Boon v. The Etna Insurance Company. acts. (Drinkwater v. London Assurance Corp'n, 2 Wilson, 363; Langdale v. Mason, referred to by the text writers above cited.) In the last named case Lord Mansfield used this significant language, (cited in Park on Insurance, p. 416 :) "What is meant by military or usurped power? They are ambiguous; and they seem to have been the subject of a question and determination. They must mean rebellion, where the fire is made by authority; as, in the year 1745, the rebels came to Derby, and, if they had ordered any part of the town, or a single house, to be set on fire, that would have been by authority of a rebellion. That is the only distinction in the case-it must be by rebellion got to such a head, as to be under authority." The term "military" is employed, in the proviso, in a meaning synonymous with the usurped power intended to be described, or as qualifying and explaining what was meant by "usurped power." It was in this view, and as a ground of distinguishing between the usurped power specified in the proviso and the power of a mob, that Mr. Justice Bathurst, in the case of Drinkwater, construed "usurped power" to mean, either an invasion by foreign enemies, to give laws and usurp the Government thereof, or an internal force or rebellion, assuming the power of the Government, by making laws and punishing for not obeying those laws. An "invasion” necessarily supposed organization and military power or force. So, of the words, "foreign enemy;" and, in the use of a phrase which should include, also, violence within the kingdom, viz., "military or usurped power," something, in like manner, hostile to, or subversive of, the laws and of lawful government, was intended, as plainly as if the clause had been, "or any other military or usurped power." That the terms used in the proviso have express application to force illegally employed and adverse to the Government, is indirectly but impliedly involved in the decision and opinion of the Court in The City Fire Insurance Company v. Corlies, (21 Wendell, 367.) The Court deemed the meaning of the words "usurped power" long settled. The property there in question was de VOL. XII.- -3 Boon v. The Etna Insurance Company. stroyed by order of the mayor of the city of New York, for the purpose of arresting a conflagration. It was claimed that this was usurpation of power and authority, in disregard of the law. The Court deemed that, if the mayor had no authority to do the act, the company were still liable, for that it was not a usurpation of the power of Government, "against which the defendants intended to protect themselves." The case of Sprull v. North Carolina Ins. Co., (1 Jones' N. Car. Law R., 126,) tends strongly in the same direction; and, if an armed patrol may be deemed a military power, that case is especially pointed and significant. These considerations and the significant fact that every other word used in this proviso to designate the means by which a fire may happen, for which the company will not be liable, expresses clearly and unequivocally what is unlawful, employed in disregard or in subversion of the laws or the Government, furnish a strong case for the application of the maxim relied upon by the plaintiffs—noscitur a sociis. This maxim is not conclusive, but, in a case of doubt, and where like meaning will satisfy the provision, where there is no other clause or language hostile to the like interpretation, and, especially, where other considerations tend to support it, the maxim has especial force and significance. We think it not too much to say, that most, if not all, intelligent readers of the proviso in question would at once declare that the word military therein was employed in a sense kindred to the other terms, and that it described an organization military in its form but unlawful and hostile to the Government in its character and purpose. Again, it is a familiar rule in the construction of provisoes and exceptions of this sort, made in qualification of the general positive agreement, that words susceptible of either construction should be taken most strongly against the speaker or party whose language is to be interpreted, and that the general and positive agreement should have effect, unless the exception clearly withdraws the case from its operation. This has especial force when the other considerations pertaining to the subject tend to the same result. To this it should be added, that Boon v. The Ætna Insurance Company. it is the duty of an insurance company, seeking to limit the operation of its contract of insurance by special provisoes or exceptions, to make such limitations in clear terms, and not leave the insured in a condition to be misled. The uncertainties arising from provisoes, exceptions, qualifications and special conditions in, or endorsed upon, policies, have been often condemned, and such special modifications are justly characterized as traps to deceive and catch the unwary. An insured may reasonably be held entitled to rely on a construction favorable to himself, where the terms will rationally permit it. Where, as in this case, such construction gives a signification to a word ejusdem generis of all those with which it is found associated, and