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one point, you must see how much easier it will be for you both to carry on the great work of the union, as far as relates to Prince and people. Besides, you are the most magnanimous nation, and can excuse things to your people, which we can less excuse to ours. To judge which is the hardest task, yours or England's, put yourself in Lord Shelburne's place. The only marks of confidence shown him at Paris are such as he dares not name. Excuse this freedom, my dearest Sir; it is the result of a very warm heart, that thinks a little property nothing, to much happiness. I do not, however, ask you to do a dishonourable thing, but simply to save England, and to give our English Ministry the means of saying on the 5th December that we have done more than the last Ministry have done. I hope you will not think this zeal persecution." *

France and Prior to the arrival of this "agitated" diplomat in Spain hostile to the exten- Paris, the French Government had intimated to the American Congress that the influence of France and Mississippi. Spain was hostile to the extension of the United States' And to the boundaries through Canadian territory to the Missisthe Canadian sippi, and to their claims to the Canadian fisheries. fisheries. And M. de Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, emphasized this in Paris, by arguing with the American Commissioners in favour of England, and by declaring that the demands of the Americans were unreasonable, and that France would not continue the war for American objects.† Nor were the English Ministers ignorant of this decision of the Allied powers. Mr. Fitzherbert, the British Plenipotentiary to France, was also informed by the French Minister that it was the joint policy of France and Spain to shut out the Their joint policy comUnited States from the Mississippi, the Gulf of St. municated to Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the fisheries; and he Great Britain.

sion of the U. S. to the

U.S. claims to

* Sparks's Franklin, v. 9, p. 433. The italics are as in the original letter.

+ Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America, v. 7, p. 140

was urged to concur with France in a concert of measures for that purpose, because it could only be accomplished by the approval and aid of Great Britain.* And M. de Rayneval, who had been sent to London on a confidential mission to the British Ministry, also expressed to them the "strong opinion" of the French Government "against the American claims to the Fisheries, and to the valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio." "These opinions," says Lord Shelburne's biographer, "were carefully noted by Shelburne and Grantham."+ That this was the known policy of the Their policy French Court, is confirmed by the American Commis-known sioners' Report to Congress, after the Treaty was signed, Commisthat "as the Articles respecting the boundaries, the refugees, and fisheries, did not correspond with the policy of this (French) Court, we did not communicate the preliminaries to the Minister until after they were signed; and not, even then, the separate article." ‡

+

* Ibid, pp. 120 and 122. Sparks's Franklin, v. 9, p. 386. + Life of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 263. M. de Rayneval also wrote to the American Commissioners: "It is clearly evident that the Court of London, when it was as yet Sovereign of the Thirteen Colonies, did not consider the vast territories situated eastward of the Mississippi, as forming part of these same Colonies." M. de Rayneval to John Jay, 6th September, 1782; Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 6, p. 25.

120.

Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, v. 10, p.

sioners.

to the British Naval victories ruin

During these negotiations, the naval victory of Lord the sea power Rodney over the French fleet under DeGrasse, in the of France and West Indian waters, in April, 1782, and the successes Spain.

Congress instructs its Commis

sioners to be governed by French advice.

of Sir George Elliott and Lord Howe, at Gibraltar, in September, 1782, had ruined the sea power of France and Spain, and had given the finishing blow to the then European war against Great Britain. In America, Congress, in acknowledgment of the material aid of France in assisting the United States to a national existence, had given imperative instructions to the American Commissioners that in their negotiations with Great Britain they were "to make the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally, the King of France; and to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce, without their knowledge and concurrence; and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion." * And pending the negotiations, Congress communicated the following resolution to the French Plenipotentiary: "That they will hearken to no propositions which shall not be discussed in confidence, and in concert, with His Most Christian Majesty." +

British diplo- The diplomatic position of Lord Shelburne's Governmacy aided by U. S. modi. ment was also materially aided by the modified instrucfied ultima- tions and ultimatum of the American Congress. In

tum.

the earlier sessions, Congress had instructed its Commissioners, that in any negotiations with Great Britain, they were to insist upon the grant of Independence, the Mississippi boundaries, and the Fisheries, subsequently adding, however, the following modification : "Although it is of the utmost importance to the peace and commerce of the United States, that Canada and Nova Scotia should be ceded, and more particularly that the equal common right of the United States to the fisheries should be guaranteed to them, yet a desire of terminating the war has induced us not to make the acquisition of these objects an ultimatum on the present occasion." * The modified instructions of U. S. deJune, 1781, informed the Commissioners that Congress limited to thought it "unsafe at this distance, to tie them up by two essenabsolute and peremptory directions upon any other subject than the two essential articles" which were: (1) To effectually secure the independency and sove- (1) Indepenreignty of the United States; and (2) That the treaties (2) Validity

* Secret Journals of Congress, v. 3, p. 138.

+ Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, v. 10, p. 86. * Secret Journals of Congress, v. 2, p. 228.

mands in 1781

tials.

dence.

with France should be left in their full force and valid-of French Treaties.

ity; adding: "You are therefore to use your own judgment and prudence in securing the interest of the United States in such manner as circumstances may direct, and as the state of the belligerent, and disposition of the mediating, powers may require." "But if a difficulty should arise in the course of the negotiation for peace, from the backwardness of Britain to make a formal acknowledgment of our Independence, you are at liberty to agree to a truce, or to make such other concessions as may not affect the substance of what we contend for, and provided that Great Britain be not left in possession of any part of the Thirteen United States." ↑

The subsequent action of Congress respecting the Action of Fisheries appeared in the report of a Committee Congress respecting the recommending "that the best security for obtaining a Fisheries.

+ Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 4, p. 477.

U. S. Commissioners

right to the Fisheries, short of admitting it into the ultimatum for Peace, will be a representation to His Most Christian Majesty (of France) through one of the Ministers for negotiating the Peace, of its great importance to the United States, and of the grounds upon which it is claimed and expected." *

The American Commissioners were, therefore, fully aware of the aware, before the negotiations commenced with Mr.

modified ultimatum.

Oswald, that Congress had modified and practically
limited its ultimatum to the independence of the
United States, and the validity of the treaties with
France.

But not being as simple-minded as Mr. Oswald or Mr. Vaughan, they did not reciprocate the blundering indiscretion of these gentlemen, by disclosing to them the secret and confidential action of Congress respecting the desired treaty with Great Britain.

At this time the military and financial outlook of the United States was depressing. General Washington reported to Congress that it was impossible to recruit the army by voluntary enlistment. Silas Deane, in private letters, intimated that it would be impossible to maintain the army another year. The Secretary of State wrote to Dr. Franklin about their mortifying financial disappointments, and the " importunate demands for money," -adding: "The army demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The Treasury is empty, and there are no adequate means of filling it." And again: "Never was there a time when money was more necessary. The total abolition of paper money, the length of the war, the arrears of debts, and the slender thread by which

Depressing outlook in the United States.

U. S. Treasury empty.

* Secret Journals of Congress, v. 3, p. 151.

+ Lecky's History of England in the 18th Century, v. 4, pp. 250-51.

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