would be liable to seizure in those of the United States. The laws of England would be executory in them. Instead of being a part of the American, they would become a part of the British territory.

It might naturally be expected that Great Britain would have given, by her conduct, some support to her pretensions; that if she had not disclaimed altogether the principle of naturalization, she would at least have excluded from her service foreign seamen. Her conduct, however, has been altogether at variance with her precepts. She has given great facility to naturalization, in all instances where it could advance her interest, and peculiar encouragement to that of foreign seamen. She naturalizes by special act of parliament. She naturalizes all persons who reside a certain term of years in British colonies; all those who are born of British subjects in foreign dominions; and all seamen who have served a certain short term in the British service; and would doubtless protect all such as British subjects, if required by them so to do. Her governours of neighbouring provinces are at this time compelling emigrants thither from the United States, to bear arms against the United States.

The mediation offered by Russia, presents to Great Britain, as well as to the United States, a fair opportu nity of accommodating this controversy with honour. The interposition of so distinguished a power, friendly to both parties, could not be declined by either on just ground, especially by Great Britain, between whom and Russia there exists, at this time, a very interesting relation. When the British ministers are made acquainted at St. Petersburg with the conditions on which you are authorized to adjust this difference, it seems as if it would be impossible for Great Britain to decline them. Should she do it, still adhering to her former pretensions, her motive could not be misunderstood. The cause of the United States would thenceforward become the common cause of nations. A concession by them would operate to the disadvantage of every other power. They would all find, in the conduct of Great Britain, an unequivocal determination to destroy the rights of other flags, and to usurp the absolute dominion of the ocean. It is to be presumed that the British government will find it neither

for the honour or interest of Great Britain to push things to that extremity, but will have accepted this me diation, and have sent a minister or ministers to St. Petersburg, with full powers to adjust the controversy on fair and just conditions.

Should improper impressions have been taken of the probable consequences of the war, you will have ample means to remove them. It is certain, that from its prosecution, Great Britain can promise to herself no advantage, while she exposes herself to great expenses, and to the danger of still greater losses. The people of the United States, accustomed to the indulgence of a long peace, roused by the causes and the progress of the war, are rapidly acquiring military habits, and becoming a military people. Our knowledge in naval tacticks has increased, as has our maritime strength. The gallantry and success of our little navy, have formed an epoch in naval history. The laurels which these brave men have gained, not for themselves alone, but for their country, from an enemy pre-eminent in naval exploits for ages past, are among the proudest boasts of their grateful and affectionate fellow citizens. Our manufactures have taken an astonishing growth. In short, in every circumstance in which the war is felt, its pressure tends evidently to unite our people, to draw out our resources, to invigorate our means, and to make us more truly an independent nation, and, as far as may be necessary, a great maritime power.

If the British government accepts the mediation of Russia, with a sincere desire to restore a good intelligence between the two countries, it may be presumed that a fair opportunity will be afforded for the arrangement of many other important interests, with advantage to both parties. The adjustment of the controversy relating to impressment only, though very important, would leave much unfinished. Almost every neutral right has been violated, and its violation persisted in to the moment that war was declared. The President sincerely desires, and it is doubtless for the interest of Great Britain, to prevent the like in future. The interposition of the emperor of Rus

sia to promote an accommodation of these differences, is deemed particularly auspicious.

A strong hope is therefore entertained, that full powers will be given to the British commissioners to arrange all these grounds of controversy in a satisfactory manner. In entering on this interesting part of your duty, the first object which will claim your attention, is that of blockade. The violation of our neutral rights, by illegal blockades, carried to an enormous extent by orders in council, was a principal cause of the war. These orders, however, and with them the blockade of May, 1806, and, as is understood, all other illegal blockades, have been repealed, so that that cause of war has been removed. All that is now expected is, that the British government will unite in a more precise definition of blockade, and in this no difficulty is anticipated; for, having declared that no blockade would be legal which was not supported by an adequate force, and that the blockades which it might institute should be supported by an adequate force, there appears to be, according to the just interpretation of these terms, no difference of opinion on the subject.

