Judgment for damages in tort. are entitled to maintain in the name of the insured all the latter's remedies to recover damages for the collision, either against the ship in fault (y) or against her owner personally (2). We have seen that all legal choses in action were made directly assignable by the Judicature Act of 1873 (a). But it does not appear that the effect of this enactment was to authorize the assignment of any chose in action, of which the indirect assignment was previously void for champerty or otherwise (b). When judgment has been entered up for a sum of money as damages in tort, the rights of the injured party undergo a beneficial change. He has then no longer a mere right of action liable in many cases to be lost by his own or his opponent's death (c): but he has a judgment debt (d), which is enforceable by his own, and against his debtor's executors and administrators (e), which is provable in his debtor's bankruptcy (ƒ), and which is, without question, lawfully assignable (g). (a) Ante, p. 37. (b) See the last three cases cited (c) Co. Litt. 289 a; ante, pp. Wms. Saund. 72 k, n; Palmer v. Cohen, 2 B. & Ad. 966; Kramer v. Waymark, L. R. 1 Ex. 241; Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order XVII. r. 1. But there is no debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff in an action in tort, although the latter may have had a verdict ascertaining his damages, until judgment is signed; Ex parte Charles, 14 East, 197. And damages in tort are not provable in the defendant's bankruptcy, even though ascertained by verdict, unless judgment were signed before he was adjudged bankrupt; Re Newman, Ex parte Brooke, 3 Ch. D. 494. (d) Black. Comm. ii. 436, 438; iii. 160, 395; see below, Ch. III. (e) See Wms. Exors. Pt. II. Bk. III. Ch. IV., and Pt. III. Bk. II. Ch. II. § 2. (ƒ) See Ch. IV. on Bankruptcy, below. (g) Carrington v. Harway, 1 Keb. 803. CHAPTER II. OF CONTRACTS. IT has been observed (a) that personal actions may be brought to enforce an obligation arising out of contract as well as out of wrong, and that money due from another and the benefit of a contract have always been among the most important things in action. These are things valuable in money, and, as such, are included. in the personal property of him who is entitled thereto (b). But it is important to remark that such things, like the right to recover compensation for a wrong, differ widely from rights of ownership. They are nothing more than the benefit of obligations, or Obligation. rights to acts or forbearances on the part of particular persons; and they are included in what is widely termed property only in so far as they are capable of being exchanged for the ownership of money (c). For the benefit of a contract with another person is the benefit of the other's obligation to perform his contract. And a sum of money due from another—what is called a debt (d)-is nothing more than the benefit Debt. of an obligation arising from breach of a contract to pay money; which is in law as in fact a very different thing from a sum of money in a man's own possession (e). A contract is an agreement enforceable at law, made Contract. by two or more persons, whereby rights are acquired by one or more to acts or forbearances on the part of the (a) Ante, pp. 4, 28, 140. (d) Ante, pp. 30, 140. Capacity to contract. Infants' contracts. other or others of them (ƒ). To make a valid contract there must be (1.) Due capacity to contract on the part of the persons entering into the agreement; (2.) The expression by all parties of a common intention to create an obligation (g) binding some or one of them; that is, an intention that some or one of them should do or forbear something affecting their legal relations for the benefit of the others or other of them (h); (3.) Due compliance with the forms or the presence of other matter required to make a promise enforceable by English law, beyond the mere expression of a common intention; (4.) Nothing unlawful in the object of the agreement; (5.) True, full, and free consent of the parties; that is, consent unimpeachable as having been induced. through mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, duress, or undue influence (i). Let us examine each of the above elements of a valid contract more fully in turn. 1. Generally, all persons who have attained the age of twenty-one years enjoy full capacity to contract (k). At common law, the contracts of infants, or persons under that age, are generally voidable, but are valid if beneficial to the infant in the opinion of the Court, Necessaries. especially contracts for necessaries, or whatsoever things are reasonably necessary for the use of the infant according to his