Bishop v. Bishop. ing for the company, and with the knowledge and consent of all its members, paid and satisfied the Bronson judgment, and charged the amount in his individual account against the company. The transactions were equivalent to buying and selling the Bronson oil for the company, and charging them with the sum paid. We think the transactions were company transactions, and that they must be regarded as belonging to the company's accounts. In relation to the Abbot and Harley item, so called, the defendant insists that, inasmuch as the committee allowed that item in the defendant's account, and there having been. no remonstrance against the committee's report, its allowance is not the subject of consideration here. But the report of the committee states all the facts in regard to that item, and the Superior Court having reserved the case and all questions of law arising thereon for the advice of this court, we think that item is a proper subject of consideration here. All the foregoing considerations apply with the same force to that item as to the Bronson judgment, and it needs no further comment. We advise the Superior Court to disallow the sum of money paid on the Bronson judgment by the defendant, and the Abbot and Harley claim. In this opinion PARDEE, LOOMIS and GRANGER, Js., concurred. CARPENTER, J., dissenting. It seems to me that the money paid by E. C. Bishop to satisfy Bronson's judgment, ought not to be treated as money paid on account of the partnership of the Foster Farm Oil Company. E. A. Skinner, David Harris, E. C. Bishop and R. L. Bishop were the defendants in that suit. It is true they were described as partners, but it is conceded that several other persons were also interested as partners in that concern, who, being out of the jurisdiction of the court, were not made defendants and were not served with process. The judgment therefore Hamilton v. Lamphear. was in effect only a joint judgment against the four defendants. They were the only persons liable on that judgment; and if one of them had been compelled to pay the whole, it is clear that he could have maintained a suit for contribution against the other three. When that judgment was satisfied Bronson had no claim against the partners not made defendants. Payment of that judgment resulted in taking Bronson's claim out of the list of partnership liabilities. The parties paying it doubtless have a remedy against the other partners, but that ought not to deprive them of a remedy as against each other. Moreover of that judgment Skinner paid nothing. Harris paid $2,500. The balance Bronson could have collected of E. C. and R. L. Bishop, or either one of them. E. C. Bishop, acting, not for the Foster Farm Oil Company, but for himself and R. L. Bishop, paid that balance. It seems to me that the payment ought to be regarded as having been made on the joint account of the plaintiff and defendant alone, and that one half the amount so paid, (assuming that Skinner is irresponsible,) should be allowed to the defendant in this action. CHARLES S. HAMILTON vs. GEORGE S. LAMPHEAR. New Haven County, June T., 1886. PARK, C. J., CARPENTER, Pardee, LOOMIS AND GRANGER, Js. S had made a written contract with the defendant to collect for him a certain claim against an insolvent life insurance company at an agreed percentage, and, with the defendant's assent, made an arrangement with H (the plaintiff,) an attorney at law, to assist him in the business at a certain lower percentage, accounting to him for the moneys collected and looking to him for payment, and delivered to him his contract with the defendant to hold until he had been fully paid. H attended to the business, proved the claim and procured it allowed, and a dividend upon it was paid by the receiver of the insurance company to the defendant. S afterwards died. H soon after brought a suit against the defendant, upon the contract with S, averring that it Hamilton v. Lamphear. was assigned to and owned by him. While the suit was pending the administrator of the estate of S moved to be admitted as a party plaintiff, alleging that he had been duly appointed such administrator, and that the contract in question had been delivered by 8 to H under an agreement that the latter should hold and own the same for the purpose of taking out of the moneys collected the amount that was due to him, and that whatever balance was left was to be the property of S. The court allowed the administrator to enter as a co-plaintiff and afterwards rendered a joint judgment in favor of H and the administrator. Held 1. That S retained an interest in the contract which would have enabled him to sue upon it jointly with H, and that his administrator therefore could properly be admitted as a co-plaintiff with H. 2. That it was not necessary that the administrator, before being admitted as a plaintiff, should make proof of his appointment; such proof being never necessary in the first instance, as the question remains open for proof on the trial of the case, and such proof being dispensed with under the Practice Act, (sec. 3,) if the defendant does not deny in his answer the right of the plaintiff to sue as administrator. 3. That it was not necessary that the administrator should file a new complaint, as his claim was identical with the one set out in the original complaint. 