docket and allowed by statute to have cases so placed upon an issue of fact being closed, is bound to have it so set in the jury docket at the first term of the court, unless the parties shall afterwards agree or the court order that it shall be so placed. ib. ARBITRATION. See SELECTMAN, 1; RAILROad Co., 12. ATTACHING CREDITOR. See OFFICER, 1. ATTACHMENT. See PARTIES TO ACTION, 1. BASE FEE. See TAXATION, 3. BOND. J being pregnant with an illegitimate child, the defendant executed a bond to the plaintiff town by which, on condition that neither the town nor the parents of J would institute any legal proceedings against him on account of her condition or for the support of the child or of the mother, he covenanted that the child should not become a charge to the town during such time as the father would by law be liable for its support, the amount not to exceed that to which such father would by law be liable and the town to give him one week's notice before taking any legal steps for the support of the child or its mother. Upon a demurrer to a complaint setting out the bond, in a suit brought by the town upon it, it was held-1. That the bond was not void for uncertainty as to the amount for which the defendant was liable, nor as to the time the liability should continue. 2. That it was not void as an agreement that no criminal prosecution should be brought against the defendant, the "legal proceedings" referred to being civil proceedings, which alone the town, or the parents of J, or she herself could have instituted. 3. That the provision for one week's notice before taking any legal steps for the support of the child, had no reference to a suit on the bond. Town of Hamden v. Merwin. 418 See REPLEVIN, 1. BOND FOR COSTS. CHARITABLE BEQUEST. 1. Bequest of a fund to trustees "to appropriate the principal and interest, as they shall deem proper, to the aid of such indigent, needy and meritorious widows and orphans of the town of W as may need temporary help to keep them from being chargeable to the town as paupers, leaving it to the trustees to exercise a sound discretion as to who shall be made the subjects of such aid." Held to be a valid gift to a charitable use. Camp v. Crocker's Adm'r. 21 2. W conveyed to a charitable corporation a quantity of land in this state, to be used for the charitable purpose for which the corporation was organized, with a proviso that if it should abandon such use it should pay the market value of the property as it received it to the selectmen of the town of M, to constitute a fund of which the selectmen and their successors in office should be trustees, the interest of which should be applied by them to the aid of indigent young men fitting themselves for the ministry. The corporation accepted the property and used it for the purpose intended for about ten years, when it abandoned the use of it, but did not pay the value over to the selectmen of M. Soon after the corporation and the selectmen quitclaimed to the widow of the original donor all their interest in the land. Held that the land remained charged with the incumbrance in favor of the selectmen of the town. Storrs Agricultural School v. Whitney. 342 3. This second charity was not void as contravening the rule against perpetuities by reason of the uncertainty when it would vest, because it was preceded by a charity, and one charity thus made contingently to succeed another does not fall within the reason of the rule against perpetuities. ib. 4. The charity being a valid one, the declining of the selectmen to accept the trust could not affect it. ib. 5. The gift "to aid indigent young men in fitting themselves for the evangelical ministry," held not to be void for uncertainty." ib. See TAXATION, 1. CHURCH CONDITION BROKEN. A right to enter for condition broken is not assignable at common law, but is so under our statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 471, sec. 1 of part 5). Hoyt v. Ketcham. 60 CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF INCREASE OF COMPEN SATION. 1. The 24th amendment of the state constitution prohibits the legislature from increasing the compensation of any public officer during his continuance in office. Held that by continuance in office was meant continuance in office under one appointment. Smith v. City of Waterbury. 174 2. A city attorney was appointed in 1877 and held the office until July, 1881, when he was re-appointed. Held that he could take the benefit of an increase of compensation allowed by a statute passed before his last appointment. ib. 3. The state constitutional prohibition held to render illegal a vote of the common council of a city to pay a joint-standing committee of the council for services rendered by the committee, the office of councilman being one without compensation and the services being those ordinarily rendered by such a committee. Garvie v. City of Hartford. 440 CONTRACT. Where a contract will bear two constructions, one of which would make it legal and the other illegal, that which will make it legal will be given to it. Town of Hamden v. Merwin. 418 CORPORATION. See NOTES AND BILLS, 2-6. COSTS. In replevin for sundry articles of personal property the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff as to all the articles but one, as to which it rendered judgment that it be returned to the defendants. The court allowed full costs to the plaintiff and only the cost of certain witnesses to the defendants. Held to be no error. Cooley v. Gillan. COSTS NOT TO EXCEED DAMAGES. See TITLE IN ISSUE, 1. COUNCILMAN. See CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION, 3. DAMAGES. 