"A. I do not.

"Q. When you sold the Vaughan, for what was it sold, for what amount? (Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.)

"A. I refuse to answer that. (The question was objected to, and after some argument the objection was sustained on the ground that only the reputed financial standing of the defendant was competent.)

* * *

"Defendant's Attorney: I move to strike out the witness' testimony.

"The Court: All testimony as to details?

"Defendant's Attorney: All testimony as to whether he owns it or not.

"The Court: Well, I think that is true, too. It is reputed worth.

"Plaintiff's Attorney: That is all his testimony? "The Court: All his testimony as to reputed worth seems to be the rule."

The defendant's twenty-third request to charge was as follows:

"There is no testimony in this case as to the reputed financial standing of the defendant, Vaughan, and I charge you that under the testimony, in this case the same cannot be considered."

In its charge to the jury the court, among other things, said:

"Now, I have been asked to charge you whether these certain statements are slanderous. You will remember: 'Mrs. McCloy has moved out drayloads of furniture; she has disappeared; she collected rents in the Vaughan apartments, and she now claims she has not collected them; she got money from the tenants in the building dishonestly, and left the city with her pockets full of money. Now it cannot be contended that the statement, "That she moved out drayloads of furniture, or that she has disappeared, or that she has collected rents from the tenants, or that she went away with her pockets full of money,' are in and of themselves slanderous. She may have done this legally and rightfully. These statements cannot alone be considered as slanderous; they are

to be taken, and may be taken, in connection with the other statements that are alleged, and if they are explanatory of those statements, or if they add to them or detract from them, they are to be considered. 'She got moneys from the tenants dishonestly, she collected rents of the tenants, and now claims she has not done so.' These, it seems to me, are the very material statements in this declaration. Charges of dishonest dealing, charges of obtaining money dishonestly in her business, if proven, would be actionable per se." Upon the subject of reputed worth, the trial court charged the jury as follows:

"There is one other matter which I am asked to call your attention to; considerable time has been spent here with reference to the question of the financial standing of the defendant. Now, gentlemen, the reputed financial standing of a defendant may be taken into consideration in considering how great weight his statements might have in the community, when considered by others who may have heard it. Now, that is true, but at the same time you must be told that the financial standing is not to be taken to increase or decrease the damages; that is to say, that simply because a man has money, he is not to be mulcted in damages, or if he has no money it is no less; it is not to be considered in that light; so you are to be very careful in considering that question. is said by our court, it should be shown to prove the influence his words would have in the community; but the court says a jury must be cautioned against allowing such evidence to carry too much weight or influence, to swell the amount of damages."

As

The record discloses that the jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000 for injured feelings, and a judgment was entered accordingly.

This renders it unnecessary for us to consider some of the points urged by defendant's counsel, as there seems to have been no recovery for injury to her business.

The defendant has brought the case here upon writ of error, and while many errors have been assigned,

we shall not find it necessary to specifically consider The following matters are covered by appropriate assignments of error:

all of them.

1. In our opinion the defendant was entitled to have the court give his third, sixth, seventh, and eighth requests to charge. We find in the record no testimony in support of these allegations in the declaration. They contained the very sting of the charge in the declaration. Where the record is in such a condition, and in a case where the language proven to have been used is not in substance the same language as charged in the declaration, and where the court's attention has been called to that fact by requests to charge, we think the defendant is entitled to have such requests given.

2. We think it was competent for the defendant to show the interest, if any, which the witnesses, Philip A. McHugh and Francis T. McGann had in the case. They offered themselves as witnesses and testified. The counsel for the plaintiff claim that such testimony was immaterial. We think that they should be estopped from here claiming that their testimony was immaterial and irrelevant. It is well settled in this State that witnesses may be cross-examined as to their interest. The interest or bias of a witness has never been regarded as irrelevant. It goes directly to his credit, and may be considered by the jury in weighing their testimony. Geary v. People, 22 Mich. 220, and cases there cited; Swift Electric Light Co. v. Grant, 90 Mich. 469 (51 N. W. 539); People v. Row, 135 Mich. 505 (98 N. W. 13); Denman v. Johnston, 85 Mich. 387 (48 N. W. 565).

In the last-cited case, while this court held that the statute authorizes a party to agree with his attorney for compensation, and that such agreement is not a material matter to be inquired into upon the trial, it added:

"If the attorney should present himself as a witness, it might be the subject of inquiry as affecting his credibility on the ground of interest."

In People v. Drolet, 157 Mich. 90 (121 N. W. 291), this court said:

"The bias or interest of a witness is always a proper subject of inquiry, and, if shown, a proper subject of argument by counsel."

See Luckhurst v. Schroeder, 183 Mich. 487 (149 N. W. 1009).

3. We are of opinion the court should have given defendant's twenty-third request to charge. And this upon the theory that the court struck out the testimony of the defendant with reference to his actual financial standing. There is some uncertainty as to just what the court did mean when it used the expression: "All his testimony as to reputed worth seems. to be the rule." We are in doubt whether the ruling of the court was so clear that the jury understood that this testimony was eliminated from the record. It is not necessary to cite cases to the effect that the actual worth of the defendant was immaterial and irrelevant. Reputed, not actual, financial standing of a defendant, is material. Brown v. Barnes, 39 Mich. 211 (33 Am. Rep. 375); Farrand v. Aldrich, 85 Mich. 593 (48 N. W. 628); Sanford v. Houghton, 184 Mich. 44 (150 N. W. 334), and cases cited. From the charge of the court we infer that the testimony of defendant as to his actual financial standing was treated as having been stricken out. We have looked in vain through the record to find any evidence tending to show the reputed worth or standing of the defendant. The record being in that condition, we think the court should have charged the jury as requested by defendant's counsel. It does appear that a number of the material allegations of the publishing of slanderous words were not proven, and the jury should have been

The language as testified to was not

so instructed. actionable per se.

Complaint is made by appellant that the testimony of the witness Becker, and others, did not show a repetition of the alleged slander. Proof of repetition of slander does not mean a verbatim repetition. The evidence is intended to show malice in repeating charges of a substantially similar nature, and calculated to produce the same impression on the community. Brown v. Barnes, supra.

We do not find it necessary to discuss any other of the many assignments of error. The questions raised are not likely to arise upon a new trial, in view of what we have said.

For the errors pointed out, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and a new trial granted.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

PERKINS . THE GOLDEN GIRL.

1. LIENS--WATERCRAFT-BILL OF COMPLAINT WAIVER OR LOSS OF LIEN-FAILURE TO STATE CORRECT AMOUNT.

Complainant's lien against a boat for an engine and materials supplied was not lost by reason of his failure to state the correct amount due, where it appeared that the error made in the bill of complaint was not intentional or was made in good faith and was not so excessive as to be misleading. 3 Comp. Laws, § 10790; (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 13626).