ernment notified the Chinese Government, on May 16, 1915, to the effect that "it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into between the governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy, commonly known as the open door policy."" An identical note was sent to the Japanese Government.

5. CHINA AND THE EUROPEAN WAR

After the United States severed its diplomatic relations with Germany, February 3, 1917, President Wilson sent a note to China advising her to follow the American example. It was largely through the influence of Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, the American minister at Peking, in combination with the Chinese liberals, that China was persuaded to follow the American lead and was brought into the ranks of the Allies.

15

During the short period of the attempted restoration of the monarchy by Chang Hsun and

14 See Part III, R.

"For a full account of China's entering the war and the reasons for it, see Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Tricks That are Vain-in Chinese Politics," Review of Reviews, 56: 172–175, August, 1917; "China's Part in the War," the Illustrated London News, 151: 249, September, 1917.

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Kang Yu Wei," in the summer of 1917, when China was on the verge of shipwreck, Secretary Lansing sent a sympathetic note to the Chinese Government through Minister Reinsch, expressing regret for the dissensions in China, and the hope that stable government would be established, and extending America's sincere good wishes. This note was severely criticized by the Japanese press as an infringement of Japan's paramount interest in China. Japan does not give any direct advices to Mexico, the Nipponese press argued, and why should the United States attempt to exercise any influence over China, the country over which Japan has as much tutelage as the United States has over Mexico? Any advice to be given China by the United States, the Japanese suggested, ought to have been given through Japan." This haughty attitude of Japan brought forth some sharp retorts on the part of the American press. Said the New York Morning Telegraph: "Why should the United States of America, the most powerfull democracy in the world, consult the Japanese monarchy, recently delivered, in part, from

"See "China Foils a Royalist Coup," New York Times, Current History, 6, pt. 2: 259-260, August, 1917; Carl Crow, 'Chang, the Unchanging," Sunset Magazine, 39: 12-13, August, 1917.

"The comparison of the Japanese position in China with the American position in Mexico is a hobby of the Japanese publicists: see statement by K. K. Kawakami, quoted by Millard in "Our Eastern Question,” p. 297.

paganism before admonishing the Chinese people? . . . To have advised with Japan would have been officially acknowledging the paramountcy of Japan in that section of the world. This we will never do."

It will be of particular interest to the American reader to know that Japan did her best to keep China out of the war, feeling that Japanese interests would be better served if China were not a belligerent. Japan preferred to deal with China herself; she did not care to have China given a voice at the Peace table. Late in 1915, on the advice of the European Allies, China practically completed plans for entering the war. On that occasion, Viscount Ishii, then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, said to the European Ambassadors at Tokyo: "Japan could not view without apprehension the moral awakening of 400,000,000 Chinese which would result from their entering the war." Japan's opposition was so definite and so potent that the Chinese plan of entering the war was blocked. Not until March, 1917, after obtaining secret promises from the European Allies that they would support Japan's claims at the Peace table and that Japan would not be interfered with in carrying out her program in China, and when it became clear that Japan was not able to checkmate the combined efforts of the European Allies and the United States to bring China into

the war on the side of the Allies, Japan withdrew her objection." The Chinese Government, after formally declaring war upon Germany, offered to send 100,000 troops to Europe to help the Allies; but Japan, unwilling to have China take so active a part, vetoed the plan.

18 See official dispatch from M. Krupensky, former Russian Ambassador at Tokyo, to Minister of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, February 8, 1917, cited in The Secret Treaties and Understandings, published by the Russian Revolutionary Government.