Winchell v. Coney. doubt. In some states it is held that a mortgage and the note or notes secured by it, for all the purposes of security constitute but one transaction-virtually one instrument. This must be so where the mortgage sufficiently identifies the note. Of course to comprehend the full meaning of the transaction the note as well as the mortgage must be examined. The mortgage points him directly to the note. He cannot be permitted to omit inquiry and thus say that the mortgage misled him. By so doing he would not only be taking advantage of his own negligence, but he would thereby make others responsible for that negligence. There is no hardship in requiring him to resort to the holder of the notes for information. Suppose the mortgage had stated in terms that the interest was payable annually; even then, if a purchaser would obtain exact information he must make inquiry. From the nature of the case the mortgage could not tell how much interest would remain in arrears at any subsequent time. If important, he may as well inquire to ascertain when interest is payable as to ascertain how much is unpaid. Again, in considering what notice the mortgage gave to Coney, we must bear in mind not only the circumstances of this particular case, but also the practice or the usual course of capitalists in loaning money. Money, especially in large amounts, is income producing, as much so as houses or lands. We should about as soon expect to find a real estate owner renting a house for five years, the whole rent payable at the expiration of the lease, as to find a man loaning twenty thousand dollars for five years with interest payable only at the maturity of the note. There is therefore no presumption that the payment of interest in such a case is to be deferred. The presumption is rather the other way. Our conclusion is, that the mortgage as it stands secures the payment of interest annually, and that too as against subsequent purchasers. That being so, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree without a reformation of the mortgage. We next come to the question of jurisdiction. The views above expressed make that comparatively an easy matter. Winchell v. Coney. It is the ordinary case of a suit to foreclose a mortgage. One of the defendants, being a non-resident, attempted to remove the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States. That court decided that the cause was not removable, and that decision has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The result is that the cause now is, and always has been, within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. The action of the Superior Court in allowing the application, approving the bond, and declining further proceedings, has not the force of an order abating the suit, or erasing it from the docket, for want of jurisdiction. The Superior Court cannot remove or prevent the removal of a cause. If the application is refused, the cause nevertheless, if removable, is removed on filing the application and bond by force. of the federal statute. If not removable, the allowance of the application is without force. When a cause is removed it disappears from the docket because the case has gone out of court, not by the act of the court, but by the operation of an act of Congress. If the case is not removed it is because that act does not apply, and the case remains in the Superior Court. It logically follows that, in contemplation of law, the case all the time has remained on the docket of the Superior Court and has been within its jurisdiction. No action of the court was required to reinstate it in the docket, or to revoke the order, if it may be called an order, removing it. The action of the clerk in re-entering it on the docket, when officially notified that the case was not removed, was proper. The appeal to this court from the order of removal did not oust the Superior Court of its jurisdiction. That order being a nullity, the appeal fell with it. So far as we can see the second application for a removal stands upon the same grounds as the first. The prayer for a reformation of the mortgage is not based upon a separate cause of action against Coney, but the reformation asked for is incidental to the foreclosure. As such it would affect both defendants, the same as the foreclosure, and both are Winchell v. Coney. interested. Therefore the refusal to allow the removal was proper. But aside from that, the reformation being unnecessary, that of itself justifies the refusal. Concerning the amendments little need be said. The objection that they were made while the court was without jurisdiction, for reasons already given, is without foundation. The facts essential to a reformation of the deed do not, in this case, constitute a separate and distinct cause of action. That matter is incidental to the main object of the suit a foreclosure. Therefore the objection to the amendment on that ground cannot prevail. Besides, it is a sufficient answer to these objections that the allegations respecting the reformation of the mortgage, being unnecessary, are immaterial and may be rejected as surplusage. The