the plaintiff's failure to complete the said contract of the 1st of May. 5. The plaintiff has failed to complete his said contract, and the defendant has suffered a loss exceeding £200. (1) Against the plaintiff for £- damages; and (Heading as in the last Form.) 1. The plaintiff joins issue upon the defence. 2. As to the counter-claim the plaintiff says that the said works were constructed to the satisfaction of the said M. N. 3. The defendant was not put to any expense by the alleged failure of the plaintiff to construct the works to the satisfaction of M. N. Reply of Defendant E. F. 1. The defendant E. F. did not covenant that he would indemnify the plaintiff to the extent of £200, or any other sum, for any loss he might sustain by the failure of the plaintiff to complete the said works to the satisfaction of the said M. N. 2. The plaintiff did not fail to complete the said works to the satisfaction of M. N. 3. If he has so failed, the defendant has not sustained any damage. Promise to marry need not be evidenced by writing. Breach of Promise to Marry (a). Claim by Plaintiff for Breach of Promise to Marry. 1. The plaintiff has suffered damage by breach of promise by the defendant to marry her on the 14th of November, 1883 [or, (a) A promise to marry on which an action is based, need not be evidenced by any writing, and may be proved entirely by parol, though it is well to remember that by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 2, it is provided that "no plaintiff in any action for breach of promise of marriage shall within a reasonable time, which elapsed before action] [or, on the death of A. B., which happened before action]. 2. The defendant refused to marry the plaintiff on the 14th of November, 1883 [or, within a reasonable time] [or, on the death of A. B.]. Particulars of special damage: - Nov. Loss of appointment of head recover a verdict unless his or her testimony shall be corroborated by some other material evidence in support of such promise.' As to what Corroboraamounts to corroboration within this section, see Bessela v. Stern, 46 tion of L. J. 467, 2 C. P. D. 265. An infant may sue in such an action, but is plaintiff not liable to be sued. (Holt v. Ward, 2 Str. 937.) The action falls essential. within the rule actio personalis moritur cum persona, and cannot be maintained by an executor or administrator. (Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & S. 408.) The averments in the claim are generally very simple. There is first a Averments statement of the agreement to marry, and then in another paragraph a in the statement of a breach of such promise. There may be a breach by refusal statement to perform the contract, although the time for performance has not of claim. arrived, as where A., having promised to marry B. on C.'s death, in C.'s lifetime absolutely refused to marry B. (Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111.) The jury in assessing damages may take into account the position Measure of in life and means of the defendant, and also the injury to the plaintiff's damages. feelings. (Smith v. Woodfine, 1 C. B. N. S. 660; Berry v. Da Costa, L. R. 1 C. P. 331.) Among the defences that may be set up are: 1. That the defendant never promised to marry the plaintiff; 2. That he promised conditionally, and the condition has not yet been fulfilled; 3. That since the promise the defendant has discovered that the plaintiff has been guilty of gross immorality or depraved conduct, of which he or she was ignorant Immorality at the time of the engagement (Irving v. Greenwood, 1 C. & P. 350); of plaintiff, 4. That the plaintiff has been guilty of material misrepresentation as to when a the real circumstances of his or her family, and his or her previous life defence. (Wharton v. Lewis, 1 C. & P. 529); 5. That the plaintiff has exonerated the defendant from his or her promise. Such an exoneration may be implied from the demeanour and conduct of the parties. The total cessation of intercourse and correspondence for two or three years is evidence for the jury on a plea of exoneration, although on the last occasion they were seen together the plaintiff refused to give up the defendant's letters, will be saying it would be like giving him up altogether. (Davis v. Bomford, implied. 6 H. & N. 245.) 6. The Statute of Limitations, which, in the case of this action, is a bar after the lapse of six years from the breach of the promise. It has been decided, however, that bodily infirmity, supervening after the promise and rendering it dangerous to the defendant's life to marry, When an exoneration by the plaintiff What will not constitute a defence to this action. The defendant says that: Defence. 