ACCIDENT. See Insurance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT-by married woman: New Zea-
land: ordinary commissioner]-The acknowledg-
ment of a disentailing deed by a married woman
under 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 74, was taken in New
Zealand before a commissioner authorised to
administer oaths in that colony, instead of before
a commission specially appointed under section
83. The Court allowed the documents to be
filed by virtue of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86. s. 22,
by which all acknowledgments required for the
purpose of enrolling any deed in the Court of
Chancery may be sworn in any colony before
any person lawfully authorised to administer
oaths in such colony. In re Alice Eliza Smith, 32

ACTION, CIRCUITY OF. See Bill of Exchange.

ACT OF GOD. See Negligence.

ADJOURNMENT. See Practice.

ADMIRALTY. See County Court.

AFFIRMATION. See Parliamentary Oaths Act.

ALABAMA COMPENSATION. See Marine Insurance.

APPEAL enlarging time for appeal after expiration
thereof: special circumstances: power to rescind
order dismissing action]-In exercise of the
discretion given to it by Order LVII. rule 6,
the Court will in a proper case enlarge the time
limited for the performance of a certain act, after
VOL. 50.-Q.B., C.P. & Excн. Index.

the expiration of the time so limited, even
though the non-performance of the said act was
not induced by the conduct of the opposite party
nor due to inevitable accident. Carter v.
Stubbs, 4

See Municipal Election. Practice.
APPRENTICE. See Shipping.

ARBITRATION-motion to set aside award: time:
making "complaint "]-A motion to set aside an
award made in an action in July may be made
on notice of motion given on the 24th for the
27th of November. Smith v. The Parkside
Mining Co. The Parkside Mining Co. v. Smith,

144

costs of. See Statute, Construction of.
ARCHES COURT. See Public Worship Regulation
Act.

ASSAULT-coercion: consent: submission] - The
plaintiff's mistress requested a doctor to examine
the plaintiff, who was a domestic servant, in
order to ascertain whether she was pregnant.
The plaintiff objected to the examination, but
undressed by the doctor's orders, and submitted
to be examined. The doctor examined her, and
ascertained that she was not pregnant. He used
no violence or threats and did nothing more
than was necessary for the examination.
mistress was not present. The plaintiff sued
her master and mistress and the doctor for
assault. At the trial the Judge directed a

A

The

verdict for the master and mistress, and the jury
found a verdict for the doctor:-Held (affirming
the order of the Common Pleas Division), that
there was no evidence against the master and
mistress, that the verdict in favour of the
doctor was right, and that a rule for a new trial
was rightly discharged. Latter v. Braddell and
Wife, 166 (App.), 448

ASSIGNMENT. See Chose in Action.

ATTACHMENT OF DEBTS. See Practice.

ATTESTATION. See Bills of Sale.

AWARD, setting aside. See Arbitration. Practice.

BANKRUPTCY-bankruptcy act: execution creditor:
title of trustee notice of act of bankruptcy]-A
judgment creditor, after seizure of the debtor's
goods in execution, but before sale, received a
letter from the debtor's solicitors giving notice
that a petition in bankruptcy had been filed
against the debtor in a County Court.

The

debtor having, on the hearing of the petition,
been adjudged bankrupt,-Held (affirming the
judgment of the Common Pleas Division), that
the letter was sufficient notice of an act of
bankruptcy committed by the debtor within
the meaning of section 95 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 1869, so as to deprive the execution creditor
of the protection of the section. Hocking v.
Acraman (12 Mee. & W. 170; 13 Law J. Rep.
Exch. 34) commented on. Lucas v. Dicker
(App.), 190

---

disclaimer of onerous property by trustee:
lease sub-lease: rights of sub-lessee: bank-
ruptcy act] A lessee who had granted a
sub-lease of part of premises demised to him
became bankrupt. The trustee of the bank-
rupt's estate obtained from the Court of Bank-
ruptcy, after notice to the sub-lessee, leave to
disclaim the interest of the bankrupt in the
demised premises, and disclaimed such interest
accordingly. The owner in reversion demanded
of the sub-lessee possession of the premises
comprised in the sub-lease, and, upon refusal
by the sub-lessee, brought an action to recover
possession:-Held (by the Court of Appeal),
that the action could not be maintained, inas-
much as a disclaimer is in such cases equivalent
to a surrender. Smalley v. Hardinge (App.), 367

