the declaration was held bad. Now, the only distinction that I can see between that case and the case of the Western Counties Manure Company v. Lawes Chemical Manure Company is that in the latter case special damage was alleged, whereas in the former it was not. BRAMWELL, B., does not call specific attention to the differentia between the case before him and the case of Evans v. Harlow, but he says that there is nothing in any of the cases inconsistent with the judgment which he is pronouncing. POLLOCK, B., who was the other Judge, pointed out that in Evans v. Harlow there was no allegation of special damage. Therefore, my Lords, the utmost that the Western Counties Manure Company v. Lawes Chemical Manure Company can be claimed as

an authority for is this, that an action will lie for falsely [162] disparaging another's goods where special damage results.

Evans v. Harlow is a distinct authority that it will not lie where special damage does not result. In the present case it cannot be pretended that any special damage was either alleged or proved.

Mr. Moulton sought to extricate himself from that difficulty in this way he said that if this were an action for damages that might be a well-founded objection to it, but that it is not an action for damages but a claim for an injunction, and that although it may be that to support an action for damages it would be neces

No. 13.-White v. Mellin, 1895, A. C. 162, 163.

sary to allege and prove special damage, that is not necessary where an injunction is claimed, that it is enough if a false statement is made and is likely to be repeated.

Certainly

Now, my Lords, no authority was cited to show that a Court of Equity under any of the branches of its jurisdiction had ever granted or would grant an injunction in such a case. there is no rule of equity under which it may be said generally that a Court of Equity would restrain every publication of a false statement. In the case of Canham v. Jones, 2 V. & B. 218 (13 R. R. 70), the bill stated that a certain Mr. Swainson had been the sole proprietor of a secret for preparing the medicine called "Velno's Vegetable Syrup," and that the plaintiff had obtained title to it under his will and had sold the medicine. Then the complaint was that the defendant, who had been a servant of Swainson, was employed in the preparation of the syrup, but was not acquainted with the complete preparation, certain essential ingredients being introduced by only Swainson himself and only in the presence of the plaintiff. Then it alleged "that the defendant being discharged from his service had made and advertised for sale a spurious preparation under the name of Velno's Vegetable Syrup, stated by him to be the same medicine in composition and quality as that made by Swainson and the plaintiff, the defendant's advertisement certifying that the medicine prepared by him at his residence under the name of Velno's Vegetable Syrup is precisely the same with that made and sold by the late Mr. Swainson." It was alleged that that was untrue, and that it was a spurious preparation pretending to be the same when it really was not. To that bill the defendant put in a general demurrer * for want of equity. That demurrer was [* 163] sustained by the Vice-Chancellor, Sir THOMAS PLUMER,

although for the purposes of that demurrer it was taken that the defendant selling this article was falsely stating that it was the same as the plaintiff's.

My Lords, the learned counsel relied upon recent cases in which an injunction has been granted to restrain the publication of a libel, and he suggested that there had been a growth of equity jurisprudence which had brought within its ambit a class of cases which were previously not regarded as within it. But when the case in which the Court of Appeal laid down that an injunction might be granted to restrain the publication of a libel is looked

if a

at, it will be seen that the decision was not founded upon any principle or rule of equity jurisprudence, but upon the fact that a Court of Common Law could have granted such an injunction in an action of libel, and that since the Judicature Act the power which a Court of Common Law possessed in that respect is now possessed also by the Court of Chancery. That was distinctly the ground upon which the judgment was founded, that "the 79th and 82nd sections of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, undoubtedly conferred on the Courts of Common Law the power, fit case should arise, to grant injunctions at any stage of a cause in all personal actions of contract or tort, with no limitation as to defamation;" and then, inasmuch as those powers are now possessed by the Chancery Division, it was held that they likewise could in such cases grant an injunction. That was the decision in Bonnard v. Perryman (1891), 2 Ch. 269, 60 L. J. Ch. 617. My Lords, obviously to call for the exercise of that power it would be necessary to show that there was an actionable wrong well laid, and if the statement only showed a part of that which was necessary to make up a case of action special damage was necessary to the maintenance of the action, and that special damage was not shown a tort, in the eye of the law, would not be disclosed, the case would not be within those provisions, and no injunction would be granted. I think, therefore, for these reasons, that the plaintiff would not be entitled

that is to say, if

to an injunction, any more than he would be entitled [* 164] * to maintain an action unless he established all that was necessary to make out that a tort had been committed; and for the reasons which I have given, taking the Western Counties Manure Company v. Lawes Chemical Manure Company to be good law, he has not brought himself within it.

