she continued unable to travel by reason of sickness and infirmity, and it would have been dangerous to have removed her to Sculcoates at any time during such lastmentioned period.

6. After her husband's death she remained a widow and continued to reside in the parish of St. Mary, Islington, until her own death.

7. The order of removal of the 19th of November, 1860, was never superseded, nor was a fresh order for the removal of Elizabeth Gibson obtained after the death of John Gibson, and the execution of the order of removal never was suspended by the Justices by reason of any sickness or infirmity or invalidity of Elizabeth Gibson, or of its being dangerous for her to travel, nor was any further suspension of the order directed by the Justices after the 19th of November, 1860.

8. On the 25th of March, 1866, Elizabeth Gibson became irremovable from the parish of St. Mary, Islington, under the provisions of the statute 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79. s. 8, and so continued and was irremovable therefrom, at the time of her death, in consequence of her residence for one year without relief from the parish of St. Mary, Islington, before the 19th of November, 1860.

9. She died on the 10th of April, 1867. 10. From the date of the order of removal until the death of John Gibson the paupers were relieved by the parish of St. Mary, Islington, and after the death of John Gibson, his widow Elizabeth Gibson continued up to the time of her own death without interruption to receive relief from the last-mentioned parish, and the sum of 2s. 6d. was paid weekly by such parish during that period for such relief.

11. On the 4th of February, 1863, the parish of Sculcoates paid the parish of St. Mary, Islington, 77. 5s., being the whole of the charges and expenses incurred by them in the relief of the paupers up to the date of the death of John Gibson, but refused to pay the further sum demanded of them by the parish of St. Mary, Islington, for the charges and expenses incurred in the weekly relief of Elizabeth Gibson, from the 13th of June, 1862, when the period of her irremovability as widow under the statute first above mentioned expired.

12. From the 4th of February, 1863, until the death of Elizabeth Gibson accounts and statements of the charges and expenses incurred in the weekly relief of Elizabeth Gibson were regularly delivered quarterly to the said parish of Sculcoates, and payment of the amounts thereof respectively was always at the time of the delivery of the several accounts to such parish demanded by the parish of St. Mary, Islington, as due to them for the relief so given to Elizabeth Gibson.

13. Payment of the accounts and charges respectively was always refused by the parish of Sculcoates, and they have not paid them, and have never paid anything for the relief or maintenance of Elizabeth Gibson since the death of her husband, but no complaint for non-payment of any of the accounts or charges or expenses so incurred for her relief or maintenance was made to the Justices, nor was any application for any order of the Justices for payment of any part thereof made till the 30th of May, 1867, when the order appealed against was applied for and obtained.

14. The parish of St. Mary, Islington, have not charged the parish of Sculcoates with the expenses incurred in the relief or maintenance of Elizabeth Gibson between the date of John Gibson's death and the 13th of June, 1862, nor for any of the expenses incurred in maintaining or relieving her after the 25th of March, 1866, when she became irremovable from the parish of St. Mary, Islington, as above mentioned, and the sum of 24l. 12s. 6d. mentioned in the order of the 30th of May, 1867, is solely composed of the payments so made by the parish of St. Mary, Islington between the 13th of June, 1862, and the 26th of March, 1866.

15. It was contended, on behalf of the parish of St. Mary, Islington, that although the order of the 19th of November, 1860, was suspended solely in consequence of the illness of John Gibson, it was by the statute 49 Geo. 3. c. 124. s. 3. suspended as to the other person named therein, and that therefore all the expenses occasioned by such suspension should be paid by the parish of settlement, and also that as the widow could not be removed on the 13th of June, 1862, by reason of her illness, the parish of St. Mary, Islington, was entitled to the

expenses incurred in maintaining her from that date up to the 25th of March, 1866, when the change in the law took place. It was further contended, on behalf of such parish, that but for her illness the order could have been executed on the 13th of June, 1862, and that as the suspension could not then be taken off because the order of removal could not then be safely executed in respect to Elizabeth Gibson, such parish was entitled to the expenses before mentioned; and it was further contended that by statute 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. s. 2. the Justices only had power to make an order on the death or removal of the paupers.

