up. The plaintiff continued to reside chiefly in London. He was a member of several clubs there, and had lodgings or furnished apartments in Suffolk Street, Bedford Gardens, Kensington, in Vauxhall Bridge Road, and in Cheniston Gardens, where he was when his wife died. He had a studio in Cheniston Gardens. He made a short expedition to Cairo, and he went round Scotland in the Norham Castle, accompanying the ocean yacht race of 1887 as one of the Thames Yacht Club Committee. This was the only visit (if it was a visit) to Scotland after the separation. The legal effect of the evidence is summed up by CHITTY, J. (1892, 3 Ch. 191, 192), as follows: "In the result, and on the assumption that the plaintiff's domicil of origin was Scotch, I find that the plaintiff acquired by choice a domicil in England from the time when he went to reside with his wife in the house at Albert Gate, and that the domicil thus acquired was not afterwards abandoned, but continued to the death of his wife. The evidence of the fact of residence here is amply sufficient. The true inference to be drawu from the evidence of the circumstances surrounding and accompanying the fact of the residence here, when taken in connection with the plaintiff's own letters and the other facts of the case viewed as a whole, appears to me to be that the plaintiff formed the intention of residing here indefinitely. There was the animus revertendi and manendi. According to Story's definition, that place is properly the domicil of a person in which his habitation is fixed without any present intention of removing therefrom: Story's Conflict of Laws, sect. 43. There was no present intention on the plaintiff's part to remove from London. London, which was at first merely his headquarters, afterwards became his home; he treated it as his home, and called it his home; more particularly he considered the house at Albert Gate, where he lived with his wife, as his home. A man may be in fact homeless, but he cannot in law be without a domicil. Subject to this distinction the term 'home,' in its ordinary popular sense, is practically identical with the legal idea of domicil: Dicey on Domicil, pages 42-55. Living in lodgings and changing the lodgings from time to time are circumstances to be taken into consideration on a question of domicil; they are not inconsistent with domicil. There are many foreigners resident and domiciled in this country who pass their lives in lodgings only; a man may be domiciled in a country without having a fixed habitation in some particular spot in that country. The plaintiff's lodgings or apartments were all within the area of London. If (as I think was the case) the plaintiff's domicil was English in January, 1886, there is no sufficient evidence to show subsequent abandonment of that domicil. The subsequent breaking up of the house at Albert Gate is attributed by the plaintiff to his wife; even if it were his own act, it would not of itself constitute an abandonment of a home or domicil in England. For the period of two and a half years which elapsed between the separation and his wife's death the plaintiff's principal place of residence was in London; he quitted London only for the temporary purpose of his short trips abroad. The plaintiff's counsel relied on the decision in In re Patience, 29 Ch. D. 976. On a question of fact a decision in a previous case affords little or no assistance. In that case I thought there was not sufficient evidence of intention. In this case I think there is." The Court of Appeal concurred in this decision. The defendant S. was born in 1868, in Ireland, where his father was temporarily located. In 1873 he returned with his father to England. In 1883 he went to Cannes to live with his uncle there. In 1887 he came to Birmingham for the purpose of studying pharmacy. In the same year his father acquired an Irish domicil, and S. paid occasional visits at his father's home there. In 1890 he returned to his uncle at Cannes. In 1892 he married a lady who had been born in Jersey and was the widow of a Frenchman, the ceremony being performed at Nice. His wife left him shortly afterwards, and the action arose out of disputes between them. By deed dated 20th September, 1892, made under a power of attorney executed by S. in Ireland, he entered into a partnership with his uncle and another for a term of ten years in a business to be carried on at Cannes. He paid a considerable premium upon entering into this business by means of money obtained from his wife, and for some time previously to the issue of the writ in the action regularly attended to the business in Cannes. He had, on the 10th of October, 1892, registered himself with the Mayor of Cannes as having declared his wish "établir (ou) avoir établi sa résidence à Cannes." The