Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to the American Plenipotentiaries at Gottenburg. Department of State, January 28, 1814.

GENTLEMEN, The British government having declined the Russian mediation, and proposed to treat directly with the United States, the President has, on due consideration, thought proper to accept the overture. To give effect to this arrangement, it was necessary that a new commission should be formed, and for that purpose that a new nomination should be made to the Senate, by whose advice and consent this important trust is committed to you.

You will consider the instructions given to the commission to treat under the mediation of Russia, as applicable to the negotiation with which you are now charged, except as they may be modified by this letter.

I shall call your attention to the most important grounds of the controversy with Great Britain only, and make such remarks on each, and on the whole subject, as have occurred since the date of the former instructions, and are deemed applicable to the present juncture, taking into view the negotiation in which you are about to engage.

On impressment, as to the right of the United States to be exempted from it, I have nothing new to add. The sentiments of the President have undergone no change on that important subject. This degrading practice must cease; our flag must protect the crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves an independent nation. To settle this difference amicably, the President is willing, as you are already informed by the former instructions, to remove all pretexts for it, to the British government, by excluding all British seamen from our vessels, and even to extend the exclusion to all British subjects, if necessary, excepting only the few already naturalized, and to stipulate likewise, the surrender of all British seamen deserting in our ports in future from British vessels, publick or private. It was presumed by all dispassionate persons, that the late law of Congress relative to seamen would effectually accomplish the object. But the President is willing, as you find, to prevent a possibility of failure, to go further.

Should a treaty be made, it is proper, and would have a conciliatory effect, that all our impressed seamen who may be discharged under it, should be paid for their services by the British government, for the time of their detention, the wages which they might have obtained in the merchant service of their own country.

Blockade is the subject next in point of importance, which you will have to arrange. In the instructions bearing date on the 15th of April, 1813, it was remarked, that as the British government had revoked its orders in council, and agreed that no blockade could be legal which was not supported by an adequate force, and that such adequate force should be applied to any blockade which it might thereafter institute, this cause of controversy seemed to be removed. Further reflection, however, has added great force to the expediency and importance of a precise definition of the publick law on this subject. There is much cause to presume, that if the repeal of the orders in council had taken place in time to have been known here before the declaration of war, and had had the effect of preventing the declaration, not only that no provision would have been obtained against impressment, but that under the name of blockade, the same extent of coast would have been covered by proclamation as had been covered by the orders in council. The war, which these abuses and impressment contributed so much to produce, might possibly prevent that consequence. But it would be more satisfactory, if not more safe, to guard against it by a formal definition in the treaty. It is true, should the British government violate again the legitimate principles of blockade, in whatever terms, or under whatever pretext it might be done, the United States would have in their hands a correspondent resort; but a principal object in making peace is to prevent, by the justice and reciprocity of the conditions, a recurrence again to war, for the same cause. If the British government sincerely wishes to make a durable peace with the United States, it can have no reasonable objection to a just definition of blockade, especially as the two governments have agreed in their correspondence, in all its essential features. The instructions of the 15th of

April, 1813, have stated in what manner the President is willing to arrange this difference.

On the other neutral rights, enumerated in the former instructions, I shall remark only, that the catalogue is limited in a manner to evince a spirit of accommodation; that the arrangement proposed in each instance is just in itself; that it corresponds with the general spirit of treaties between commercial powers, and that Great Britain has sanctioned it in many treaties, and gone beyond it in

some.

On the claim to indemnity for spoliations, I have only to refer you to what was said in the former instructions. I have to add, that should a treaty be formed, it is just in itself, and would have a happy effect on the future relations of the two countries, if indemnity should be stipulated on each side, for the destruction of all unfortified towns, and other private property, contrary to the laws and usages of war. It is equally proper that the negroes taken from the southern states, should be returned to their owners, or paid for at their full value. It is known that a shameful traffick has been carried on in the West Indies. by the sale of these persons there, by those who professed to be their deliverers. Of this fact, the proof which has reached this department shall be furnished you. If these slaves are considered as non-combatants, they ought to be restored: if, as property, they ought to be paid for. The treaty of peace contains an article, which recognises this principle.

In the view which I have taken of the conditions on which you are to insist, in the proposed negotiations, you will find, on a comparison of them with those stated in the former instructions, that there is no material difference between them, the two last mentioned claims to indemnity excepted, which have originated since the date of those instructions. The principal object of this review has been to show, that the sentiments of the President, are the same in every instance, and that the reasons for maintaining them have become more evident and strong since the date of those instructions.

In accepting the overture of the British government to treat independently of the Russian mediation, the United

F

States have acted on principles which governed them in every transaction relating to peace since the war. Had the British government accepted the Russian mediation, the United States would have treated for themselves, independently of any other power, and had Great Britain met them on just conditions, peace would have been the immediate result. Had she refused to accede to such conditions, and attempted to dictate others, a knowledge of the views of other powers on those points might have been useful to the United States. In agreeing to treat directly with Great Britain, not only is no concession contemplated, on any point in controversy, but the same desire is cherished to preserve a good understanding with Russia, and the other Baltick powers, as if the negotiation had taken place under the mediation of Russia.

It is probable that the British government may have declined the Russian mediation, from the apprehension of an understanding between the United States and Russia, for very different purposes from those which have been contemplated, in the hope that a much better treaty might be obtained of the United States, in a direct negotiation, than could be obtained under the Russian mediation, and with a view to profit, of the concessions which might thus be made by the United States, in future negotiations with the Baltick powers. If this was the object of the British government, and it is not easy to conceive any other, it clearly proves the advantage to be derived in the proposed negotiation, from the aid of those powers, in securing from the British government, such conditions as would be satisfactory to all parties. It would be highly honourable as well as advantageous to the United States, if the negotiation with which you are charged, should terminate in such a treaty.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

VOL. IX.

47

JAMES MONROE.

Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to the Plenipotentiaries of the United States, at Gottenburg. Department of State, Jan. 30, 1814.

GENTLEMEN,-In addition to the claims to indemnity, stated in your preceding instructions, I have to request your attention to the following, to which it is presumed there can be no objection.

On the declaration of war by the United States, there happened to be, in the ordinary course of commerce, several American vessels and cargoes in the ports of Great Britain, which were seized and condemned; and, in one instance, an American ship which fled from Algiers, in consequence of the declaration of war by the dey, to Gibraltar, with the American consul and some publick stores on board, shared a like fate.

After the declaration of war, Congress passed an act, allowing to British subjects six months, from the date of the declaration, to remove their property out of the United States, in consequence of which many vessels were removed with their cargoes. I add, with confidence, that, on a liberal construction of the spirit of the law, some vessels were permitted to depart, even after the expiration of the term specified in the law. I will endeavour to put in your possession a list of these cases. A general reciprocal provision, however, will be best adapted to the object in view.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

JAMES MONROE.

From the Secretary of State, to the Commissioners of the United States, for treating with Great Britain. Depart ment of State, Feb. 10, 1814.

GENTLEMEN,-Should you conclude a treaty and not obtain a satisfactory arrangement of neutral rights, it will be proper for you to provide that the United States shall have advantage of any stipulations more favourable to neutral nations, that may be established between Great Britain and other powers. A precedent for such a pro