in harmony with the general character and purpose of the provision in which they are found, he is clearly entitled to insist upon such construction. Our conclusion is, that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment, for the amount of the insurance, with interest thereon from the expiration of sixty days from the 2d of May, 1865, on which day it is admitted the preliminary proofs of loss were furnished to the defendant, that is to say, with interest from the 1st of July, 1865, and with costs. Francis Fellowes, for the plaintiffs. George W. Parsons, for the defendant. The Russell and Erwin Manuf. Co. v. The P. and F. Corbin Manuf. Co. THE RUSSELL AND ERWIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY vs. THE P. & F. CORBIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND The claim of the letters patent granted to Rodolphus L. Webb, December 31st, 1867, for an "improvement in reversible locks and latches," namely, "The combination of a lock and latch, when the latch-bolt and its operative mechanism are arranged in a case or frame independent of the main case, and constructed so that the latch-bolt may be reversed, substantially as described, without removing the said independent case from the main case," is infringed by the combination of a lock and latch, in which the latch-bolt and its operative mechanism are arranged in a skeleton frame in an outer or lock case, which operates to preserve the proper relations of the yoke and tumbler, while being moved forward and backward, although it does not so operate when the latch and latch mechanism are removed from the outer or lock case. Infringement is not avoided by the fact that, when the patentee's latch-bolt is drawn forward, for the purpose of reversing it, the case or frame moves forward with it in a straight line, and that the defendants' frame, when the latch-bolt is drawn forward, moves forward in a curved line. Nor is infringement avoided by the fact, that the defendant introduces a catch, operated by a spring, to hold in position the latch and its mechanism, after reversal, until the knob-spindle is inserted. The word "independent," in the claim, does not mean that the latch and its mechanism operate without any contributory aid from the main case or adjuncts thereto, but means that the frame containing the latch and its mechanism is separate from, or forms no part of, the main case. (Before WOODRUFF and SHIPMAN, JJ., Connecticut, April 28th, 1874.) WOODRUFF, J. The bill of complaint herein is filed to restrain the alleged infringement by the defendants, of letters patent for an "improvement in reversible locks and latches," granted, on the 31st of December, 1867, to Rodolphus L. Webb, and assigned by him to the plaintiff on the 12th of May, 1868, and to recover from the defendants the gains and profits arising from such infringement, and for other relief. The answer of the defendants places their defence upon two grounds, viz., that the invention described in the patent is The Russell and Erwin Manuf. Co. v. The P. and F. Corbin Manuf. Co. not the invention of Webb, but of one Burton Mallory, and was known and used by him before the said Webb had any knowledge thereof, and was described in letters patent granted to Mallory May 5th, 1863; and that, under any proper construction of the patent to Webb, the defendant corporation has not made use of, or employed, any improvement described or claimed in the said letters patent, or sold any locks which correspond with the construction claimed by the patentee, as described in his claim. They then allege, that the locks which they have made and sold are constructed with the improvements described in letters patent issued to W. T. Munger, March 1st, 1870. In a suit in this Court between the present complainant and the same Burton Mallory referred to in the answer of of these defendants, we considered the construction and validity of the claims in the patent granted to Webb, held him to be the first inventor, and adjudged the said Burton Mallory an infringer of the rights of these complainants. (Russell & Erwin Mfg Co. v. Mallory, 10 Blatchf. C. C. R., 140.) The defendants in this cause have so far acquiesced in that decision that, on the trial of this cause, the only question raised and discussed, or to which proofs on the part of the defendants were addressed, was whether the locks and latches produced, and which, as admitted, the defendant corporation is engaged in manufacturing and selling, do infringe the patent granted to Webb on which this suit is founded. Upon that question we entertain no serious doubt. There is, it is true, a conflict of testimony. The defendants have examined experts, who point out noticeable differences between the latch mechanism. made by the defendants and that made by the complainant, but those differences are mainly formal, and, in some respects, verbal only. If, in any feature, there is material change of construction, it is, at most, an addition, modification or improvement on the structure of the patentee, which, nevertheless, embraces its substantial features, and operates by the same substantial means and in substantially the same way. We do not think it necessary to enter very fully into the de |