It is said that the salaries and expenses, or budget of the court, are fixed by the Assembly of the League upon the proposal of the Council. But the action of the Assembly is the action of the 52 members composing the Assembly and the recommendation of the Council is the recommendation of the states composing the Council, in each case the action being taken under the statute of the court. If the nations are to support a court, they must of course have some practical means of dealing with the budget. Under the present plan, by which both these groups act, there is abundant protection against extravagance. We properly reserve the right of Congress to determine by its appropriation the amount which the United States shall pay as its share. I find nothing which can be regarded as inimical to the interests of the United States in the provisions as to procedure.

(3) But it is said that support of the court, although it manifestly does not involve entrance into the League or the assumption of any obligation under the Covenant of the League, constitutes an entanglement. But in what do we become entangled? Are we to abandon the effort to dispose of international controversies by judicial settlement, which has been a feature of American policy since the foundation of the Government? We can not have an ordinary arbitration unless we have an international agreement and an international tribunal for the purpose of the arbitration. We have never considered this to be an entanglement. We have manifested our desire for such judicial settlements by numerous treaties and special conventions.

Certainly we do not object that the disputes of others should be settled peacefully by similar methods. Then, as I have shown, the establishment of a permanent court has been an American policy because we have desired this essential improvement in judicial process in international relations. Political platforms have treated this as an American policy, and not as a forbidden entanglement. If you are to treat participation in a permanent court of international justice as an entanglement foreign to our institutions, you must rewrite American history. If you are not, then the question is as to this particular permanent court, and we return to the consideration of its organization and functions, and these justify the conclusion that it is an independent judicial body of the highest character and deserves our confidence.

JURISDICTION IS VOLUNTARY

(4) Again, it is objected that a world court should have compulsory jurisdiction and that the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice is not compulsory. It may be noted that provision is made in the statute of the court for the acceptance by states, through a special agreement, of compulsory jurisdiction of legal disputes as defined in the statute. I understand that of the 46 states that have signed the protocol about 15 have ratified this optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction, but among the majority of the states which have not assented to the optional clause are Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. It is apparent that the greater nations are not yet ready to accept compulsory jurisdiction even of the limited class of questions above described. Certainly it does not appear that the United States is ready to accept it.

The American plan for a permanent court, which was submitted to the Second Hague Conference, was, as Mr. Choate pointed out, for a jurisdiction of a voluntary character. The Senate repeatedly, from the days of President Cleveland, has refused to sanction an arbitration treaty providing for compulsory arbitration. It has been required that, even under our general arbitration treaties relating to legal disputes, there should be a limitation relating to questions which affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states, and the Senate has insisted that a special agreement for each particular arbitration should be submitted for its assent.

Shall we postpone the plan for a world court because we can not have compulsory jurisdiction? Can we not make substantial progress in the judicial process by the creating of a tribunal which in the highest degree will command confidence and to which the nations may present their cases for the most impartial and expert consideration that is obtainable? Why should impossibilities be demanded if we are really interested in judicial settlement? It is said that the court is substantially an arbitral tribunal because of the absence of compulsory jurisdiction. But this is not an effective argument, for even if the court could be so described, the question would remain: Why should we not have the great advantage of this improvement in the judicial mechanism? This brings us back to the question whether or not we desire a permanent court with the continuous service of judges with appropriate

judicial standards instead of temporary arbitral tribunals—a question to the affirmative answer of which we have long been committed.

(5) Further, it is objected that no provision is made for the enforcement of the decisions of the court. There are those who desire to see an international armed force to compel the carrying out of decisions. Those who make this demand generally assume that there will be substantial unity among those furnishing the armed force so that it can be used. But when there is such international unity the power of public opinion is at its maximum and there is the least need for force, while in the absence of such unity the armed force is likely to remain unused.

The truth is that the decisions of the court will have the most solemn sanction that it is practicable to obtain. When nations agree to submit a dispute to a tribunal and to abide by the decision, its observance is a point of international honor of the highest sort. You can really have no better sanction than this and the obligation is one which will be all the more keenly felt when the decision is not simply that of a temporary arbitral tribunal but of a permanent court supported by practically all the nations of the world. If you desire to improve the authority of judicial determinations of international disputes, you can best effect the object by improving the reputation for impartiality, and for disinterested judicial consideration, of the tribunal that decides them.

(6) An objection of a different character is that the United States should unconditionally support the court, and therefore, apparently, that the suggested conditions should be withdrawn. This objection simply means that the United States should enter the League of Nations, as the objection assumes, in accordance with the fact that the proposed support of the court does not involve entry into the League.

But why, in supporting an institution which embodies a cherished ideal of the American people, should we revive the controversy over the League? Why should we not support the court as a judicial body? In giving this support, however, it is important that we should reserve the right to participate in the election of judges, that we should protect ourselves against amendment of the statute without our consent, and that we should provide

for the determination by Congress of the amount to be paid as our share of the expenses. The stipulated conditions are appropriate to the purpose.

ANSWERS SIX-VOTE OBJECTION

(7) Another objection is that the British Empire has six votes in the Assembly of the League in the election of judges, because the Dominions and other constituent parts of the Empire are members of the Assembly. It must be remembered, however, that there are 52 votes in the Assembly. The admission to membership of these parts of the British Empire has been a recognition of the aspiration of the peoples composing them, and this has not been found an insuperable obstacle to the support of the court by other powers. And it would be difficult to find a sound reason for objection on the part of the United States to this increase on natural grounds in the voting strength of the peoples who have been developed under the influence of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.

Moreover, under the proposed condition the United States will not only participate in the election by the Assembly, but also in the election by the Council, and in the Council the British Empire has but one vote. We are far better protected by this arrangement than by one which would have all states vote together on exactly the same footing and where the smallest nation would cast the same vote as the United States. The arrangement for our participation in the voting for the judges by the Council is really a stronger protection to the interests of the United States than has hitherto been suggested in any plan for a permanent court. The question should also be considered in the light of the nature of the action that is involved. It is practically impossible, under the scheme that has been adopted, for the British Empire, or for any combination, to secure an election of judges in aid of a particular political interest. Such an effort would die stillborn, because of the necessity for a concurrent choice by both groups of nations in the manner that has been devised.

Finally, it is hardly necessary to say that I am in entire sympathy with efforts to codify international law and to provide conventions for its improvement. I believe in conferences for that purpose. We have already made some progress in this direction

through the recent Commission of Jurists which sat at The Hague to suggest modifications in the laws of war which are made necessary by new agencies of warfare-a commission established under a resolution adopted at the Conference on Limitation of Armament. However, the process of codifying, clarifying and improving international law is necessarily a slow one, and if we wait for a satisfactory body of law before we have a permanent court a generation will pass before it is established. Meanwhile let us supply appropriate means for the application of the law we have. The two projects are not inconsistent; the one can exist along with the other.

But we have an acute world need. We shall make no progress toward the prevention of war if we adopt a perfectionist policy. Whatever else we should have, we need at once a permanent court of international justice. No plan to promote peace can dispense with it. Why should we wait for the solution of difficult problems of policy and the settlement of the most acute international controversies of a political nature before we meet the obvious necessity of providing for the appropriate disposition of those controversies with which an international court is competent to deal?

Any successful effort to settle controversies aids in the cultivation of good will and the desire for the adjustments of amity. The support of a permanent court as an institution of peace will be a powerful influence in the development of the will to peace. I hope that the United States, in deference to its own interests and in justice to its ideals, will do its part.