amendments to the complaint for the purpose of showing that interest is due are unobjectionable. The material questions arising on the several demurrers need not be separately noticed. The views already expressed dispose of them. It only remains to consider some of the questions of evidence. Many of these questions arose in the effort to prove that Coney was not a bona fide purchaser, but that Carll, notwithstanding the conveyance, was the real owner of the equity of redemption. As we have assumed that Coney was a bona fide purchaser to the extent at least of $1,100, and as we are of the opinion that the plaintiff nevertheless is entitled to a decree against him, those questions are unimportant and need not be noticed. Another question related to the alleged mistake. That, too, may be laid out of the case. The conversations between the plaintiff and Carll are of no importance. They seem to have been offered solely for the purpose of affecting the question relating to the time when interest was payable as showing the practical construction adopted by the parties. As the written instruments. taken together are free from ambiguity, we cannot see that any such evidence was necessary, or, strictly speaking, admissible for that purpose. But we cannot see that either VOL. LIV-3 Town of Haddam v. Town of East Lyme. defendant was harmed by it, and therefore the finding is not vitiated by its admission. The other evidence objected to was offered for the purpose of proving the value of the property, and that for the purpose of fixing the time to be limited for redemption. This too is of little consequence; for if the evidence was clearly inadmissible, we should advise the Superior Court to ascertain the value by competent testimony and pass a decree. The testimony of Mr. Treat, that the buildings could be re-produced for $30,000, tended to show the value of the buildings now standing, and was clearly admissible. The testimony of Mr. Wall, an expert, for the purpose of showing the rental value of the property, is less clear. He stated what in his judgment the rental value was. Ordinarily the rents actually received, deducting therefrom the expense, would be more satisfactory. But that being a matter peculiarly and perhaps solely within the knowledge of Carll, we cannot say that the court erred in not compelling the plaintiff to make Carll his witness. That the rental value, when shown, is competent evidence of value cannot be doubted. For these reasons the Superior Court is advised to render judgment for the plaintiff. In this opinion the other judges concurred. THE TOWN OF HADDAM vs. THE TOWN OF EAST LYME. Hartford District, Jan. T., 1886. PARK, C. J., CARPENTER, PARDEE, Upon the creation of a new town out of the territory of an existing one, where the legislature does not otherwise provide, any settled inhabitants of the original town who become paupers, are to be considered as belonging to the new town if they had their residence as such inhabitants upon the territory embraced within it. The town of E was incorporated from territory taken from the towns of W Town of Haddam v. Town of East Lyme. and L. The resolution provided that "all the inhabitants now or at any time residing within said limits, excepting the paupers of W now in its poor-house, shall be a separate corporation." Held that the provision with regard to a portion of the paupers, and the omission to provide for any others, and the comprehensive language used, did not take the case out of the application of the general rule. One of three selectmen of a town submitted the question of the settlement of a pauper to arbitration. Of the other selectmen one had agreed that this one "should attend to the case," and the other had not been consulted. Held that the town was not bound by the award. [Argued January 5th-decided March 1st, 1886.] ACTION to recover for supplies furnished to a pauper claimed to belong to the defendant town; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. Facts found by a committee and case reserved for advice. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. S. A. Robinson, for the plaintiffs. S. Lucas and C. W. Butler, for the defendants. PARDEE, J. In 1839 the town of East Lyme was incorporated, including territory taken from Waterford and Lyme. The father of the pauper was born within the limits of the present town of Waterford and there lived until the year 1837, when he removed to that part of the same town which was made part of the town of East Lyme; there the pauper was born in 1838; and there he lived with his father until after the incorporation of East Lyme. Neither of them gained a legal settlement in the part of Waterford which was made a part of East Lyme, nor subsequently in any other town. The pauper came to want in and was aided by East Haddam in 1882. This suit is for money thus expended. The plaintiff had judgment, and the defendant appealed. In Bethany v. Oxford, 15 Conn., 550, it is said as follows: -"But, by the construction which has been given to our laws relating to the settlement of paupers, when a town has been divided each part becomes liable to support such pau |