These changes for the most part have resulted from free negotiation between the parties that imposed the treaties and those upon whom they were imposed. In most cases only those states specifically interested have been parties to the revisions. The body of the peace settlement as a result of these developments becomes less and less of a unilateral resolution. Every document printed herein has a reputation of being secret. But the treaties printed herein, though constantly called secret, are not even concealed. Every one of them has either been issued by the Governments in appropriate official publications or has been supplied by the Governments upon a mere request. A somewhat anomalous feature of the situation is the slowness with which they have been presented at Geneva for registration by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. II. ALLIANCE MOVEMENTS AGAINST GERMANY 1. THE PROBLEM OF FRENCH SECURITY It is well known that the French desire for security has played a great part in postwar policies. The question was first raised at the Paris Peace Conference, where the guaranty articles incorporated in the treaty of Versailles, Arts. 42-44 and 429-32, were regarded by the French as insufficient for their purposes. In order to secure French assent to other decisions, it was proposed by the American and British delegations that they underwrite France. The resulting agreement possessed a certain novelty of form, being neither joint nor several. It consisted of an agreement between France and the United States and an agreement between France and Great Britain in identic terms; but neither was to come into force until the other came into force. The agreement with the United States follows1: Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic are equally animated by the desire to maintain the Peace of the World so happily restored by the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles the 28th day of June, 1919, putting an end to the war begun by the aggression of the German Empire and ended by the defeat of that Power; and, Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic are fully persuaded that an unprovoked movement of aggression by Germany against France would not only violate both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles to which the United States of America and the French Republic are parties, thus exposing France anew to the intolerable burdens of an unprovoked war, but that such aggression on the part of Germany would be and is so regarded by the Treaty of Versailles as a hostile act against all the Powers signatory to that Treaty and as calculated to disturb the Peace of the world by involving inevitably and directly the States of Europe and indirectly, as experience has amply and unfortunately demonstrated, the world at large; and, Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic fear that the stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine contained in said Treaty of Versailles may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France on the one hand and the United States of America as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles on the other; 'Reprinted from Sen. Doc. No. 63, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5, 7, 9. Therefore, the United States of America and the French Republic having decided to conclude a treaty to effect these necessary purposes, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, specially authorized thereto by the President of the United States, and Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War, and Stéphen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, specially authorized thereto by Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, have agreed upon the following articles: ARTICLE I. In case the following stipulations relating to the Left Bank of the Rhine contained in the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles the 28th day of June, 1919, by the United States of America, the French Republic and the British Empire among other Powers: "ARTICLE 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine. "ARTICLE 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization are in the same way forbidden. "ARTICLE 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.", may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany. ART. II. The present Treaty, in similar terms with the Treaty of even date for the same purpose concluded between Great Britain and the French Republic, a copy of which Treaty is annexed hereto, will only come into force when the latter is ratified. ART. III. The present Treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, and must be recognized by the Council, acting if need be by a majority, as an engagement which is consistent with the Covenant of the League. It will continue in force until on the application of one of the Parties to it the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection. ART. IV. The present Treaty will be submitted to the Senate of the United States at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It will be sub mitted before ratification to the French Chambers of Deputies for approval. The ratifications thereof will be exchanged on the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles at Paris or as soon thereafter as shall be possible. In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit: On the part of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, President, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, of the United States; and on the part of the French Republic, Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of War, and Stéphen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, have signed the above articles both in the English and French languages, and they have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in duplicate at the City of Versailles, on the twenty-eighth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, and the one hundred and forty-third of the Independence of the United States of America. [SEAL.] [SEAL.] [SEAL.] [SEAL.] WOODROW WILSON. ROBERT LANSING. The American agreement was submitted to the Senate shortly after the treaty of Versailles was sent to that body. No action was ever taken upon it. The British treaty was favorably passed upon by the London Parliament; and, though it was a document supposedly only of the United Kingdom, was likewise passed by the Parliaments of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The ratification of the Crown was not, however, given, owing to the failure of the United States to bring into force its agreement. The failure of this effort to underwrite France caused a keen disappointment in Paris. It was not until the summer of 1920 that France became convinced that the project represented by the agreements was a dead letter. She then turned to other quarters for what she wished. Franco-Belgian Military Understanding By Art. 31 of the treaty of Versailles and the corresponding articles in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, it is recognized that the treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the neutral status of Belgium, "no longer conform to the requirements of the situation." Those treaties were accordingly declared abrogated. Belgium for her part decided to reject neutralization as a future condition. Having rejected the old guaranty, she decided to find a new one. In this mood negotiations took place with France. It became known in September, 1920, that France and Belgium had reached an agreement respecting common action toward Germany. There was an immediate hue and cry respecting its relation to the Covenant of the League of Nations and a widespread demand outside of the two countries concerned for the publication of the agreement. When it was announced that the document was in the form of a military understanding between the general staffs which-dealing with the movement of troops under certain hypotheses-would lose its value if its terms were made public, the agitation was increased rather than allayed. Public opinion in general demanded more accurate information. The French and Belgian Governments eventually agreed to the publication and registration with the League of an exchange of notes between their respective ministers of foreign affairs which gave governmental effect to the detailed military understanding. That exchange of letters, which was registered on November 4, 1920, reads as follows1: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Excellency, BRUSSELS, September 10, 1920. We have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Government gives its approval to the Military Understanding, the text of which was signed September 7, 1920, by Marshal Foch, General Maglinse, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army, and General Buat, Chief of Staff of the French Army, designated for this purpose by their respective Governments. The object of this understanding is to reinforce the guaranties of peace and security resulting from the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is recognized as a matter of course that the two states retain undiminished their rights of sovereignty in respect of the imposition of military burdens upon their respective countries and in regard to determining in each case whether the eventuality contemplated by the present understanding has in fact arisen. 1League of Nations, Treaty Series, II, 128. |