have seen eye to eye with Wilson. But when the war closed these liberals had mostly been shaken out of both Governments and their places taken by virile conservatives under the able leadership of Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Advanced liberals in every country hoped until the last moment that Wilson would insist upon a righteous peace, and, failing that, would return home without giving his sanction to a treaty of another sort. But if he had done this he would have left the world in greater confusion than it now is, and he would have had but little support from our people and less from the Senate. He might have been a little less yielding at Paris and a little more yielding at Washington if he had realized that the situation was no longer wholly in his hands. George and Clemenceau did not sense the real situation any more than Wilson, and he might have safely forced them further toward his point of view. On the other hand, the result would probably have been the same, for the Senate were plainly waiting to deal him a mortal blow, and chose the Covenant as the most convenient spot to strike. Nevertheless, taking the treaty as it is, it could have been made a workable and efficient instrument for peace had we done our part. Among those who know there is absolute agreement that the crux of most of the trouble that has arisen since the armistice was signed is France's fear of Germany, not immediate, but eventual. Failure to pay reparations has been the apparent cause of the controversy, but the real cause is the fear of Frenchmen that when Germany is in condition to pay she will also be in condition to discontinue payment and, should it suit her plans, to invade France again. That was the situation which confronted the American delegates in Paris and that is the situation to-day. There is but one. solution and that is to guarantee France, and accompany the guaranty by a demand that a just sum shall be fixed for reparations, a sum which Germany can pay. Clemenceau, Wilson and George agreed upon the sensible and the reasonable plan to accomplish this result, and the Anglo-French and the Franco-American treaties were formulated and signed. The mere existence of a treaty of guaranty would in itself be sufficient to keep Germany from embarking on another adventure like that of 1914; Great Britain and the United States would never be called upon to fulfill their guaranties. Had the Senate ratified both treaties placed before it, with the League of Nations in force to modify and adjust unfair provisions of the Versailles treaty, a different world might exist to-day. TO-MORROW'S DEVELOPMENTS The United States, after having risen to heights of courage and idealism in its entry and prosecution of the war, has gone to the other extreme in the making of peace. For taking this course history will probably be even less sparing of us than our presentday critics. Therefore, until to-morrow, when we shall again lend a guiding and helping hand, Europe must work out its own salvation. The problems are acute, but they are not insoluble, even without our aid. The French adventure in the Ruhr may not be wholly bad in its consequences. The Germans are now realizing the bitterness of defeat, and the French are not accomplishing what they sought. This may lead both to a maximum effort toward mutual accommodation. When each side reaches such a frame of mind an agreement can be brought about. Germany must be willing to accept France's fear as a fact, not an illusion, and must offer to meet it in any reasonable way. This might be done by creating a zone of ample proportions along the Rhine in which Germany would agree to dismantle fortifications already there and build no new ones; she might also agree neither to maintain nor recruit troops within that area. Such a zone is already partially warranted by the treaty of Versailles in Part V, Chapter IV, Article 180, which reads: "All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled." In addition, France might obtain an especial guaranty from both Great Britain and Italy, similar to that offered at Paris by Lloyd George and Wilson. The Irish Free State has now made application for membership in the League and undoubtedly will be admitted at the September meeting. The League is a God-sent haven for such states as Ireland. While many of her differences with Great Britain have been settled by treaty, there are still matters to be threshed out between them. They may be able to arrange these unsettled problems privately, but if they can not Ireland has sought the only forum open to her where it can be done. Germany, too, will doubtless soon seek the same sanctuary. In the League a hearing before all the nations of the world may be had, and if not the power of the League then surely the power of public opinion may be invoked. When Ireland and Germany are once Members of the League there is certain to be a desire on their part for the United States also to join, for what other nation is there whose interests are more detached than ours? Germany should be permitted League membership, and the League should undertake to see that Germany lived up to her obligations in the restricted zone. Once secured from unwarranted invasion, France should, and doubtless would, be reasonable as to the sum Germany must pay for reparations. This sum and the time and manner of its payment should be determined by a commission to be agreed upon by France and Germany. This commission should also present a plan for the stabilization of the mark and for specifying the nature of security Germany should give that her obligations would be met as they became due. Once the entire problem was in course of settlement, American and European bankers would probably co-operate to make the plan a success. These measures should have been taken as soon as the United States stepped from under the responsibilities of peacemaking. But while the United States of to-day is not the United States of yesterday, there are unmistakable indications that she is also not the United States of to-morrow. The courage and selflessness which were the compelling influences that brought us into the war are but latent, and will leap forth under proper leadership. After 1917-18 Europe will scarcely make the mistake of thinking that we are as timid and selfish as our present attitude would indicate. Our people, native- and foreign-born, cherish the belief that this Republic was created to become an instrument for the betterment of man, and not merely a pleasant and safe abidingplace. They will not be content until the United States has again assumed the leadership and responsibilities in world affairs commensurate with her moral, economic and political position. THE AMERICAN PEACE AWARD Created by EDWARD W. BOK Offering One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) THIS AWARD WILL BE GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR OF THE BEST PRACTICABLE PLAN BY WHICH THE THE AWARD is offered in the conviction that the peace of the world is the problem of the people of the United States, and that a way can be found by which America's voice can be made to count among the nations for peace and for the future welfare and integrity of the United States. THE PURPOSE of the award is to give the American people from coast to coast a direct opportunity to evolve a plan that will be acceptable to many groups of our citizens, who, while now perhaps disagreeing as to the best method of international association, strongly desire to see the United States do its share in preventing war and in establishing a workable basis of cooperation among the nations of the earth. Four Subsidiary Awards Since the plan finally selected by the Jury may be a composite of more than one plan, there are also offered, in addition to the main award of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), second, third, fourth and fifth awards of five thousand dollars ($5,000) each for any plans or portion of plans used by the Jury of Award in a composite plan. If the Jury accepts one plan in full, making no additions to it from other plans, no subsidiary awards will be made. Conditions of Award Qualifications of Contestants.-The contest is open to every citizen of the United States, by birth or naturalization. Plans may be submitted either by individuals or by organizations of every kind, national, state or local. Scope of the Plan.-The winning plan must provide a practicable means whereby the United States can take its place and do its share toward preserving world peace, while not making compulsory the participation of the United States in European wars, if any such are, in the future, found unpreventable. The plan may be based upon the present covenant of the League of Nations or may be entirely apart from that instrument. Time and Manner of Payment of Award.-The purpose of the Award is twofold: first, to produce a plan; and secondly, to insure, so far as may be, that it will be put into operation. The Award is, therefore, to be made in two payments: fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) will be paid to the author of the winning plan as soon as the Jury of Award has selected it. The second fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) will be paid to the author if and when the plan, in substance and intent, is approved by the United States Senate; or if and when the Jury of Award decides that an adequate degree of popular support has been demonstrated for the winning plan. |