16. It was contended, on behalf of the parish of Sculcoates, that the order of the 19th of November, 1860, ought to have been superseded, and a fresh order obtained for the removal of Elizabeth Gibson on the 13th of June, 1862, which last-mentioned order might have been suspended in consequence of her illness. It was further contended, on behalf of the parish of Sculcoates, that the order of the 19th of November, 1860, for the suspension of the order of removal, became exhausted and a dead letter upon the death of John Gibson, and could not be kept alive or revived by the sickness or infirmity of Elizabeth Gibson, or by reason of its being dangerous for her to be removed,. and that the charges, for the payment of which the order of the 30th of May, 1867, was made, were not incurred by the suspension of the order of removal within the meaning of the statute 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. s 2. On behalf of the parish of Sculcoates it was also contended, that even assuming that the order of removal remained suspended after the death of John Gibson, the order of the 30th of May, 1867, was bad, and the Justices had no power to make it, inasmuch as Elizabeth Gibson was by law actually irremovable from the parish of St. Mary, Islington, at the time of her death, and that the sum ordered to be paid by the parish of Sculcoates was irrecoverable, and the order of the 30th of May, 1867, ought not to have been made, because the complaint upon which it was founded was not made within six calendar months from the time when the matter of the said complaint arose, as required by statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. 11.

17. The question for the opinion of this Court was whether, upon the facts above stated, the Justices were right in making the order of the 30th of May, 1867, upon the parish of Sculcoates for the payment of the charges incurred in the relief of Elizabeth Gibson, from the 13th of June, 1862, to the 25th of March, 1866. If the Court should answer this question in the affirmative, the order of Sessions confirming the order was to be confirmed; if in the negative, the order of Sessions and the order of the 30th of May, 1867, were to be quashed.

Poland, in support of the order of Sessions.-The respondents are clearly entitled to be paid the sum which they claim. The 14th paragraph of the case shews that they have carefully excluded all sums to which any objection could be made. It is admitted that both John and Elizabeth Gibson were settled in the appellant parish, and the order of removal was properly made and suspended under 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. s. 2; by the same section, an order may be made for the payment of the charges incurred by such suspension, "in case any removal shall take place, or in case of the death of the pauper before the execution of the order."

[LUSH, J.-No order can be made till one or other of those events happens.]

No. Next, the above-mentioned statute would only apply to John Gibson himself, but by 49 Geo. 3. c. 124. s. 3, "in order to avoid any pretence for forcibly separating husband and wife, or other persons nearly connected with or related to each other, and who are living together as one family at the time of any order of removal made, during the dangerous sickness or other infirmity of any one or more of such family," it is enacted that "the execution of such order of removal shall also be suspended for the same period with respect to every other person named therein who was actually of the same household or family of such sick or infirm person at the time of such order of removal made." The order remains suspended till an order is made to execute it.

[LUSH, J.-There was no time at which the order could be safely executed up to the 25th of March, 1866, when Elizabeth became irremovable.]

That is so. She was irremovable under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. s. 2. for a year after the death of John, and on the 25th

of March, 1866, she became irremovable altogether, as stated in the 8th paragraph, by the operation of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 60. s. 1; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 55. s. 1; and 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79. s. 8. These statutes only touch the question of irremovability, and do not in any way interfere with the right to obtain payment in respect of the charges incurred by the respondent parish. Elizabeth still belonged to the appellants, and if she had recovered and had broken her residence, she might have been removed to their parish. In The King v. Chagford (1), it was held that no order could be made for the payment of the charges incurred except in the cases of removal or death; but that decision is in favour of the contention on behalf of the respondents. The appellants contend that the order of the 19th of November, 1860, ought to be superseded, and a fresh order obtained. But why should the appellants go through such a useless proceeding as to obtain another order in substitution of that which was still in existence? There seems to be no sound reason why the respondents should not be repaid this money, which they have advanced on behalf of the appellants, who might, under 14 & 15 Vict. c. 105. s. 8, have paid it from time to time during the continuance of the suspension. It is also alleged that the order is bad because it was not made within six months after the matter of the complaint arose, as required by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. 11, but there is no foundation for such a contention. Even supposing that the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. applies to Poor Law Orders at all, this order was made within the prescribed period; for no cause of complaint arose until the 10th of April, 1867, when Elizabeth died.