circumstances and condition of life (l). (f) Anson on Contract, 9, 6th (g) Ante, pp. 4, 30, 137, 149. (i) See Pollock on Contract, (k) Litt. S. 259; Co. Litt. 171 b; Pollock on Contract, 50, 5th ed. (1) Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Ex. 32 Johnstone v. Marks, 19 Q. B. D. 509; Walter v. Everard, 1891, 2 Q. B. 369. But an infant cannot bind himself by a bill of exchange, though given in payment for necessaries; Re Soltykoff, 1891, 1 Q. B. 413. Ada women. Bit by the effect of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874 (m), all contracts entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or for goods supplied (other than contracts for necessaries (n) ), and all accounts stated with them, are now absolutely void (o); and no ratification by persons of full age of their contracts made during infancy will render such contracts enforceable against them (p). Married women were under a general in- Married capacity to contract at common law. But under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (q), a married woman is capable of binding herself by contract in respect and to the extent of the separate property to which she is entitled without restraint on anticipation. The contract of a man who is so insane or drunk as to Lunatics; drunken men. be incapable of understanding its effect, is voidable at his option, if the other party knew of his condition. But if the other contracted with him in good faith, and without knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect his state of mind, and the contract be partly executed, he cannot avoid it (r). Convicts (s) are incapable of Convicts. making any contract except while they are lawfully at (m) Stat. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62; see Ex parte Kibble, Re Onslow, L. R. 10 Ch. 373; Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 439; Northcote v. Doughty, 4 C. P. D. 385; Ditcham v. Warrall, 5 C. P. D. 410; Duncan v. Dixon, 44 Ch. D. 211. (n) See Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 166. (0) Persons who have furnished an infant with money to buy necessaries are, however, entitled in equity to stand in the place of the persons who supplied the necessaries; Marlow v. Pitfeild, 1 P. W. 558. (p) Pollock on Contract, 52-— 77, 5th ed. (7) Stats. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 1 (sub-s. 2), 19; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, s. 1; Pelton v. Harrison, 1891, 2 Q. B. 422; see Williams's Conveyancing Statutes, 392 et seq., 447. (r) Molton v. Camroux, 2 Ex. Corporations. large under any licence (t). The capacity of corpora Consent. Offer and acceptance. tions to contract is placed under certain limitations, arising from the fact that they are artificial not natural persons, and sometimes also from restrictions imposed by the power which created them (u). 2. The common intention or consent of the parties to an agreement may be expressed either by their uniting in a set form of written or spoken words, or by the acceptance by some or one of them of an offer made to them or him by the others or other of them (x). In order that the acceptance of an offer may make a conCommunica- tract, it is essential that there should be communication tion. of the offer and its acceptance to each party respectively (y). But the communication of an offer or its acceptance may be made by conduct as well as in words, as where a man takes up wares exposed for sale, or gets into a ferryboat or an omnibus, or hails a cab, or borrows money. In each case his acts amount to an acceptance of the terms held out by the other party, and are equivalent to the expression in words of a promise to pay a reasonable price, or the usual or a reasonable fare, or to repay the money, as the case may be. Similarly, if a man does work, which another employs him to do without making mention of payment, that is, in general, as good as the acceptance of an offer made in express words to pay him reasonable remuneration for his labour (2). So if a man offers a reward to any one who shall do a certain thing for his benefit, performance of the conditions is an acceptance of the offer (a). An offer is revocable until the accept (t) Stat. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, ss. 8, 30. (u) On this subject, see Pollock on Contracts, 109 et seq., 145, et scq., 5th ed. (x) Pollock on Contract, 2, 5, 5th ed.; Re New Eberhardt Co., Ex parte Menzies, 43 Ch. D. 118. (y) Anson on Contract, 16, 6th ed.; Pollock on Contract, 10, 32, 5th ed.; Dickenson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463; Blackburn, L. A., 2 App. Cas. 691, 692. (z) Pollock on Contract, 1012, 5th ed.; 2 Black. Comm. 443. (a) Pollock on Contract, 13 et |