during the day, but with little effect. In the evening the troops were retired beyond reach of the enemy's guns, and directed to hut themselves. Ground was also marked out for a redoubt on our flank, and the guns on our left covered them from the enemy's fire.

From the 28th to the 31st every exertion was made to get up from the ships ten eighteen-pound and four twenty-four-pound carronades, with the ammunition and stores. These were brought up the canal in boats to within a quarter of a mile of the main road, and thence transported on carriages of the country or our own limbers, by the seamen, with incredible labour. The wea ther was fortunately fair, and the road consequently good.

The enemy, during this period, established two batteries of one gun each on the opposite bank of the river, and occasionally threw shot into our camp with some effect.

Four eighteen-pounders were placed in a battery formed with hogsheads of sugar, on the main road, to fire upon the ship if she dropped down the river.

Preparations were also made to establish batteries, one of six eighteen-pounders to break the enemy's line, and the four twenty-four-pound carronades, and the field-gun and howitzers were to keep the fire of the enemy under, whilst the troops were to be moved forward to storm the works so soon as a practicable breach was effected.

On the night of the 31st December working parties were employed in throwing up the batteries and getting in the guns. In this they were most materially assisted by the seamen under captain sir Thomas Troubridge: before daylight the whole was completed, and the batteries ready to open.

The morning of the 1st January was foggy, and objects could not be discerned at any distance until nine o'clock, when our batteries opened. The enemy soon returned our fire, and a mutual cannonade took place:-Our batteries made little impression upon 'the enemy's parapet. The order for the assault was therefore not carried into effect. The troops remained in this advanced position, and orders were given to retire the guns in the night. The evening changed to wet, and the ground became in conse quence so deep, that it required the exertions of the whole army

as a working party, aided by the seamen, to retire the guns a short distance before daylight. The army then fell back to the position it occupied on the 31st.

C. R. FORREST, A. Q. R. M. G.

No. 4.

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL LAMBERT TO LORD BATHURST.

Camp in front of the enemy's line before New Orleans,

MY LORD,

January 10, 1815.

It becomes my duty to lay before your lordship the proceedings of the force lately employed on the coast of Louisiana, under the command of major-general sir E. M. Pakenham, K. B. and acting in concert with vice-admiral the honourable sir A. Cochrane, K. B.

The report which I enclose from major-general Keane will put your lordship in possession of the occurrences which took place until the arrival of major-general the hon. sir E. M. Pakenham, to assume the command: from that period I send an extract of the journal of major Forrest, assistant-quarter-master-general, up to the time of joining the troops (which sailed on the 26th October last under my command) and which was on the 6th January; and from that period I shall detail, as well as I am able, the subsequent events.

I found the army in position, in a flat country, with the Mississippi on its left, and a thick extensive wood on its right, and open to its front, from which the enemy's line was quite distinguishable.

It seems sir E. Pakenham had waited for the arrival of the fusileers and the 48d regiment, in order to make a general attack upon the enemy's line; and on the 8th the army was formed for that object.

In order to give your lordship as clear a view as I can, I shall state the position of the enemy. On the left bank of the river it was simply a straight line of a front of about one thousand yards, with a parapet, the right resting on the river and the left on a wood, which had been rendered impracticable for any body

of troops to pass. This line was strengthened by flank works, and had a canal of four feet deep, but not always of an equal width; it was supposed to narrow towards their left. About eight heavy guns were in position on this line. The Mississippi is here about eight hundred yards wide, and they had on the right bank a heavy battery of twelve guns, which enfiladed the whole front of the position on the left bank.

Preparations were made on our side with very considerable labour, to clear out and widen a canal that communicated with a stream by which the boats had passed up to the place of disembarkation, to open it into the Mississippi, by which means troops could be got over to the right bank, and the co-operation of armed boats would be secured.

The disposition for the attack was as follows: a corps consisting of the 85th light infantry, two hundred seamen, and four hundred marines, the 5th West-India regiment, and four pieces of artillery, under the command of colonel Thornton of the 85th, was to pass over during the night, and move along the right bank towards New Orleans, clearing its front, until it reached the flanking battery of the enemy on that side, which it had orders to carry.