- property held by bankrupt on trust: principal
and agent: goods in order or disposition of bank-
rupt: bankruptcy act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c.
71), s. 15. sub-ss. 1 and 5]-Brewers had a
malting agent, who acted for them alone. He
had power, for the purpose of purchasing barley
for malting, to draw on certain banking ac-
counts of the brewers. He drew out money
fraudulently, and bought barley on credit, which,

by his conduct, he represented to the brewers to
be barley paid for with their money. He also
bought malt, which he represented to have been
made from barley bought with their money.
He became bankrupt. The brewers seized all
barley and malt upon his premises, the value of
which was less than the moneys he had drawn
out. The trustee in his bankruptcy sued the
brewers for the value :-Held, that, as the bank-
rupt could not have been heard to say he was
not trustee of the barley and malt for the
brewers, the trustee in his bankruptcy likewise
(the bankrupt not having been reputed owner)
could not dispute the equitable right of the
brewers, and that the brewers were consequently
entitled to judgment. Harris v. Truman, Han-
bury & Co., 633

trustee resignation or removal: default in
accounting: committal to prison: bankruptcy
rules, 1870, rule 126: “shall enforce obedience"]
-The Comptroller in Bankruptcy reported to
the Court having jurisdiction in a certain bank-
ruptcy, that an ex-trustee in the bankruptcy
had, contrary to rule 126 of the Bankruptcy
Rules, 1870, failed to render to the Registrar
an account shewing what he had done while
trustee, and to account for the property of the
bankrupt, and had not, upon being required by
the Comptroller, given satisfactory explanation
of his conduct. The trustee was summoned to
attend at the Court, and did not do so. The
Court committed him for contempt. Upon ap-
plication for a habeas corpus to discharge him
out of custody,-Held, that rule 126, in direct-
ing the Court to "enforce obedience" to the
requisitions of the rule, did not justify a com-
mittal without a previous order of the Court
requiring obedience to such requisitions, and
that the prisoner must accordingly be discharged
out of custody. In re Royle, 656

See Conversion. Damages, Measure of.

BASE FEE, Mortgage of. See Revenue.

BASTARDY Order: subsequent marriage of
mother: liability of putative father: statute 35
& 36 Vict. c. 65. s. 3. Southeran v. Scott
(M.C. 56), 535

affiliation order: limiting duration of order:
marriage of mother: 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65 (the
Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872), ss. 4
and 5. Pearson v. Heys (M.C. 124), 762

order: subsequent marriage of mother:
ability of husband to support: 35 & 36 Vict.
c. 65. s. 3. Hardy v. Atherton (M.C. 105), 779

BILL OF EXCHANGE—prior indorser: consideration:
parol agreement: guarantee: statute of frauds:
right of holder who is prior indorser of bill to
sue intermediate indorser: circuity of action]-
The plaintiffs having supplied goods to E., drew

two bills of exchange upon him for the price.
E. accepted the bills, and the plaintiffs indorsed
them to the defendant, who, in pursuance of a
verbal agreement to become surety for E., in
respect of the price of the goods, re-indorsed
them to the plaintiffs, who, as indorsees of the
bills, sued the defendant:-Held (affirming the
judgment of BOWEN, J.), that the plaintiffs could
set up the verbal agreement to shew that the
defendant could not have sued them as prior in-
dorsers, and that, as no circuity of action would
result, the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain
their action. Wilkinson & Co. v. Unwin (App),
338.

