such claims in general. The pertinent part of this exchange between the German Chancellor and the American Ambassador at Berlin begins with this quotation from the Chancellor's letter of August 10, 1922: From the numerous conferences which have taken place with your excellency, the German Government believes itself justified in assuming that it is not the intention of the American Government to insist in the proceedings of the commission upon all the claims contemplated in the Versailles treaty without exception; that it in particular does not intend to raise claims such as those included in paragraphs 5 to 7 of annex 1 of article 244 of the Versailles treaty (claims for reimbursement of military pensions paid by the American Government and of allowances paid to American prisoners of war or their families and to the families of persons mobilized) or indeed claims going beyond the treaty of August 25, 1921. The German Government would be grateful if your excellency would confirm the correctness of this assumption. The American Ambassador replied on the same day as follows: In accordance with the instructions that I have received from my Government, I am authorized by the President to state that he has no intention of pressing against Germany or of presenting to the commission established under the claims agreement any claims . . . falling within paragraphs 5 to 7, inclusive, of the annex following article 244 of the treaty of Versailles.1 PRESENTS PLANS OF SETTLEMENT The present study is highly selective. The previous publications have described the general machinery of reparation, which has not changed. The subsequent efforts to work out a final scheme of payment are consequently the proper thing on which to throw some light. This publication, therefore, aims to set forth the official documents which represent serious consideration of the possible terms of settlement. It will doubtless be found that the eventual agreement will be a combination of elements from the allied and German plans printed in the first three chapters of this publication. The Reparation Commission, which by the treaty shall "in 1 Myers, "Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers, 1910-1923," Vol. III, p. 2603-04. (Sen. Doc. 348, 67th Cong., 4th sess.) general have wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation problem," has had very little to do with the matter in the period from November, 1922, to March, 1924. Beginning with decisions as to German defaults on timber and coal in December, 1922, the problem has in effect been remitted to the creditor states. This has been perhaps natural and inevitable, but as a constantly recurring situation it emphasizes a condition fundamentally unsatisfactory. The treaty clearly contemplates that the Reparation Commission should be a responsible body, but it contradictorily provides that "no member of the commission shall be responsible, except to the Government appointing him." It consequently follows that in any matter of crucial importance, the members of the commission act solely as agents of their Governments and not in any other capacity. This condition accounts for the fact that so much of reparation history emanates from the foreign offices rather than the headquarters of the commission. There was every evidence before the publication of the reports of the Committees of Experts that the political mood of the creditor states was such that the purely economic recommendations of the experts would be acceptable as a way of closing the door on past policy. There remains, however, a great deal of detail to be worked out, not only by the Reparation Commission, but by the Governments, before the reparation problem can be said to be proceeding with automatic regularity. Throughout the period under review, the seizure and occupation of the Ruhr has been to the fore. The question of its legality has been definitely raised and the documents printed herein incidentally refer to the controversy on that subject. The German passive resistance in the Ruhr was a novel feature of the incident, and the attitude of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission was a matter of fundamental importance. I. PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT The account of reparation negotiations previously published in this series closed with a summary of the London meetings of the British, French, Belgian and Italian premiers in August, 1922.2 At that conference the policy which France subsequently pursued became evident and met with opposition. Germany, already granted a moratorium from the strict terms of the Schedule of Payments of May 5, 1921,3 was having difficulties and was seeking a longer respite. At that period there was a general feeling among those qualified to have an economic opinion on the subject that the burden technically imposed on Germany must be lightened if that country were to acquire a reasonable capacity to pay by methods and means which the creditors could afford to accept. In the autumn of 1922 Germany, hampered from the time of the armistice by prejudice against her motives, sought to refute the allegation of avoiding the reparation debt by calling together financial experts of world-wide reputation and securing from them a study of her condition. Their reports were transmitted to the Reparation Commission on November 14, 1922, with an application for a moratorium based upon a scheme founded upon the expert reports. As the moratorium then current would expire with the coming December, it was obvious that this move must receive attention. The British, French, Belgian and Italian premiers met at London on December 9 and 10, 1922, and at Paris on January 2-4, 1923,4 for this purpose. The actual work of the meetings was, however, taken up with discussions of Italian, British and French proposals for settlement, which are exceedingly enlightening as to the 'The proceedings have not been made public. The British have sought to publish them and have stated in Parliament that French consent was not forthcoming. The French have said the Belgians objected, and the Belgian foreign minister states that as he was not a party to all the conferences, he was unable to consent to the integral publication of the proceedings. 2Vol. V, No. 2, p. 108. "Vol. V, No. 3, p. 195. "The Italian premier was represented at Paris by a delegate. national points of view and which as a whole, along with the German proposals, present the possible lines of settlement. This group of documents is therefore set forth herewith. The plans were discussed at great length, but without progress toward an agreement. The Italian plan was not brought into the argument, which was confined almost exclusively to British and French memoranda and criticisms of their respective proposals. In the end considerable frankness prevailed and the statements of Messrs. Bonar Law and Poincaré at the conclusion of the session of January 4 accurately reflected the British and French attitudes. At that time Mr. Bonar Law read a statement as follows: His Majesty's Government, after giving the most earnest consideration to the French proposals, are definitely of opinion that these proposals, if carried into effect, will not only fail in attaining the desired results, but are likely to have a grave and even disastrous effect upon the economic situation in Europe, and, in these circumstances, they can not take part in, or accept responsibility for, them. His Majesty's Government at the same time desire to assure the Government of the Republic that while they regret extremely that there should be an irreconcilable difference of opinion on a subject so serious, the feeling of friendship on the part not only of the British Government, but, as they believe, of the British people, toward the Government and people of France remains unchanged.1 M. Poincaré thanked the British Government for the last statement, and then read the following statement on behalf of the French Government: The Government of the Republic for their part have examined very attentively and carefully the British proposals, and the longer they have studied them, the more have they felt obliged to recognize that the proposals would involve, together with a considerable reduction of the debt owing to France, the overthrow of the treaty of Versailles, and that it is impossible for them to accept such a solution. The Government of the Republic deeply regret their inability to agree with the British Government on those serious questions, but they thank the British Government for their friendly statements and can assure them that, in spite of this difference of opinion, the sentiments of the Government of the Republic and of the French nation toward England remain unchangingly cordial. "Interallied Conferences on Reparations and Interallied Debts," p. 194. (Miscellaneous No. 3, 1923. Cmd. 1812.) |