But, my Lords, I cannot help saying that I entertain very grave doubts whether any action could be maintained for an alleged disparagement of another's goods, merely on the allegation that the goods sold by the party who is alleged to have disparaged his competitors' goods are better either generally or in this or that particular respect than his competitors' are. Of course, I put aside the question (it is not necessary to consider it) whether where a person intending to injure another, and not in the exercise of his own trade and vaunting his own goods, has maliciously and falsely disparaged the goods of another, an action will lie; I am dealing

with the class of cases which is now before us, where the only disparagement consists in vaunting the superiority of the defendant's own goods. In Evans v. Harlow, Lord DENMAN expresses himself thus: "The gist of the complaint is the defendant's telling the world that the lubricators sold by the plaintiff were not good for their purpose, but wasted the tallow. A tradesman offer

ing goods for sale exposes himself to observations of this kind, and it is not by averring them to be 'false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory,' that the plaintiff can found a charge of libel upon them. To decide so would open a very wide door to litigation, and might expose every man who said his goods were better than another's to the risk of an action.' My Lords, those observations seem to me to be replete with good sense. It is to be observed that Evans v. Harlow does not appear to have been decided on the ground merely that there was no allegation of special damage. The only Judge who alludes to the absence of such an allegation is PATTESON, J. No reference to it is to be found either in the judgment of Lord DENMAN or in the judgment of WIGHTMAN, J., the other two Judges who took part in that decision; and I think it is impossible not to see that, as Lord DENMAN says, a very wide door indeed would be opened

to * litigation, and that the Courts might be constantly [*165] employed in trying the relative merits of rival productions, if an action of this kind were allowed.

Mr. Moulton sought to distinguish the present case by saying that all that Lord DENMAN referred to was one tradesman saying that his goods were better than his rival's. That, he said, is a matter of opinion, but whether they are more healthful and more nutritious is a question of fact. My Lords, I do not think it is possible to draw such a distinction. The allegation of a tradesman that his goods are better than his neighbour's very often. involves only the consideration whether they possess one or two qualities superior to the other. Of course better means better as regards the purpose for which they are intended, and the question of better or worse in many cases depends simply upon one or two or three issues of fact. If an action will not lie because a man says that his goods are better than his neighbour's, it seems to me impossible to say that it will lie because he says that they are better in this or that or the other respect. Just consider what a door would be opened if this were permitted. That this sort of

"

No. 13. White v. Mellin, 1895, A. C. 165, 166.

puffing advertisement is in use is notorious; and we see rival cures advertised for particular ailments. The Court would then be bound to inquire, in an action brought, whether this ointment or this pill better cured the disease which it was alleged to cure, whether a particular article of food was in this respect or that better than another. Indeed, the Courts of Law would be turned into a machinery for advertising rival productions by obtaining a judicial determination which of the two was the better. As I said, advertisements and announcements of that description have been common enough; but the case of Evans v. Harlow was decided in the year 1844, somewhat over half a century ago, and the fact that no such action unless it be Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co. has ever been maintained in the Courts of Justice is very strong indeed to show that it is not maintainable. It is, indeed, unnecessary to decide the point in order to dispose of the present appeal.

For the reasons which I have given I have come to the [*166]* conclusion that the judgment of the Court below cannot be sustained, even assuming the law to be as stated by the learned Judges; but inasmuch as the case is one of great importance and some additional colour would be lent to the idea that an action of this description was maintainable by the observations in the Court below, I have thought it only right to express my grave doubts whether any such action could be maintained even if the facts brought the case within the law there laid down.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the judgment of ROMER, J., was right and ought to be restored, and that this appeal should be allowed, with the usual result as to costs; and I so move your Lordships.

Lord WATSON:

My Lords, the ground of this action is slander, not of the plaintiff himself, in his personal or business capacity, but of an article of food which he manufactures and sells as " Mellin's Infants' Food." The defendant, who is a chemist, sells the plaintiff's food at his establishments in Portsmouth and its neighbourhood. He also sells another food, in which he has a proprietary interest, which is known as "Dr. Vance's Prepared Food for Infants or Invalids."

The alleged slander is contained in a label, notice, or advertisement used by the defendant, by which "The public are recom. mended to try Dr. Vance's Prepared Food for Infants or Invalids,