BILL OF LADING-pledge by consignee before ar-
rival: delivery order to third party: title of in-
dorsee: liability of warehouseman: merchant
shipping amendment act, 1862]-Goods shipped
to C., as owner, were before arrival pledged
by him to the plaintiffs as security for an ad-
vance. The bill of lading was, as is customary,
in three sets, "the one being accomplished the
rest to stand void," and made the goods deliver-
able to 66
"C. or assigns," freight payable in
London. C. indorsed one copy of the bill of
lading marked " first," to the plaintiffs, and
also gave them a letter of charge, making the
bill of lading a collateral security for the ad-
vance, and empowering them to sell the goods
represented by the bill of lading should default
be made in the repayment of the advance. The
vessel went on arrival into the dock of the de-
fendants. C. duly entered the goods at the
Custom House, and they were afterwards, at the
request of C., landed and deposited with the
defendants, the freight being unpaid. The
manifest, a copy of which the captain lodged
with the defendants, authorised the defendants
to deliver the goods to the holders of the bill of
lading. On the following day the captain lodged
with the defendants a stop order for freight,
pursuant to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1862.
C. then produced and gave to the defendants, un-
indorsed, the second part of the bill of lading;
the defendants then entered C. as the pro-
prietor of the goods. C. paid the freight, the
stop was taken off, and the defendants delivered
the goods to W., on the production by him of
a delivery order from C. C. shortly after went
into liquidation, when the plaintiffs, producing
the indorsed bill of lading, in vain demanded
the goods of the defendants. In an action for
conversion,-Held (by the Court of Appeal-
BRAMWELL, L.J., and BAGGALLAY, L.J.; dis-
sentiente BRETT, L.J.), that the defendants were
not liable. (By BRAMWELL, L.J.), that the
property in the goods did not pass, but that
there was a pledge of them with a right of re-
demption in C.; that the duty of the defendants
was the same as that of the shipowner would
have been had the goods remained on board;
that the plaintiffs assented to C.'s retaining the
other parts of the bill of lading, and to the
receipt by the defendants of the goods to hold,
after freight paid to the order of C., so that

there was no conversion. (By BAGGALLAY, L.J.),
that the property in the goods passed by the
delivery of the indorsed bill of lading; that
the landing of the goods was the result of an
arrangement between the shipowner, C. and
the defendants; that the Merchant Shipping
Act did not effect that the defendants there-
after held the goods for the plaintiffs, but
that they received them to hold to an order
of C., and that in the absence of any notice of
title in anyone else, the defendants were bound
to deal with them as directed by the ostensible
owner. (By BRETT, L.J.), that the defendants
were liable; that C. by indorsing the bill of
lading to the plaintiffs passed the legal pro-
perty to the plaintiffs, only reserving to himself
an equity of redemption; that the shipowner
was therefore bound to deliver to the plaintiffs,
subject to the provisions of the Merchant
Shipping Act as to warehousing the goods;
that the defendants were, as such warehouse-
men, bound to hold the goods till freight was
paid, and then to deliver to the plaintiffs as
holders of the bill of lading. Glyn, Mills,
Currie & Co. v. The East and West India Dock
Co. (App.), 62

BILL OF SALE-attestation: insufficiency of, if by
solicitor who is also grantee]-A solicitor who
is the grantee of a bill of sale cannot also be the
attesting solicitor of that bill of sale so as to
satisfy the requirements of the Bills of Sale
Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), s. 10. Seal v.
Claridge (App.), 316

priority: registered and unregistered bills
of sale: seizure]-The provision in section 10
of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, as to the priority
of bills of sale, applies only where there has
been a bankruptcy or execution, and does not
determine the relative rights of the holder of
an unregistered bill of sale and the holder of a
registered bill of sale in the absence of bank.
ruptcy or execution. Such rights are unaffected
by the statute. Lyons v. Tucker, 322. Judg-
ment reversed on appeal, 661

· priority of competing bills of sale: registered
and unregistered: bills of sale act]-The pro-
vision in section 10 of the Bills of Sale Act,
1878, as to the priority of bills of sale, applies
to all competing bills of sale in all cases in
which registration is necessary. It is a provision
independent of section 8 of the Act, and applies
equally in such cases whether there has or has
not been a bankruptcy or an execution, and
whether there are or are not two or more re-
gistered bills of sale:-So held by the Court
of Appeal. Conelly v. Steer (App.), 326

property in goods assigned: power of grantee
to seize goods removed from grantor's premises]
-By the provisions of a bill of sale assigning
to the plaintiff all the goods and chattels on