The British government has recently, in two formal acts, given definitions of blockade, either of which would be satisfactory. The first is to be seen in a communication from Mr. Merry to this department, bearing date on the 12th of April, 1804. The following are the circumstances attending it. Commodore Hood, the commander of a British squadron in the West Indies, in 1803, having declared the islands of Martinique and Gaudaloupe in a state of blockade, without applying an adequate force to maintain it, the Secretary of State remonstrated against the illegality of the measure, which remonstrance was laid before the lords commissioners of the admiralty in England, who replied, "that they had sent orders not to consider any blockade of those islands as existing, unless in respect of particular ports, which might be actually invested, and then not to capture vessels, bound to such ports, unless they shall previously have been warned not to enter them." The second definition is to be found in a convention between Great Britain and Russia, in June, 1801, 4th sec. 3d art. which declares, "that in

order to determine what characterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given only to a port where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering." The President is willing for you to adopt either of these definitions, but prefers the first, as much more precise and determinate; and when it is considered that it was made the criterion by so formal an act, between the two governments, it cannot be presumed, that the British government will object to the renewal of it. Nothing is more natural after the differences which have taken place between the two countries, on this and other subjects, and the departure from this criterion by Great Britain, for reasons which are admitted by her no longer to exist, than that they should, on the restoration of a good understanding, recur to it again. Such a recurrence would be the more satisfactory to the President, as it would afford a proof of a disposition in the British government, not simply to compromise a difference, but to re-establish sincere friendship between the two nations.

An interference with our commerce between enemy colonies and their parent country, was among the first violations of our neutral rights committed by Great Britain in the present war with France. It took place in 1805, did extensive injury, and produced universal excitement. In securing us against a repetition of it, you will attend to an article of the convention between Russia and Great Britain, entered into on the day of

1801; to the 11th article of the project of a treaty with Great Britain that was signed by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, on the 31st of December 1806; and to the instructions from this department relating to that article, of the 20th May, 1807. The capture by Great Britain, of almost all the islands of her enemies, diminishes the importance of any regulation of this subject; but as they may be restored by a treaty of peace, it merits particular attention: It being understood, however, that unless such a trade can be obtained in a proper extent, and without a relinquishment of the principle contended for by the United States, it will be best that the treaty be silent on the subject.

A disposition has been shown by the British government to extend this principle so far as to inhibit a trade to neutrals even between a power at peace with Great Britain and her enemy, as, for example, between China and France. The absurdity of this pretension may prevent its being hereafter advanced. It will not, however, be unworthy of your attention.

By an order of the British government in 1803, British cruisers were authorized to take neutral vessels laden with innocent articles, on their return from an enemy's port, on the pretence that they had carried to such port contraband of war. This order is directly repugnant to the law of nations, as the circumstance of having contraband articles on board bound to an enemy's port, is the only legal ground of seizure. The claim was relinquished by the British government in the 9th article of the project above recited; you will endeavour in like manner to provide against it. It is the practice of British cruisers to compel the commanders of neutral vessels which they meet at sea, either to board them in person with their papers, or to send their papers on board in their own boats by an officer. The injustice and irregularity of this procedure need not be mentioned. You will endeavour to suppress it in the manner proposed in the third article of a project communicated to Mr. Monroe at London in his instructions of the 5th January, 1804. You will endeavour likewise to restrict contraband of war, as much as in your power, to the list contained in the 4th article of that project.

The pretension of Great Britain to interdict the passage of neutral vessels with their cargoes from one port to another port of an enemy, is illegal and very injurious to the commerce of neutral powers. Still more unjustifiable is the attempt to interdict their passage from a port of one independent nation to that of another, on the pretence that they are both enemies. You will endeavour to obtain, in both instances, a security for the neutral right.

Upon the whole subject I have to observe, that your first duty will be to conclude a peace with Great Britain, and that you are authorized to do it, in case you obtain a satisfactory stipulation against impressment, one which