4. That it did not affect the case that I had in his complaint alleged the ownership of the contract by himself, as the administrator in his application to be made a party had alleged his interest in the contract. 5. That it did not affect the case that the suit was in a city court, that the defendant was a non-resident, and that jurisdiction had been acquired only by an attachment of property in the city in H's suit; the Practice Act (sec. 19) providing that no change of parties should impair an attachment. The attachment inured to the benefit of the joint parties obtaining the judgment. 6. That it did not affect the right of the court to take jurisdiction of the administrator's part of the case that he was a non-resident. It is enough to give a city court jurisdiction if one of several joint plaintiffs resides in the city. 7. That the declarations of S, now deceased, pertinent to the matter in issue, were admissible in evidence, under the act of 1881, (Session Laws 1881, ch. 99, sec. 1.) [Argued June 2d-decided July 20th, 1886.] ACTION upon a contract for compensation for legal services; brought to the City Court of the city of New Haven, and heard before Pickett, Acting Judge. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff and another party admitted as a co-plaintiff. The defendant appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion. Hamilton v. Lamphear. E. P. Arvine, for the appellant. C. S. Hamilton, for the appellees. LOOMIS, J. It appears from the record that the defendant had a claim against the insolvent estate of the American Mutual Life Insurance & Trust Company, and that on the 20th day of February, 1878, he entered into a written contract with one Charles T. Shelton, a counsellor at law, that the latter should attend to the collection of the claim, for the compensation of twenty-five per cent. of the net amount recovered in lieu of all other charges. Shelton did not, except to a limited extent, attend personally to the matter, but with the assent of the defendant substituted Hamilton, the plaintiff, to prosecute the claim. The agreement between Shelton and Hamilton in substance was, that the latter was to assist in making and presenting proofs of this claim and other like claims, for which he was to receive two per cent. of all the moneys collected on the claims, and was to render other professional services in relation to the same and other matters for a fair compensation; and it was agreed that Hamilton might retain out of the twenty-five per cent. mentioned in the agreement between the defendant and Shelton a sufficient sum, not only to pay him the two per cent., but also to compensate him for other services rendered and to be rendered, more particularly mentioned in the agreement between Hamilton and Shelton. And to forward this last mentioned agreement, the defendant executed and delivered a power of attorney to the plaintiff (Hamilton,) authorizing him to prosecute the claim, to collect dividends and give receipts therefor, &c., but providing that he should look to Shelton for his compensation and pay over dividends collected to him. To secure Hamilton, Shelton delivered to him the written contract he had made with the defendant, to hold until he had been fully paid. Hamilton, with some assistance from Shelton, fully performed the services contemplated in the agreement between Hamilton v. Lamphear. Shelton and the defendant and in the power of attorney from the defendant to Hamilton, and obtained before the commissioners on the insolvent estate of the life insurance company an allowance in favor of the defendant and against the insurance company of the sum of $1,862.64, upon which a dividend of $93.15 has been allowed and paid by the receiver to the defendant. The defendant has never paid the twenty-five per cent. or any part of it, either to Hamilton or to Shelton. This suit was originally brought in the name of Hamilton alone. Shelton died July 29th, 1885, intestate, and afterwards, during the pendency of the suit, at the April term of the City Court, 1886, Cyrus M. Shelton, as administrator of his estate, made formal application in writing to be admitted a party, alleging, among other things, that Shelton died intestate, that the applicant had been duly appointed such administrator and had qualified as such, and also setting forth the substance of the agreement between the defendant and the intestate, and between Hamilton and the latter, and that Hamilton was to hold and own the former contract for the purpose of paying his percentage and other claims in his favor against Shelton, and that whatever balance of the twenty-five per cent. was left was to belong to Shelton and be paid to him or his assigns, and praying that as such administrator he be allowed to become a party plaintiff in this action with Hamilton, and be allowed as such co-plaintiff to prosecute the action to effect. The court granted the application and afterwards rendered a joint judgment in favor of Hamilton and the administrator. The first question for review is-whether the court erred in granting this application by the administrator to be made a party. One prominent objection is, that the intestate at the time had no interest in the contract which forms the basis of the action. But it must be conceded that at first the sole interest was in Shelton, and at the commencement of the suit it was still in him, or in Hamilton, or in both; so that at most the |