1. He was an infant at the time of making the alleged promise. 2. The defendant was exonerated by the plaintiff before breach. Particulars are as follows:-An arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant made verbally on the 1st of October, 1883. 3. When the defendant made the alleged promise he was not aware, nor was he aware until the 1st of October, 1883, that, as the fact was, the plaintiff had been seduced and had borne an illegitimate child in the year 1881 (b). Claim for Breach of Promise to Marry, alleging Seduction as 1. The plaintiff has suffered damage by breach of promise by the defendant to marry her within a reasonable time, which elapsed before action. 2. The plaintiff, relying upon the said promise, permitted the defendant to debauch and carnally know her, whereby the defendant infected her with a venereal disease. is no answer to an action for breach of promise to marry (Hall v. Wright, E. B. & E. 746, 765); so on the authority of the last case, insanity in the plaintiff existing unknown to the defendant previously to his promise, was held to be no defence (Baker v. Cartwright, 10 C. B. N. S. 124); so a pre-contract on the part of the plaintiff to marry another person, which the plaintiff concealed from the defendant at the time of his promise, is no defence to the action without fraud (Beechey v. Brown, E. B. & E. 796); so it is no defence that the defendant is a married man, and was married when he promised, provided the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact. (Millward v. Littlewood, 5 Exch. 775.) A ratification after majority of a promise made by an infant is void (37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 2), but as to what amounts to a fresh promise, and what to a mere ratification of the old promise, see Coxhead v. Mullen, 3 C. P. D. 439; Northcote v. Doughty, 4 C. P. D. 385; and Ditcham v. Wurrall, 5 C. P. D. 410.) (b) Unless supported by very clear evidence this is a very dangerous plea. (c) The seduction alleged in the second paragraph does not give the plaintiff a new cause of action, but it is properly pleaded as a “material fact" (R. S. C. Order XIX., r. 4). Even if it were not a statement of "material fact" the Court will not strike it out, for it is neither scandalous nor does it tend to prejudice or embarrass the fair trial of the action. (Millington v. Loring, 6 Q. B. Div. 190, C. A.) 3. The defendant refused to marry the plaintiff within a reasonable time. Particulars of special damage : Nov. 1883. Dr. Smith for medical attendance £10 10 0 The plaintiff claims £1000. Charter-Party (@). 1. Statement of Claim in Action by Ship Owner against Charterer for Detention beyond the Demurrage Days. 1. The plaintiff has suffered damage by breach of a charterparty, dated the 10th of March, 1882, between the plaintiff and the defendant, of the ship "May." 2. The ship was detained at the port of loading. (a) "A charter-party is a contract whereby the ship-owner or the shipmaster covenants or agrees for the use of the ship by the charterer for some specified period of time, or for a particular voyage or adventure" (Addison on Contracts, 7th ed., 718). The ship-owner by the charter-party expressly grants the vessel to be used by the charterer, but this will not generally (though sometimes it will be otherwise, see Trinity House v. Clark, 4 M. & S. 295; Hutton v. Bragg, 7 Taunt. 14) be regarded as a demise of the ship, so as to clothe the charterer with the possession of the vessel, but simply as a contract for the use of the ship, together with the services of the master and crew, for the purpose of carrying merchandise. Definition of charter party. The duty of the charterer is to load his cargo on board within the agreed time, and there is also an implied contract on his part not to put on board without notice packages of dangerous or corrosive matter, the Correlative nature of which the ship-owner or his agents could not be reasonably ex- rights and pected to know. (Brass v. Maitland, 6 E. & B. 470 ; L. J. 26 Q. B. 49.) duties of The duty of the ship-owner is to fulfil all the terms of the charter-party charterer and safely convey the goods to their destination, the loss arising from and shipcertain perils being excepted, and his right is either then or before (if, owner. but only if, it has been so expressly agreed) to receive the freight due to him A deviation from the course of