Digby, contra, for the appellants.-As to the last point; some of these costs, amounting to 71. 58., were applied for on the 4th of February, 1863, and were then paid. The respondents were not bound to wait until Elizabeth died before applying for these costs.

[HAYES, J.-They could not enforce payment of them.]

Perhaps not.

[Per Curiam.-There is nothing in this

point.]

(1) 4 B. & Ald 235.

Next it is submitted that the order of the 19th of November, 1860, for the suspension of the order of removal, became extinguished on the death of John Gibson. It was granted on account of his illness alone. The intention of 49 Geo. 3. c. 124. s. 3. was, to prevent the removal of the pauper and the members of his family while he remained ill. The words are, "shall also be suspended for the same period"; that is to say, for the period the order remains suspended on account of his illness. The order of suspension could not be kept alive by the sickness of Elizabeth; for an order of removal can only be suspended for some cause existing at the time the order is made-The Queen v. Llanelchid (2). If a fresh cause intervenes, there is no power to suspend the order on account of such cause at all. This order cannot be said to have been suspended on account of the illness of Elizabeth, for she was not ill when the order was made. The proper course, therefore, was to have superseded the old order, and to have obtained a fresh one for the removal of Elizabeth upon the 13th of June, 1862, when the year next after the death of John had expired.

[LUSH, J.-The result of that would have been that the respondents would have abandoned all the costs which they were entitled to in respect of John.]

The King v. Englefield (3) shews that the order of suspension would remain after the death of John until another order was made taking it off.

[HANNEN, J.-Suppose, after the order of suspension is made, the pauper gets well, but before the matter has been brought before the Justices he becomes ill again, would a new order be necessary?]

Yes; it would be necessary to go before the Justices to have a new inquiry as to the illness then existing. So here, the respondents ought to have gone before the Justices in order that the illness of Elizabeth should be inquired into.

[LUSH, J.-She could not have been removed. Why, then, go through the step of going before the Justices to ask for an order of removal and suspension when she could not be removed?]

(2) 2 El. & El. 530; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 102.

(3) 15 East, 317.

The charges which the respondents are now seeking to get cannot be said to have been incurred by reason of "such suspension" of the order under 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. s. 2. Next, by the same section, the order for the costs may be made if the churchwardens or overseers, &c. "shall, upon the removal or death of such poor person ordered to be removed, refuse or neglect to pay the said charges," &c. The question here arises upon the death of Elizabeth, but she was irremovable at the time of her death, and therefore the costs are not within this statute: see The King v. Chagford (1), where, during the suspension of the order of removal, the pauper had become irremovable by reason of a freehold estate having descended upon him. The Queen v. Chedgrave (4) is extremely like this case, the pauper being irremovable under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66; and it was held that the respondent parish could not recover its

costs.

[LUSH, J.-That case is not an authority in your favour, for there was there neither the event of death nor of removal. HANNEN, J.-The judgment would seem to imply that the costs might have been recovered if there had been the death of the pauper.]

Next, it may be said that these costs were recoverable under 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. 8. 84, but The Overseers of Salford v. the Overseers of Manchester (5) shews that where the pauper becomes irremovable by reason of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 55. coming into operation, the costs cannot be recovered under that section.

[LUSH, J.-A period of fourteen days elapsed in that case while the pauper might have been removed; and my Brother Mellor said, "The statute has worked injustice to this extent, that the appellants are not entitled to be reimbursed the expenses which they would have been reimbursed if the order had been carried out."]

It is submitted that there is no way under the circumstances set out in the case by which the respondents can recover these

costs.

(4) 12 Q.B. Rep. 206; s. c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 54.

(5) 3 B. & S. 599; s. c. 32 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 107.

