character and in protecting the rights of the nation as well as of individuals. To what, then, do we owe these blessings? It is known to all that we derive them from the excellence of our institutions. Ought we not, then, to adopt every measure which may be necessary to perpetuate them? JAMES MONROE. SPECIAL MESSAGES. WASHINGTON CITY, December 7, 1823. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States: By an act of the last session of Congress it was made the duty of the accounting officers of the Treasury to adjust and settle the accounts of Daniel D. Tompkins, late governor of the State of New York, on principles of equity and justice, subject to the revision and final decision of the President of the United States. The accounting officers have, in compliance with this act, reported to me a balance of $35,190 in favor of Governor Tompkins, which report I have had under consideration, together with his claim to an additional allowance, and should have decided on the same before the present time had I not delayed my decision at his request. From the view which I have taken of the subject I am satisfied, considering all the circumstances of the case, that a larger sum ought to be allowed him than that reported by the accounting officers of the Treasury. No appropriation, however, having been made by the act, and it appearing by recent information from him that the sum reported would afford him an essential accommodation at this time, the subject is submitted to the consideration of Congress with a view to that object. JAMES MONROE. To the Senate of the United States: I transmit to the Senate, for its advice and consent as to the ratification, a treaty lately concluded with the Seminole Indians in Florida, whereby a cession of territory is made to the United States. JAMES MONROE. DECEMBER 15, 1823. WASHINGTON, December 23, 1823. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States: I herewith transmit to Congress a statement by William Lambert, explanatory of his astronomical calculations with a view to establish the longitude of the Capitol. JAMES MONROE. WASHINGTON, December 31, 1823. To the House of Representatives of the United States: I transmit to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents, containing the information requested by the resolution of the House of the 19th instant, relating to the condition and future prospects of the Greeks. JAMES MONROE. WASHINGTON, January 5, 1824. To the House of Representatives of the United States: In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th of December last, requesting copies of contracts for cannon, cannon shot, muskets, and other small arms which have been entered into since the 1st of January, 1820, and for other detailed information therein specified, I herewith transmit a report, with accompanying documents, from the Department of War, JAMES MONROE. WASHINGTON, January 9, 1824. To the House of Representatives of the United States: Agreeably to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th of December, 1823, requesting copies of all contracts for cannon, cannon shot, muskets, and other small arms entered into since the 1st of January, 1820, I herewith transmit a report from the Department of the Navy, with other documents relating thereto. JAMES MONROE. WASHINGTON, January 12, 1824. To the House of Representatives of the United States: In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of December 24, requesting the President of the United States to lay before the House such information as he may possess, and which may be disclosed without injury to the public good, relative to the determination of any sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, to assist Spain in the subjugation of her late colonies on the American continent, and whether any Government of Europe is disposed or determined to oppose any aid or assistance which such sovereign or combination of sovereigns may afford to Spain for the subjugation of her late colonies above mentioned, I have to state that I possess no information on that subject not known to Congress which can be disclosed without injury to the public good. JAMES MONROE. WASHINGTON, January 30, 1824. To the House of Representatives of the United States: In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th of December last, requesting the President of the United States "to communicate a plan for a peace establishment of the Navy of the United States," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of the Navy, which contains the plan required. In presenting this plan to the consideration of Congress, I avail myself of the occasion to make some remarks on it which the importance of the subject requires and experience justifies. If a system of universal and permanent peace could be established, or if in war the belligerent parties would respect the rights of neutral powers, we should have no occasion for a navy or an army. The expense and dangers of such establishments might be avoided. The history of all ages proves that this can not be presumed; on the contrary, that at least one-half of every century, in ancient as well as modern times, has been consumed in wars, and often of the most general and desolating character. Nor is there any cause to infer, if we examine the condition of the nations with which we have the most intercourse and strongest political relations, that we shall in future be exempt from that calamity within any period to which a rational calculation may be extended. And as to the rights of neutral powers, it is sufficient to appeal to our own experience to demonstrate how little regard will be paid to them whenever they come in conflict with the interests of the powers at war while we rely on the justice of our cause and on argument alone. The amount of the property of our fellow-citizens which was seized and confiscated or destroyed by the belligerent parties in the wars of the French Revolution, and of those which followed before we became a party to the war, is almost incalculable. The whole movement of our Government from the establishment of our independence has been guided by a sacred regard for peace. Situated as we are in the new hemisphere, distant from Europe and unconnected with its affairs, blessed with the happiest Government on earth, and having no objects of ambition to gratify, the United States have steadily