81 The question whether damages are excessive can be considered only when the whole evidence is brought up on the appeal. Page v. Merwin. 427 DEBT DUE. See FOREIGN ATTACHMENT, 1, 2, 3. DEED. 1. A warranty deed described certain property conveyed, being part of a larger tract belonging to the grantors, as "the horse shed on the west side of the highway, with the land covered by the same; the grantee to have the right to go on land of the grantors around the shed for the purpose of repairing the same." Held that the highway referred to as the eastern boundary was the apparent highway, and not the line of the highway as found by actual survey, and that the land conveyed was that actually covered by the shed, without reference to its situation in relation to the true line of the highway. Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Barnes. 53 2. The question was regarded as one wholly of the construction of the language of the deed, and the provision in the deed that the grantee was to have the right to go around the shed on the land of the grantors for the purpose of making repairs, was regarded as showing clearly that the parties did not intend to convey or acquire any other land than that actually covered by the shed. ib. 3. A deed of a tract of land contained the following provision: "If any building shall be erected on said tract, the cost of which shall be less than four thousand dollars, or used for other purposes than as a dwelling house, then the whole of said land shall be forfeited and revert to the grantor, his heirs and assigns." Held-1. That this provision was not a mere restriction or limitation of the right conveyed, nor a mere personal covenant of the grantee that terminated with his death, but was a condition of the title. 2. That this condition was released by a conveyance to a party who held the title, of all the grantor's interest in the property, by the administrator of the grantor with the will annexed, the will giving the executor the power to convey, and the ad ministrator with the will annexed having by statute (Session Laws of 1877, ch. 40) the same power to convey that the executor had. Hoyt v. Ketcham. 60 4. A quitclaim deed, in this state, is an ordinary and primary instrument of conveyance, and carries to the releasee whatever interest the releasor had in the premises. ib. 5. The grantee in the deed above mentioned took back a mortgage for a part of the purchase price, and afterwards, on payment of the mortgage, gave the mortgagor a quitclaim of all his interest, not limiting it to his interest as mortgagee, nor referring to the payment of the mortgage, though stating the fact of its existence. Held that the quitclaim conveyed the entire interest of the grantor and released the condition of the original deed. ib. 6. The defendant agreed in writing to sell to the plaintiff a lot with a dwelling house thereon, "and the use of the sewer through the grantor's adjoining land to the Church street sewer." Soon after a deed was executed by the defendant and delivered to the plaintiff, which contained only the following provision as to the sewer: “Reserving to myself and my heirs and assigns the right to connect sewer pipes with the sewer now leading from said described premises through my adjoining land to Church street." The plaintiff, supposing that the deed secured to him the right to the use of the sewer, accepted it and paid the defendant the price agreed for the lot conveyed. In an action afterwards brought by him for a breach of the contract in not conveying to him the sewer right, it was held-1. That the deed did not convey such right. 2. That the plaintiff's acceptance of the deed, being made under a mistake as to its effect, did not conclude him. Butterfield v. McNamara. 94 7. The mistake, though as to the legal effect of the deed, was yet essentially a mistake of fact. ib. 8. The land through which the sewer ran was afterwards conveyed to 0, and by O to C, each deed containing the following provision as to the sewer: "Together with the right to connect sewer pipes with the sewer now leading from said B's (the plaintiff's) land to the Church street sewer." Also: "And said premises are conveyed subject to such rights, if any, as said B has to maintain a sewer across said premises." Held that nothing was conveyed to the plaintiff by these provisions. ib. 9. A misdescription in a deed does not affect its operation so long as the property intended to be conveyed is otherwise so described that it can be identified. Sherwood v. Whiting. 330 10. Especially is this so where the mistake is in some statement of fact with regard to the title, and not in the description of the property. ib. 11. A made a conveyance to B of a quantity of real estate described thus:"All the real estate of D deceased, which was distributed to E and afterwards conveyed by E to me." In point of fact E had conveyed to A before the distribution and not after, but his deed fully described the land conveved to A. Held, in a suit for the correction of the deed, that it needed no correction. ib. 12. And held that the question whether the conveyance by E to A was not made to defraud creditors and whether therefore E could recover the ib. DEMAND. See REPLEVIN, 3. DISCHARGE. See RECEIPT, 1. DISSEIZIN. See TITLE IN ISSUE, 1. DISTRIBUTION. 1. The statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 372, sec. 5,) provides that intestate estates ib. EMINENT DOMAIN. See RAILROAD, 2. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. 1. The defendants, a manufacturing company, had a standing rule known €4. |