the voyage to save life is justifiable, but not to save property; and if the ship deviates with the latter object the shipowner is liable to the charterer for any loss. (Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C. P. Div. 295; 49 L. J. 674.) If the charterer fails to load a cargo, or loads an insufficient cargo so that the ship-owner cannot claim the full amount of freight to which he is entitled by the terms of the charter-party, he is liable for damages in an action by the ship-owner. In an action for not loading, the shipowner must prove at the trial, compliance with all warranties and conditions on his part. The description of a ship may be a warranty. Thus, if she be described as of class A 1 and is not so, this would be an answer to an action for not loading (Hurst v. Usborne, 18 C. B. 144; L. J. 25 C. P. 209); so a description of a ship as "now in a particular port' What con stitutes a warranty or condi tion precedent. amounts to a warranty that she really is there (Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751; L. J. 32 Q. B. 204); so "now at sea, having sailed three weeks ago," is a condition precedent. (Ollive v. Booker, 1 Exch. 416.) Where the ship is chartered for a given time and not for a voyage merely, the stipulation as to the time when the ship shall be ready to sail or to load is a condition precedent (Seegar v. Duthie, 8 C. B. N. S. 45, 72; L. J. 30 C. P. 65; Tully v. Howling, 45 L. J. 756; 2 Q. B. D. 182); and delay, even though caused by the excepted perils, when so great as to put an end in a commercial sense to the speculation, exonerates the charterer. (Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 572; L. R. 10 C. P. 125; 44 L. J. C. P. 27.) There is an implied warranty on the part of the ship-owner that his ship shall be seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, and where she was not, and in consequence the charterer's cargo was lost, it was held that he could recover its value from the ship-owner (Kopitoff v. Wilson, 1 Q. B. D. 337; 45 L. J. Q. B. 436; Cohen v. Davidson, 46 L. J. 305; 2 Q. B. D. 459; Stanton v. Richardson, 45 L. J. 230 (H. L.)). The measure of damages for not loading any cargo is the amount of freight which would have been carried, deducting expenses and any profit earned during the time covered by the charter. Demurrage.]-The charterer usually covenants to load and unload the vessel within a certain time, or if he fails to do so, to pay so much a day during the delay. This delay as well as the payment is called Demurrage, demurrage. The days which by the charter-party are allowed to the when action for lies. Delay occasioned by unforseen events. charterer to load or unload are called lay days; and these days are, in the absence of a contrary usage, to be taken as consecutive or running days. (Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331.) The lay days allowed are to be reckoned from the time of the ship's arrival at the usual place of discharge, and not from her arrival at the entrance of the port, although for the purposes of navigation she may have discharged a portion of her cargo (Brereton v. Chapman, 7 Bing. 559; Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498); and where by a charter-party a specified sum is to be paid for each day over and above the lying days, that sum is payable in respect of a fraction of a day during which the ship is detained. (Commercial Steamship Co. v. Boulton, 44 L. J. Q. B. 219.) When the charter-party is silent as to the time of loading and unloading, the contract implied by law is that each party will use reasonable diligence in performing that part of the loading or delivery which by the custom of the port falls upon him. The charterer cannot escape from liability on his express covenant to pay demurrage by showing that the delay was occasioned by some unforeseen event not provided for by the contract, such as the crowded state of the docks (though here it may be otherwise if there is a custom of the port that ships of the kind should not be considered as arrived until they get a discharging berth within the dock (Steamship Co., Norden, v. Dempsey, 45 L. J. 764); or the delay of Customhouse officers, or the inclemency of the weather (Blight v. Page, 3 B. & P. 295), or the neglect of the holders of the bill of lading to present it and claim the goods. (Erichsen v. Barkworth, 3 H. & N. 894; L. J. 28 Ex. 95; Tiis v. Byers, 45 L. J. 511; 1 Q. B. D. 244.) But if after the loading has been completed, the vessel is detained by a sudden frost or by |