The United States performed an important mission during and at the close of the war. When the war was declared, both belligerent countries intrusted the archives and property of their legations and consulates and the interests of their subjects in the enemy country to the care of the United States ministers and consuls in the respective countries. At the close of the conflict, peace overtures were made through American ministers both at Peking and Tokyo." Thus the United States proved herself a disinterested friend to both China and Japan, and established the foundation for further diplomatic achievements in the East. The Emperor of Japan, soon after the close of the war, sent a letter to the President of the United States expressing his cordial thanks for the good offices of the United States during the war. A similar sentiment was expressed by China through Li Hung Chang on his visit to the United States in 1896.

the Far East," pp. 259-266; Curzon, "Far East," pp. 196208.

For the events of the war, see "Foreign Relations," 1894, Appendix I, pp. 44-104; Williams, "China," pp. 444-459; "Vladimir," "The China-Japan War," London, 1896, pts. II and III, Appendix D, F-H. For results of the war, see J. H. Wilson, U. S. A., “China, Travels in the Middle Kingdom," chap. XX.

"For peace negotiations, see "Foreign Relations," 1894, Appendix I, pp. 29-106; 1895, p. 969; "History of Peace Negotiations Between China and Japan," officially revised, Tientsin, 1895; Williams, "China," p. 459.

See "Memoirs of Li Hung Chang," edited by W. F. Mannix, Shanghai, 1912.

T

HE position of China at the opening of the twentieth century was peculiar. The China-Japanese War, 1894–95, revealed the utter helplessness of China. When the three European powers-Germany, France, and Russia-sent a notice to Japan to withdraw from the mainland of Asia and to return to China the conquered territory of the Liaotung Peninsula, they did not do so with the altruistic motive of helping China preserve her territorial integrity. Their action was motivated, as was proved by subsequent events, by a desire to curb the expansion of Japanese influence on the Asiatic mainland, and to appropriate for themselves, in time, what Japan wanted as a prize of her victory. The downfall of China was predicted, and the partition of that vast empire among civilized nations was freely discussed. Then arose the "sphere of influence" doctrine. This peculiar modern doctrine, paraphrased,

means that each nation that has some interest in China shall map out a certain district as its own sphere in which it will have a paramount influence, and out of which other nations must stay. In case of final partition, each district thus mapped out will become a territory of its respective owner. Even in far-off China, as in Europe proper, the spirit of European rivalry was based on the theory and practice of balance of power. And every incident was utilized as a pretext to press upon the Chinese Government claims for leases, concessions, and privileges of one kind or another.

Germany fired the opening gun in this European lease scramble in China. In 1897 two German missionaries were killed by a Chinese mob. The German Government lost no time in seizing this opportunity. German men-of-war appeared promptly in Kiaochow Bay, occupied the city, demanded, as an indemnity, the lease of Kiaochow for ninety-nine years, and the recognition of a German sphere of influence in the greater part of Shantung Peninsula. These demands were complied with by the Chinese Government in the treaty signed March 8, 1898.

This move of Germany turned loose the pent-up ambition of European nations to exploit China. Russia, who had already held railroad franchises in northern Manchuria, now approached China with cajolery, intimidation, and