purpose on an iron vessel; and as to another part, it was the application of the same old invention, viz. planking with timber, which had been formerly done on a wooden frame, for an analogous purpose on an iron frame. (Jordan v. Moore, L. R. 1 C. P. 624.)

The use of a guide in-a frilling machine for the purpose of keeping down the work, was held by Jessel, M. R., in Hill v. Tombs (Engineer,' April 15, 1881, p. 274), not to be a patentable invention, because that was the use of known means for an analogous purpose,' guides of similar character having been employed in many other machines.

Compare the preceding cases with Penn v. Bibby (L. R. 2 Ch. 127). Mr. John Penn obtained a patent for an improvement in bearings and bushes for the shafts of screw propellers, which consisted in grooving the inner surfaces of the bearings of the shaft, and placing in the grooves strips of wood, which projected beyond the inner surface of the metal bearings, so as to support the rubbing action of the shaft whilst water was allowed to circulate freely in the intermediate channels. The metal bearings previously employed had been found unable to withstand for any length of time the friction of the screw shaft, and it almost seemed as if the screw propeller would have to be abandoned; but Mr. Penn's simple contrivance got over the difficulty, and the invention came into general use. It was contended that the alleged invention was merely a new application of an old and well-known thing, viz. wood, and the wooden bearings of grindstones and waterwheels were adduced as showing that the invention was not novel. 'In every case of this description' (said Lord Chelmsford), one main consideration seems to be whether the new application lies so much out of the track of the former use as not naturally to suggest itself to a person turning his mind

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to the subject, but to require some application of thought and study. Now, strictly applying this test to the present case, it appears to me impossible to say that the patentee's invention is merely the application of an old thing to a new purpose. The only examples of old use are of a totally different character, and for a totally different object. It is difficult to believe that bearings of this description could ever have suggested the application of wood to the bearings of screw propellers in the way described in the patent.'

A patent was obtained for improvements in the manufacture of glass. The invention consisted of a mode of forming the sides of the chambers, where the materials were fused, in such a manner that a current of cool air might circulate and so prevent over-heating. Although the principle was previously known, yet, as the contrivance when applied to the manufacture of glass rendered the process of melting less costly and less dangerous, the patent was held good. (Cannington v. Nuttall, L. R. 5 H. L. 205.)

The same distinction, which, it has been seen, is made between mechanical applications brought about by an obvious exercise of the inventive faculty and those where it is scarcely appreciable, holds good with regard to the applications of the chemical properties of matter. Thus, in Calvert v. Ashburn (Pract. Mech. Journal, vol. vii. 2nd ser. 97), it was held that the application of caustic alkalies for the purpose of dissolving the gluten contained in flour employed in the manufacture of size could not be the subject of a patent, inasmuch as caustic alkalies had been previously used for the purpose of dissolving gluten in the manufacture of starch. See also the observations of Lord Hatherley and Lord Blackburn in Bailey v. Roberton (L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1055, 1073, 1079).

This case, in which the amount of invention was

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adjudged too small to support the patent, should be compared with that of Young v. Fernie (4 Giff. 597, 612), a suit for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent for obtaining paraffine oil by the distillation of bituminous coals, wherein it was proved that previously to the plaintiff's invention paraffine oil had been extracted from bituminous shale by distillation. It was argued for the defendants, on the authority of Regina v. Cutler, Brook v. Aston, and such cases, that bituminous shale being a substance analogous to bituminous coal, the invention of the plaintiff was not in law the subject of a patent. But Stuart, V. C., said that there seemed to be no analogy between the cases cited and the present one. And in giving judgment in favour of the validity of the patent, his Honour observed, Inventions in mechanics are as widely different from inventions in economical chemistry as the laws and operations of mechanical forces differ from the laws of chemical affinities, and the results of analysis and experiment in the comparatively infant science of chemistry, with its boundless field of undiscovered laws and undiscovered substances. This observation, as applied to reported cases, will strike the mind of every lawyer who has even a slight elementary knowledge of both sciences.' (See also the case of Muntz v. Foster, ante.)

In Hills v. London Gas Light Company (5 H. & N. 369), an action upon a patent for the purification of coal gas by the use of hydrated oxides of iron, it was argued that as the property which these oxides possess of combining with sulphuretted hydrogen, the deleterious part of unpurified coal gas, was a perfectly wellknown property, the mere application of the oxides to remove sulphuretted hydrogen from gas could not be the subject of a patent. The Court of Exchequer held that if a man were simply to say that he claimed the

use of hydrated oxides of iron for the purification of gas, without saying how they were to be applied, the objection might possibly be well founded; but as the patentee had shown how the oxides were to be used, the objection failed. (Comp. Ormson v. Clarke, 13 C. B. N. s. 337; in error, 14 C. B. N. s. 475.)

Two distinct issues are usually raised upon the pleadings in regard to the question of novelty: 1st, whether the patentee is the 'true and first' inventor of the patented invention; and 2nd, whether the subject-matter of the patent is a new invention as to the public use and exercise thereof.

TRUE AND FIRST INVENTOR.'

Before examining the decisions which bear upon the questions of prior publication and public user, it may be well to advert to those which have reference to the person who asserted himself to be the true and first inventor when application was made for the patent. A discovery may be both useful and quite new to the world at large; yet if it can be shown that the person, upon whose solemn declaration that he was the true and first inventor the patent was granted, does not really answer to that designation, the patent is not saved from the clause in the statute of James, which declares that all monopolies are invalid. Let us therefore inquire what construction the courts have put upon the words true and first inventor.'

It must be kept in mind that the word 'patentee' in this section signifies, in the case of a patent granted to several persons jointly under the Act of 1883, only the person who claimed to be the inventor of the subject-matter of the patent, and does not include other noninventors who may have joined him in obtaining the grant.

Moreover, it will be seen in the next chapter that the importer of an invention from abroad is held by the courts of law to fall within the meaning of the words 'true and first inventor.'

One of the earliest cases on this subject is that of Dollond, the optician, who brought an action for an infringement of his patent for a new method of making the object-glasses of refracting telescopes. It was alleged, on the part of the defendant, that Dollond was not the true and first inventor of the method, inasmuch as Dr. Hall had made the discovery before him. But it was holden that as Dr. Hall had confined it to his closet, and had not communicated it to the public, Dollond was to be considered the first and true inventor as required by the statute. This decision has been frequently mentioned in subsequent cases, and always with approval.

The case was not reported, and our knowledge of it is derived from the mention made of it in the case of

Boulton v. Bull (2 H. Bl. 469). Dollond's case was decided in 1766, and it was followed by numerous cases, the result of which may be thus stated :-If two persons make the same invention about the same time independently of each other, he who first obtains a patent has an exclusive right to the invention (Forsyth v. Riviere, Chit. Prerog. Cr. 182); and he will be held. the first inventor, although, in point of fact, the date of his invention was subsequent to that of the other person, provided that there was not such a use of the invention previously to the patent as amounted to what is technically called 'public use.'

In Lewis v. Marling (1 W. P. C. 496), Bayley, J., said, 'If I make a discovery, and am enabled to produce an effect from my own experiments, judgment, and skill, it is no objection that some one else has made a similar discovery in his mind, unless it has become public.' And Parke, J., said, 'There is no case in which a patentee has been deprived of the benefit of his invention because another had also invented it, unless be had also rought it into use.' Again, in the case of Hill v