to act, under circumstances so critical and important for the country. He accordingly wrote on the 4th of September to Mr. Blanque, one of the representatives of the state, sending him all the papers delivered to him by the British officers, with a letter addressed to his excellency W. C. C. Claiborne, governor of the state of Louisiana. (See Appendix, No. 5.) The contents of these letters do honour to Mr. Lafitte's judgment, and evince his sincere attachment to the American cause.

Persuaded that the country was about to be vi. gorously attacked, and knowing that at that time it was little prepared for resistance, he did what his duty prescribed; apprising government of the impending danger; tendering his services, should it be thought expedient to employ the assistance of his crews, and desiring instructions how to act; and in case of his offers being rejected, he declared his intention to quit the country, lest he should be charged with having cooperated with the invading enemy. On the receipt of this packet from Mr. Lafitte, Mr. Blanque immediately laid its contents before the governor, who convened the committee of defence lately formed, of which he was president; and Mr. Rancher, the bearer of Mr. Lafitte's packet, was sent back with a verbal answer, of which it is understood that the purport was to desire him to take no steps until it should be determined what was expedient to be done; it is added, that the message contained an assurance that, in the meantime, no steps should be taken against him for his past offences against the laws of the United States.

At the expiration of the time agreed on with captain Lockyer, his ship appeared again on the coast with two others, and continued standing off and on before the pass for several days.

Mr. Lafitte now wrote a second letter to Mr. Blanque, urging him to send him an answer and instructions. (See Appendix No. 6.) In the meantime he appeared not to perceive the return of the sloop of war, who, tired of waiting to no purpose, and mistrusting Mr. Lafitte's intentions, put out to sea and disappeared.

About this time, Mr. Lafitte received information that instead of accepting his services, and endeavouring to take advantage of the confidence the British had in him, to secure the country against an invasion, and defeat all their projects, the constituted authorities were fitting out at New-Orleans a formidable expedition against Barataria. He then retired to the German coast, where, strictly adhering to the principles he had professed, he warned the inhabitants of the danger with which they were threatened from the means intended to be employed by the enemy.

About this time, there fell into Mr. Lafitte's hands an anonymous letter directed to a person in New-Orleans, the contents of which left no doubt as to the intentions of the British, and which is the more interesting, as all that it announced has since been fully verified. (See Appendix, No. 2.)

Such are the particulars of the first attempt made by the British against Louisiana-an attempt in which

they employed such unjustifiable arts, that it may fairly be inferred that the British government scruples not to descend to the basest means, when such appear likely to contribute to the attainment of its ends. Notwithstanding the solemn professions of respect for the persons and property of the inhabitants, so emphatically made in the proclamation of colonel Nicholls, we see that one of their chief reliance for the success of operations in Louisiana, was on the insurrection of the negroes. Is it not then evident from this, that the British were bent on the destruction of a country whose rivalship they feared in their colonial productions, and that the cabinet of St. James had determined to carry on a war of plunder and devastation against Louisiana?

In coming to Barataria, to endeavour to gain over the privateers to their interests, they acted consistently with their known principles, and on a calculation of probabilities; for it was an obvious presumption that a body of men proscribed in a country whose laws they had violated, reflecting on their precarious existence, would embrace so favourable an opportunity of recovering an erect attitude in society, by ranging themselves under the banners of a powerful nation. But this calculation of the British proved fallacious; and in this instance, as in every other, they found in every individual in Louisiana, an enemy to Britain, ever ready to take up arms against her; and those very men, whose aid they so confidently expected to obtain, signally proved throughout the campaign, particularly in the service of the bat

téries at Jackson's lines, that the agents of the British government had formed a very erroneous opinion of them. (See Note No. 1, at the end of the volume.)

The British finding themselves disappointed in their expectation of drawing over to their interests the privateersmen of Barataria, concentrated their preparations at Pensacola and Apalachicola. In this latter place, they had landed not only troops, but also twenty-two thousand stand of arms, with ammunition, blankets, and clothing, to be distributed among the Indians; and it was generally reported at that time, that several of their vessels had already sailed for Jamaica, to take in black troops.

General Armstrong, the then secretary of war, by a circular letter of the 4th of July, had informed the different state governments of the quota of militia they were respectively to furnish, pursuant to the president's requisition of the same date. (See Appendix, No. 7.) On the 6th of August, the governor of the state of Louisiana published, conformably to that requisition, militia general orders, in which, after having laid before his constituents the views and intentions of the general government, to employ an adequate force to maintain with honour the contest in which our country was engaged, he exhorted the citizens of the state zealously to stand the necessary draught for completing the thousand men demanded by the above mentioned requisition. (See Appendix, No. 8.)

E

All the western and southern newspapers were at that time loudly inveighing against the shameful assistance afforded by the governor of Pensacola to the British, at least inasmuch as he suffered the character of his nation to be sullied, by permitting them publicly to make hostile preparations in that town, where they had established their head-quarters, and where they were, if not the nominal, at least the virtual masters. Such repeated violations, and the succours constantly furnished to the Indians, who were evidently the allies of our enemy, contributed not a little to rouse the national spirit in that part of the union. I cannot refrain from giving here an extract from one of the papers that appeared about that time, in which the writer, after having enumerated all the grievances that the United States had to complain of against the Spanish governor of Florida, says: "who of us would not prefer to take his fortune as a common soldier, to remaining at home in affluence, while the community of which he is a member, submits tamely, silently and unresistingly to such indignities."

The commander-in-chief of the 7th district, wrote to the governor of the state, from fort Jackson, on the 15th of August, announcing to him the necessity of holding all the forces of Louisiana militia in readiness to march at the first signal, in consequence of the preparations making at Pensacola, of which he had received certain information. (See Appendix, No. 9.) Conformably to this order, the governor published in militia general orders, an extract from his letter to the commanders of the two divisions of state militia, in which he gave them instructions and regulations for their respective divisions. Commo