cultivated the relations of amity with every power; and if in any European wars a respect for our rights might be relied on, it was undoubtedly in those to which I have adverted. The conflict being vital, the force being nearly equally balanced, and the result uncertain, each party had the strongest motives of interest to cultivate our good will, lest we might be thrown into the opposite scale. Powerful as this consideration usually is, it was nevertheless utterly disregarded in almost every stage of and by every party to those wars. To these encroachments and injuries our regard for peace was finally forced to yield. In the war to which at length we became a party our whole coast from St. Croix to the Mississippi was either invaded or menaced with invasion, and in many parts with a strong imposing force both land and naval. In those parts where the population was most dense the pressure was comparatively light, but there was scarcely an harbor or city on any of our great inlets which could be considered secure. New York and Philadelphia were eminently exposed, the then existing works not being sufficient for their protection. The same remark is applicable in a certain extent to the cities eastward of the former, and as to the condition of the whole country southward of the latter the events which mark the war are too recent to require detail. Our armies and Navy signalized themselves in every quarter where they had occasion to meet their gallant foe, and the militia voluntarily flew to their aid with a patriotism and fought with a bravery which exalted the reputation of their Government and country and which did them the highest honor. In whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to land their troops our fortifications, where any existed, presented but little obstacle to them. They passed those works without difficulty. Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only, but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering those inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there. The expense attending this species of defense, with the exposure of the inhabitants and the waste of property, may readily be conceived. The occurrences which preceded the war and those which attended it were alike replete with useful instruction as to our future policy. Those which marked the first epoch demonstrate clearly that in the wars of other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral rights. Those of the second demonstrate with equal certainty that in any war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. Hence the subject of defense becomes intimately connected in all its parts in war and in peace, for the land and at sea. No government will be disposed in its wars with other powers to violate our rights if it knows we have the means, are prepared and resolved to defend them. The motive will also be diminished if it knows that our defenses by land are so well planned and executed that an invasion of our coast can not be productive of the evils to which we have heretofore been exposed. It was under a thorough conviction of these truths, derived from the admonitions of the late war, that Congress, as early as the year 1816, during the term of my enlightened and virtuous predecessor, under whom the war had been declared, prosecuted, and terminated, digested and made provision for the defense of our country and support of its rights, in peace as well as in war, by acts which authorized and enjoined the augmentation of our Navy to a prescribed limit, and the construction of suitable fortifications throughout the whole extent of our maritime frontier and wherever else they might be deemed necessary. It is to the execution of these works, both land and naval, and under a thorough conviction that by hastening their completion I should render the best service to my country and give the most effectual support to our free republican system of government that my humble faculties would admit of, that I have devoted so much of my time and labor to this great system of national policy since I came into this office, and shall continue to do it until my retirement from it at the end of your next session. The Navy is the arm from which our Government will always derive most aid in support of our neutral rights. Every power engaged in war will know the strength of our naval force, the number of our ships of each class, their condition, and the promptitude with which we may bring them into service, and will pay due consideration to that argument. Justice will always have great weight in the cabinets of Europe; but in long and destructive wars exigencies often occur which press so vitally on them that unless the argument of force is brought to its aid it will be disregarded. Our land forces will always perform their duty in the event of war, but they must perform it on the land. Our Navy is the arm which must be principally relied on for the annoyance of the commerce of the enemy and for the protection of our own, and also, by cooperation with the land forces, for the defense of the country. Capable of moving in any and every direction, it possesses the faculty, even when remote from our coast, of extending its aid to every interest on which the security and welfare of our Union depend. Annoying the commerce of the enemy and menacing in turn its coast, provided the force on each side is nearly equally balanced, it will draw its squadrons from our own; and in case of invasion by a powerful adversary by a land and naval force, which is always to be anticipated and ought to be provided against, our Navy may, by like cooperation with our land forces, render essential aid in protecting our interior from incursion and depredation. The great object in the event of war is to stop the enemy at the coast. If this is done our cities and whole interior will be secure. For the accomplishment of this object our fortifications must be principally relied on. By placing strong works near the mouths of our great inlets in such positions as to command the entrances into them, as may be done in many instances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ships to pass them, especially if other precautions, and particularly that of steam batteries, are resorted to in their aid. In the wars between other powers into which we may be drawn in support of our neutral rights it can not |