wife instituted an action in the Irish Court and applied for leave to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction upon S., on the ground that he was domiciled in Ireland. It was held by PORTER (M. R. for Ireland), upon the facts, particularly the fact of the defendant's paying the premium and regularly attending to the business in which he had engaged himself for ten years, that he was domiciled at Cannes, and not in Ireland. Spurway v. Spurway (22 July, 1893), 1894, 1 Ir. Ch. D. 385. AMERICAN NOTES. The principal case is repeatedly cited in Jacobs on Domicil, where the subject is discussed exhaustively and learnedly. In Fitzgerald v. Arel, 63 Iowa, 104, the Court said: "Residence and domi cil are not necessarily the same. 2 Kent Com. 431, note; Love v. Cherry, 24 Iowa, 204; Cohen v. Daniels, 25 id. 90. In the latter case, BECK, J., said, The distinction between the import of the terms "residence" and "domicil" is obvious. The first is used to indicate the place of dwelling, whether perma. nent or temporary; the second to denote a fixed, permanent residence, to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.'" See also Price v. Price, 156 Pennsylvania State, 617; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barbour (New York Supreme Ct.), 522; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 Howard (U. S. Supreme Ct.), 185; Pearce v. State, 1 Sneed (Tennessee), 63; 60 Am. Dec. 135. In Long v. Ryan, 30 Grattan (Virginia), 718, it is said: "There is a wide distinction between domicil and residence recognized by the most approved authorities. 'Domicil' is defined to be a residence at a particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time. To constitute domicil two things must concur: first, residence; secondly, the intention to remain there. Domicil therefore means more than residence. A man may be a resident of a particular locality without having his domicil there. He can have but one domicil at one and the same time, at least for the same purpose, although he may have several residences. According to the most approved writers and lexicographers, residence is defined to be the place of abode, a dwelling, a habitation, the act of abiding in a place for some continuance of time. To reside in a place is to abide, to sojourn, to dwell there permanently or for a length of time. It is to have a permanent abode for the time being as contradistinguished from a mere temporary locality of existence." "Residence' commonly imports something less fixed and stable than, and to that extent different from, 'domicil."" Jacobs on Domicil, p. 121. «In a strict legal sense, that is properly the domicil of a person where he has his true, fixed, permanent house and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." Story on Conflict of Laws, sect. 41. In the leading case of Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binney (Penn.), 349, n. "domicil" is defined to be “a residence at a particular place, accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of continuing in it an unlimited time." This has been much quoted, and with general approbation. In Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Massachusetts, 488, the Court said: "In this new and enterprising country it is doubtful whether one half of the young men, at the time of their emancipation, fix themselves in any town with an intention of always staying there. They settle in a place by way of experiment, to see whether it will suit their views of business and advancement in life, and with an intention of removing to some more advantageous position if they should be disappointed. Nevertheless they have their home in their chosen abode while they remain. Probably the meaning of Vattel is that the habitation fixed in any place, without any present intention of removing therefrom, is the domicil. At least this definition is better suited to the circumstances of this country." (This was a question of municipal and not of national domicil.) This is followed in Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Maine, 165; 83 Am. Dec. 502. "No one word is more nearly synonymous with the word 'domicil' than the word 'home.'" White v. Brown, 1 Wallace, Junior (U. S. Circ. Ct.), 217. So in Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wallace (U. S. Supreme Ct.), 350; Exeter v. Brighton, 15 Maine, 58; Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Massachusetts, 158; State v. Aldrich, 14 Rhode Island, 171; Chaine v. Wilson, 1 Bosworth (New York Super. Ct.), 673; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pennsylvania State, 302; Roberts v. Cannon, 4 Devereux & Battle (Nor. Car. No. 2. Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. Cas. 391.