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GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, of Massachusetts, from July 17, 1862, to March 3, 1863, both dates inclusive.

JOSEPH J. LEWIS, of Pennsylvania, from March 18, 1863, to June 30, 1865.
WILLIAM ORTON, of New York, from July 1, 1865, to October 31, 1865.
EDWARD A. ROLLINS, of New Hampshire, from November 1, 1865, to March 10,

COLUMBUS DELANO,' of Ohio, from March 11, 1869, to January 2, 1871.

John W. Douglass, of Pennsylvania, was Acting Commissioner from November 1, 1870, to January 2, 1871.

ALFRED PLEASONTON, of New York, from January 3, 1871, to August 8, 1871. JOHN W. DOUGLASS, of Pennsylvania, from August 9, 1871, to May 14, 1875. DANIEL D. PRATT, of Indiana, from May 15, 1875, to July 31, 1876.

GREEN B. RAUM, of Illinois, from August 2, 1876, to April 30, 1883.

Henry C. Rogers, of Pennsylvania, Acting Commissioner from May 1, 1883, to May 10, 1883.

John J. Knox, of Minnesota, Acting Commissioner from May 11, 1883, to May 20, 1883.

WALTER EVANS, of Kentucky, from May 21, 1883, to March 19, 1885.

JOSEPH S. MILLER, of West Virginia, from March 20, 1885, to March 20, 1889. JOHN W. MASON, of West Virginia, from March 21, 1889, to April 18, 1893. JOSEPH S. MILLER, of West Virginia, from April 19, 1893, to November 26, 1896. WILLIAM ST. JOHN FORMAN, of Illinois, from November 27, 1896, to December 31, 1897.

NATHAN BAY SCOTT, of West Virginia, from January 1, 1898, to February 28, 1899.

GEORGE W. WILSON, of Ohio, from March 1, 1899, to November 27, 1900.

Robt. Williams, jr., of Ohio, Acting Commissioner from November 28, 1900, to December 19, 1900.

JOHN W. YERKES, of Kentucky, from December 20, 1900, to April 30, 1907.
JOHN G. CAPERS, of South Carolina, from June 5, 1907, to August 31, 1909.
ROYAL E. CABELL, of Virginia, from September 1, 1909, to April 27, 1913.
WILLIAM H. OSBORN, of North Carolina, from April 28, 1913, to September 25,

DANIEL C. ROPER, of South Carolina, from September 26, 1917, to March 31, 1920.
WILLIAM M. WILLIAMS, of Alabama, from April 1, 1920.

1 Mr. Delano was appointed and commissioned Secretary of the Interior November 1, 1870. He did not resign the office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and therefore became the legal holder of two offices, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary of the Interior, as he might legally do, for the duties of the two offices are distinct and compatible. (Converse v. United States, 21 How., 468; United States v. Saunders, 120 U. S., 126.)

He continued to hold the office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue until his successor was appointed and qualified, but was absent from the internal-revenue office and discharged the duties and received the salary of the office of Secretary of the Interior and of that office only.

Deputy Commissioner Douglass was Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the absence of Commissioner Delano (15 Stat., 168), and continued to be so until Alfred Pleasonton was commissioned as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, January 3, 1871.




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Art. 1. Sec. 8. Cl. 1: "The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises * ; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Art. 1. Sec. 9. Cl. 4: "No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."

Art. 1. Sec. 9. Cl. 5: "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State."

Art. 1. Sec. 10. Cl. 2: "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress."

Am. Art. 16: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

Am. Art. 18: "Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

"SEC. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

"SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress."


The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. (Constitution of the United States, art. 1, sec. 8; McGuire v. Commonwealth, 3 Wall., 387; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall., 533; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., 113, 13 Int. Rev. Rec., 141; United States . Singer, 15 Wall., 111, 17 Int. Rev. Rec., 9; Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall., 331.)

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A general power is given to Congress to lay and collect taxes of every kind or nature without any restraint, except only on exports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely, uniformity and apportionment. Three kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other direct taxes, by the second rule. (Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall., 171173.)

The power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution with only one exception, and only two qualifications. Congress can not tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. (License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 463, 6 Int. Rev. Rec., 36.)