The assailing of the enemy's works in front of us was to be made by the brigade composed of the 4th, 21st and 44th, under major-general Gibbs, and the 3d brigade, consisting of the 93d, two companies of the 95th, and two companies of the fusileers, and the 43d, under major-general Keane. Some black troops were destined to skirmish in the wood on the right;-the principal attack to be made by major-general Gibbs;-the first brigade and the 43d formed the reserve;-the attacking columns were to be provided with scaling-ladders and rafts;-the whole to be at their stations by daylight. An advanced battery in our front of six eighteen-pounders was thrown up during the night, about eight hundred yards from the enemy's line. The attack was to be made at the earliest hour. Unlooked for difficulties, increased by the falling of the river, occasioned considerable delay in the entrance of the armed boats; and those destined to land colonel Thornton's corps, by which four or five hours were lost, and it was not until half past five in the morning that the first division, consisting of five hundred men, were over. The ensemble of the general move

ment was lost, and in a point which was of the last importance to the attack of the left bank of the river, although colonel Thornton, as your lordship will see by his report, which I enclose, ably executed in every particular his instructions, and fully justified the confidence the commander of the forces placed in his abilities. The delay attending that corps occasioned some on the left bank, and the attack did not take place till the columns were discernible from the enemy's line at more than two hundred yards distance. As they advanced a continued and most galling fire was opened from every part of their line, and from the battery on the right bank.

The brave commander of the forces, who never in his life could refrain from being at the post of honour, and sharing the danger to which the troops were exposed, as soon as from his station he had made the signal for the troops to advance, galloped on to the front to animate thein by his presence, and he was seen with his hat off encouraging them on the crest of the glacis; it was there (almost at the same time) that he received two wounds, one in his knee, and another, which was almost instantly fatal, in his body: he fell in the arms of major M'Dougall, aid-decamp. The effect of this in the sight of the troops, together with major-general Gibbs and major-general Keane being both borne off wounded at the same time, with many other commanding officers, and further, the preparations made to aid in crossing the ditch not being so forward as they ought to have been, from, perhaps, the men being wounded who were carrying them, caused a wavering in the column, which in such a situation became irreparable; and as I advanced with the reserve, at about two hundred and fifty yards from the line, I had the mortification to observe the whole falling back upon me in the greatest confusion.

In this situation, finding that there had been no impression made, that though many men had reached the ditch, and were either drowned or obliged to surrender, and that it was impossible to restore order in the regiments where they were,--I placed the reserve in position, until I could obtain such information as to de

• This position was a supine one. The reserve, and all those of the advanced columns, who escaped slaughter, were ordered to crouch down in the stubble, where they lay flat upon their faces till night. This new evolution was executed in order to avoid the fire of our artillery.

termine me how to act to the best of my judgment, and whether or not I should resume the attack, and if so, I felt it could be done only by the reserve. The confidence I have in the corps composing it would have encouraged me greatly, though not without loss, which might have made the attempt of serious consequence, as I know it was the opinion of the late distinguished commander of the forces, that the carrying of the first line would not be the least arduous service. After making the best reflections I was capable of, I kept the ground the troops then held, and went to meet vice-admiral sir A. Cochrane, and to tell him that under all the circumstances, I did not think it proper to renew the attack on that day. At about ten o'clock I learnt of the success of colonel Thornton's corps on the right bank. I sent the commanding officer of the artillery, colonel Dickson, to examine the situation of the battery, and report if it was tenable; but informing me that he did not think it could be held with security by a smaller corps than two thousand men, I consequently ordered lieutenant-colonel Gubbins, on whom the command had devolved (colonel Thornton being wounded) to retire.

The army remained in position until night, in order to gain time to destroy the eighteen-pounder battery we had constructed the preceding night in advance, I then gave orders for the troops to resume the ground they had occupied previous to the attack.

Our loss has been very severe, but I trust it will not be considered, notwithstanding the failure, that this army has suffered the military character to be tarnished. I am satisfied, had I thought it right to renew the attack, that the troops would have advanced with cheerfulness. The services of both army and navy, since their landing on this coast, have been arduous beyond any thing I have ever witnessed, and difficulties have been got over with an assiduity and perseverance beyond all example by all ranks, and the most hearty co-operation has existed between the two services. It is not necessary for me to expatiate to you upon the loss the army has sustained in major-general the hon. sir E. Pakenham, commander-in-chief of this force, nor could I in adequate His services and merits are so well known, that I have only, in common with the whole army, to express my sincere regret, and which may be supposed at present to come peculiarly home to me.

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