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will, if they are wise, not only welcome, but encourage this great Chinese Empire to take long steps in administrative and governmental reforms, in the development of her natural resources and the improvement of the welfare of her people." This statement, though unofficially made, assumed somewhat of an official nature, as it was from a great American statesman who was to be the next president of his country and as it was made before a large gathering of both foreigners and Chinese in that great metropolis of the East. The Chinese wished to reciprocate the good will of America in refunding the balance of Boxer indemnity, by welcoming the American fleet to their shores.

As soon as this move in China was known at Tokyo, action was taken with the characteristic Japanese celerity to checkmate the Chinese attempt to gain American favour and recognition. The Japanese Government immediately dispatched an invitation which reached Washington one day ahead of that of the Chinese Government. Subtle influences were exerted to defeat Chinese expectations. The Japanese had apparently three reasons for their attempt to frustrate the plans of the Chinese Government in inviting the American fleet to Chinese waters:

'Secretary Taft was welcomed at Shanghai, China, October 8, 1907, "The World's Almanac and Encyclopedia," 1908, p. 314.

(1) After the war with Russia the Japanese had created among the Oriental nations an impression that their fighting force was equal, if not superior, to that of any Western nation, and they did not want a first-class foreign fleet to anchor off Chinese waters and destroy that impression. (2) They wanted to make the Oriental peoples feel that Japan was the only Asiatic nation recognized on the basis of equality by Western Powers; and if the American fleet visited both Japan and China it would elevate China to the same plane with Japan. (3) The Japanese wanted to keep the relation between China and the United States as distant and non-intimate as possible, so that they could allude to China as a backward nation that must need the tutelage of Japan, while to China they could intimate that her aspirations for recognition and equal treatment by Western Powers were useless except through Japan, and that, indeed, China's solution of her national problems must be in following Japanese leadership.

European residents in China, who were none too eager to have American prestige in China and the cordial relation between China and the United States enhanced, heartily encored Japanese sentiment. Through W. W. Rockhill, the American minister to China, who was then in Japan on his way back from America, official Washington was informed of the in

advisability of sending a fleet to China. The original plan was revised and a part of the American fleet visited Amoy instead of Shanghai-the original city designated by both the Chinese and American residents in China for the welcome of the fleet. This was a great disappointment to both the Chinese and the Americans in China, who had planned an elaborate welcome to the fleet in the greatest center of communication and commerce in the East. The "number two fleet and number two admiral are coming to China, while the number one fleet and number one admiral are going to Japan," said the Chinese papers. All their enthusiasm was dampened, and the reception was perfunctory. The news of the Chinese reception of the American fleet was scattered abroad through the channels of Japanese publicity as being cold and unappreciative, and as showing the backward condition of China.

2. AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICIES

With the incoming of the Taft and Knox administration, the American policy in the Orient assumed a more active form. Both President Taft and Secretary of State Knox had some knowledge of what was taking place in the East subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War. After singeing the outstretching paws of the Northern Bear, Japan occupied her place in the

sun with other first-class Powers of the world, and was ready to play the rôle of mistress of Asia. England's fear and suspicion of Russian domination in the East, which had been the nightmare of English statesmen for the past half a century, now faded away. In place of the Russian phantom stalked the ever-threatening figure of the German Superman with Kultur in one hand and Weltpolitik in the other. German industries were monopolizing the markets of the world by both business efficiency and "dumping," and the German navy was growing by leaps and bounds.'

In the Anglo-Russian rivalry it had been merely a question of protecting British possessions and commercial interests in the East; but now the very existence of the British Empire was threatened by the Weltpolitik. English statesmen realized the vital need of readjustment of their policy to meet changed conditions. They buried the hatchet with Russia by allowing her a free hand in Mongolia in return for the safeguarding of British interests in China.

'Many excellent books have been written on Kultur, Weltpolitik, growth of the German navy, “dumping," AngloGerman rivalry, etc., leading up to the war. The following are a few typical references: Reventlow, “Deutschland's auswartige Politik"; Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," von Bülow, "Imperial Germany"; Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War"; Rohrbach, "Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt"; Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany"; Price, "Diplomatic History of the War of 1914"; publications of various governments engaged in the war.

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In European politics, Russia and Great Britain regarded each other as allies; and in matters of Asiatic policy they coöperated, as illustrated in the division of Persia into spheres of influence assumed by their respective governments. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, defensive in character, was renewed in 1905 and again in 1911. Japan promised to protect British possessions in Asia, and Great Britain in turn consented to the free hand of the Japanese in Manchuria, and to support Japan, or at least, not to oppose her, in whatever measures she deemed necessary in firmly establishing her sphere on the mainland of Asia. England also settled all differences with France on an amicable basis, supported her against Germany in the Moroccan question in 1907, and formed an entente to offset the Triple Alliance. The protection of British interests in the Mediterranean was left to the French just as the possessions in the East were left to the care of the Japanese. Thus the British fleet was able to concentrate in the North Sea to meet any exigency that might occur, and to bottle up the German fleet

'The Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907, regarding Persia has never been made public. See Review of Reviews, 45: 49-53, January, 1912, "Persia, Russia, and Shuster."

'For England's part in Moroccan question, see J. Holland Rose, "The Origins of the War," chap. IV, "Morocco"; Perseus, "Morocco and Europe: The Task of Sir Edward Grey," Fortnightly Review, 85: 609-624, April, 1906.