Subject to the limitations in the Constitution the taxing power of Congress extends to all usual objects of taxation. (Knowlton v.. Moore (1900), 178 U. S., 41; T. D. 129.)

The authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises is exhaustive, and embraces every conceivable power of taxation. (Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S., 1; T. D. 2290.)


Direct taxes must be apportioned, while indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States. (Income Tax Cases, 157 U. S., 429; 158 Id., 601; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S., 509.)

A tax on bank circulation is not a direct tax, and may be laid without apportionment. (Springer v. United States, 102 U. S., 586; 27 Int. Rev. Rec., 78; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 10 Int. Rev. Rec., 195.)

A tax upon the business of an insurance company is not a direct tax, but a duty or excise. (Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule, 7 Wall., 433.)

The tax imposed by the act of June 13, 1898 (war-revenue act), on sugar refining companies was not a direct tax but a "special excise tax." (Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S., 397; T. D. 760.)

The uniformity clause of the Constitution relates only to geographical uniformity. (Head Money Cases, 112 U. S., 580.)

The corporation excise tax provision of the act of August 5. 1909, is constitutional. The tax is not a direct tax, but an impost or excise which Congress has power to impose. (Flint v. Stone- | Tracy Company, 220 U. S., 107; T. D. 1685.)

The income tax act of October 3, 1913, declared constitutional; it does not violate the rules of apportionment and uniformity. (Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S., 1; T. D. 2290.)


No State court can by injunction or otherwise prevent Federal officers from collecting Federal taxes. The Government of the United States within its sphere is independent of State action. (Keely v. Sanders, 99 U. S., 443.)

The same principle which denies to a State power to raise a revenue by taxation on Federal property, or sources of revenue, or means of carrying on its duties, forbids taxation of State revenue for Federal purposes. (12 Op. Atty. Gen., 282; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., 113; Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S., 1; T. D. 593.)

As the States can not tax the powers, the operations, or the property of the United States, nor the means which they employ to carry their powers into execution, so it has been held the United States have no power under the Constitution to tax either the instrumentalities or the property of a State. (Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S., 584.)

A municipal corporation is a portion of the sovereign power of the State, and is not subject to taxation by Congress upon its municipal revenues. (United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall., 322.)

The exemption of State agencies does not extend to those used by the State in carrying on an ordinary private business. (South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S., 437; T. D. 961.)


Intention: In construing statutes the fundamental rule is to get at the intention of the legislature. (In re Matthews, 109 Fed., 603.) Legislative intention is the guide to true judicial interpretation. (United States v. 100 Barrels of Spirits, 12 Int. Rev. Rec., 153.)

A well-settled rule of interpretation is that a legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature apparent upon its face. (Wilkinson v. Deland, 2 Pet., 627; 22 Op. Atty. Gen., 363.)

The intention must be found from the language used. (Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S., 694.)

It is the duty of the court to study the whole statute, its policy, its spirit, its purpose, its language, and, giving to the words used their obvious and natural import, to read the act with these aids in such way as will best effectuate the intention of the legislature. (United States v. 100 Barrels Spirits, 12 Int. Rev. Rec., 154.)

Liberal or strict construction.-Revenue laws are not, like penal acts, to be construed strictly in favor of the defendants. They are rather to be regarded as remedial in their character, passed to promote the public good, and should be so construed as to carry out the intention of the legislature in passing them. (Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall., 114; 4 Int. Rev. Rec., 58; United States v. 28 Casks of Wine, 7 Int. Rev. Rec., 4; United States v. 36 Barrels of High Wines, 12 Id., 40; Fed. Cas. No. 16468; 7 Blatch., 459; United States v. 100 Barrels of Spirits, 12 Id., 153; United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S., 1; 36 Int. Rev. Rec., 30.)

As a general rule the construction of these statutes must be such as is most favorable to their enforcement. There is no liberal interpretation in favor of the individual to be indulged in. (18 Op. Atty. Gen., 246; 31 Int. Rev. Rec., 246.) Revenue laws are to be construed liberally to carry out the purposes of their enactment (Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall., 380; Taylor. United States, 3 How., 197), and the rule of construction applicable to statutes generally, that what is implied in them is as much a part of the enactment as what is expressed, holds in regard to them. (United States v. Hodson (1870), 10 Wall., 395; 12 Int. Rev. Rec., 213.)

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