LUSH, J.-I am of opinion that the order of Sessions ought to be affirmed. It is abundantly clear that the legislature intended, first, that no pauper should be removed from one parish to another while the pauper was in such a state of infirmity or sickness as to make the removal dangerous to life; and secondly, that the members of the pauper's family should not be separated one from the other, so that if one member of the family was detained by reason of sickness or disability, and it was impossible to remove him safely, no other member of the family should be removed during the suspension of the order on that account. We must therefore interpret the words of the statutes in such a way as will reasonably carry out that manifest intention of the legislature. And it appears to me that, as to the first part of the case, we can well do so by giving a fair, reasonable meaning to the words of the enactments. The first question is, what is the period during which the suspension in this case continued to operate? Did it operate only during the illness of the man on account of whose indisposition the suspension was made; or, did it continue to operate during the illness of the wife, which supervened on that occurrence? I have come to the conclusion that a suspension, once made, continues in operation until every member of the family can be removed; for, by the 49 Geo. 3. c. 124, they are not to be separated or removed until every member of the family is able to be removed without danger. Reading the 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. by the light of the 49 Geo. 3. c. 124, which is a declaratory act rather than an enacting one, the former statute reads thus: "In case any poor person shall be brought before any Justice or Justices for the purpose of being removed from the place where they are inhabiting, by virtue of any order, and it shall appear to the Justices that such poor family, or any of them, is either ill or unable to travel by reason of sickness, so that it would be dangerous for him or her so to do, the Justices making such order of removal are hereby required and authorized to suspend the execution of the same until they are satisfied that it may safely be executed without danger to any person who is named in the order." It appears to me an intentional change of expression in order to compre

hend every member of the family; and, that being so, suspension once made continues until the Magistrates (who, under the subsequent act, need not be those who made the order, but any two) can be satisfied that the order may be obeyed without danger to the life of the pauper whose settlement is adjudicated upon, or any member of his family. That being so, the order of suspension here continued to operate, after the death of the husband, during the dangerous illness of the wife, up to the time when she became irremovable under the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79; therefore, I cannot agree in the argument that has been put before us, that an application should have been made to the Magistrates; for none could have been successfully made for an order to take off the suspension and to carry out the execution of the order of removal. The suspension continued when once made as operative in favour of the widow, who became ill shortly after the death of the husband, as it was in favour of the husband during his life, it being perfectly clear, both from the language of the statutes and the decided cases, that no subsequent order or suspension could have been made. The only mode in which we can carry out the manifest intention of the statute is to hold that the order of suspension must operate until every member of the family is in a state of health fit to be removed.

The next question is, whether the last act, the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, which makes a pauper irremovable after one year's residence in the parish, having supervened. during the illness of the widow and before she was in a condition to be removed under the order, had the effect of nullifying the previous order; and not only so, but of depriving the parish of the power of obtaining repayment of the expense they had incurred in maintaining the pauper Elizabeth up to that time. I am of opinion it has not that effect; and I think we have put the meaning upon the words of the 35 Geo. 3. c. 101, which would certainly be just, and, I think, not at all at variance with what we suppose the legislature had in their minds when the subsequent act was passed. I am aware that we are under a difficulty, because we are putting upon the words of the 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. a meaning that could not

have been in the minds of the framers of that act at the time it was made, because there was then no such thing as irremovability by residence; but it must have been intended to give the parish, who had a claim upon another parish for the maintenance of the pauper during the suspension of the order of removal, the means of recouping themselves from the parish upon which that order was made. Now, singularly enough, although the parish is made to disburse its moneys while the suspension is in operation, the time for the repayment of the money is the time when the pauper is removed under the order, or the time when the pauper dies, if no removal has taken place. When the legislature passed the 49 Geo. 3. to enable the debtor parish to obtain payment, it is singular enough that they did not give the parish which was at the expense of maintaining the pauper the power of recovering the costs from time to time. The Justices are only authorized to make the order for repayment in case of the removal of the pauper, or in case of the death of the pauper before the execution of the order of removal: the legislature did not contemplate the death of the person during the state of irremovability, because there was no such thing. Subsequently, irremovability was created; and the question is, whether that state of things supervening deprives the parish of all power of obtaining payment. I think we may fairly construe the statutes so as not to have the effect of perpetrating that amount of injustice, and that we may treat the death of Elizabeth, though in fact it happened after she became irremovable, as occurring at the point of time up to which the amount due for maintenance was payable. Here the event of removal has not taken place, but the other event has happened. The widow has died before the order of removal was executed. In that event the Justices were authorized in making the order for the repayment.

The answer to the last objection necessarily follows what I have already said. As the respondents did not make the application while the pauper was alive, the death of the pauper was the time at which the money became payable, and the application was made in time. On these grounds I am of opinion the Sessions were right.