- Rule. Law), 256; Smith v. Croom, 7 Florida, 81; Venable v. Paulding, 19 Minnesota, 488. Some cases however require some qualifying adjective expressive of permanency. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 New York, 556; Horne v. Horne, 9 Iredell (Nor. Car.), 99; Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Illinois, 312; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Mississippi, 704; 61 Am. Dec. 530. See Notes, 13 Lawyer's Rep. Annotated; 161. THE domicil of a married woman is during coverture the same as, and follows, the domicil of her husband. Dolphin v. Robins. 7 H. L. Cas. 390-423 (s. c. 29 L. J. P. & M. 11; 5 Jur. N. s. 1271). [391] A. and B. were married in England in 1822; they lived together till 1839, when they separated. In February 1854 the husband went to Scotland, and resided there, with some very short intervals, till July 1854. In June 1854, his wife, who had followed him to Scotland, sued out, in the Scotch Courts, a process for dissolution of marriage, on account of adultery committed by him in Scotland. In July a decree for divorce à vinculo was pronounced. In September she married a Frenchman (according to the forins required by Scotch and by French law), and went with him to his domicil in France. While in England she had executed an English will, in pursuance of a power reserved to her, and in accordance with the terms of that power. After having resided nearly two years in France, she executed, in June, 1856, a holograph will (valid according to the laws of that country) revoking all previous wills: Held (sustaining the judgment of the Court of Probate) that there had not been any change of domicil by the husband A.; that the domicil of B. the wife, was that of her husband; that the Scotch decree of divorce had no effect; that she continued to be a married woman and a domiciled English woman; and that consequently her will of 1854 was properly admitted to probate, and the revoking paper of June, 1856, was a nullity. This was an appeal against an order made by Sir C. CRESSWELL, the Judge of the Probate Court, on the 5th of March, 1858, by which he rejected a responsive allegation tendered by the present appellant, in a suit which the respondents had instituted to obtain probate of the will of Mary Ann Dolphin, otherwise Marie Eustelle de Pontés, deceased. No. 2. Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. Cas. 391-393. On the 15th of July, 1822, in contemplation of a marriage between Mary Ann Payne and Vernon Dolphin, a deed was executed, by which Dolphin covenanted to settle certain hereditaments, therein described, to the uses of the marriage. This marriage was celebrated on the next day at St. George's, Hanover Square. *On the 1st of April, 1823, indentures of lease and re- [* 392] lease were executed in pursuance of this covenant, by which certain manors were settled in trust for securing to Mary Ann Dolphin £200 a year for her separate use during the joint lives of the appellant and herself, with remainder to secure her £700 a year if she should survive the appellant, and, after certain specific limitations, with remainder to the appellant, his heirs, &c. One child was born of this marriage, but it died shortly after its birth. In 1839 differences arose, and the two parties agreed to separate. By a deed of trust executed on the 15th of November, 1839, in pursuance of a family arrangement, certain estates were settled on trusts therein described, after satisfying which the trustees were to pay the surplus to Mary Ann Dolphin for life for her separate use, or to such persons as she should, notwithstanding coverture, appoint; and in case of her dying during the life of the appellant, then on trust for such purposes as, notwithstanding coverture, she should by any deed, with or without the power of revocation, duly executed, and attested in the presence of two or more credible witnesses or by her last will, direct; and in default of such direc tion, in trust for the appellant, his executors, &c. A similar power was given to her with regard to other estates not previously mentioned. On the 11th of April, 1854, Mrs. Dolphin (then residing in England), in exercise of the power reserved to her under the deed of 1839, made a will, executed according to the forms required by that deed, by which she appointed Robins and Paxton her executors, with directions to sell all the estates over which she had power to direct a sale, and (after setting apart £12,000 for the purposes therein mentioned, some of which were trusts for her husband's benefit) to stand possessed of the monies thereby obtained upon various trusts therein set forth: "And * as to the rest, residue, and remainder of the monies to [* 393] arise and be received by the means aforesaid, I give and bequeath the same unto my true and best friend, General Amedée |