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What
amoun
to an
insurable

interest..

Assignment of life policies.

The effect
of false
or fraudu
lent misre-
presenta-
tion by the
assured.

When the assured

commits

suicide.

policy of life insurance with the defendant company for the sum of £1000, and the defendant company agreed to pay to

his own name on the life of his son, he having no pecuniary interest in it, is void. (Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & C. 724; Worthington v. Curtis, 45 L. J. Ch. 259; 1 Ch. D. 419.) But everyone has an interest in his own life, and if he insures it his executor is not bound to show any interest beyond this (Wainewright v. Bland, 1 M. & Rob. 481); so a wife may insure her husband's life (Reed v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., Peake Add. Ca. 70); and now by the 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 11, a married woman may effect a policy of insurance upon her own life or the life of her hus band for her separate use, and the same and all benefit thereof shall enure to her accordingly. So a creditor may insure his debtor's life. (Anderson v. Edie, Park Ins. 8th ed. 914.) As in the case of marine policies so in the case of life policies, the assured can only recover the amount of his insurable interest in the life of the person insured; and if he chances to have it covered by several policies, he can only recover the amount on one or more policies. (Hebdon v. West, 3 B. & S. 579; L. J. 32 Q. B. 85.)

Life policies may be assigned, and by the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144, the assignee may sue in his own name upon giving written notice of such assignment to the assurance company liable under the policy. A written agreement by the owner of a life policy to execute an assignment of it is not an assignment within the Act, and notice of such an assignment to the insurance office does not give priority over the prior equitable title of a person who had not given notice. (Spencer v. Clarke, 9 Ch. D. 137 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 692.)

Where an equitable mortgagee of a policy of life insurance sues the company for the policy monies, the Court of Appeal intimated in Webster v. The British Empire Mutual Life Assurance Co., 49 L. J. Ch. 769; 15 Ch. D. 169 (dissenting from Crossley v. The City of Glasgow Co., 4 Ch. D. 421; 46 L. J. Ch. 65), that the presence on the record of the personal representatives of the assured ought not to be dispensed with.

An assignee of a life policy need not show any interest in the life of the person insured, other than the original interest of his assignor at the time of the entering into the policy. (Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 149.)

The assured usually subscribes a declaration answering facts inquired of by the insurers, and it is made a condition that if any be untruly answered, the policy is to be void. In such a case the policy is void though there is no intentional untruth (Macdonald v. Law, &c., Insurance Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 328; The London Assurance Co. v. Mansel, 11 Ch. D. 363; 48 L. J. Ch. 331); and it makes no matter though the misstatement is found by the jury to be immaterial, for as the basis of the contract is the truth of the representation, its materiality is not in question, and ought not to be left to the jury. (Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. C. 484; Cazenove v. British Equitable Assurance Co., 6 C. B. N. S. 437 ; L. J. 28 C. P. 259.) But mere representations and statements which turn out untrue will not avoid a life policy, unless the policy purport to be based upon their truth, or there be fraud. (Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 E. & B. 232; L. J. 26 Q. B. 265.)

There is generally a clause in life policies avoiding the policy if the person whose life is insured "commits suicide," or "dies by his own hand;" and this clause has been construed to include all voluntary selfdestruction, though not felonious. Therefore, where, as often happens, a man whose life is insured (there being a clause of the kind in the policy). commits suicide in a fit of insanity, his representatives, or those who hold the policy, cannot recover on it. (Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Dormay v. Borrodaile, 5 C. B. 380; but see Smith's Mercantile Law, 9th ed. 404-5.)

his executors, administrators, or assigns, the said sum of £1000 within three months of the death of the said A. B., and notice to the defendant's company thereof.

3. A. B., during the continuance of the said policy, and more than three months ago, died, and the defendant's company have had three months' notice of his death.

The plaintiff claims £1000.

Defence.

1. It was an express condition of the said policy of insurance that the defendant company should not be liable to pay the said sum of £1000, or any part thereof, to the executors, administrators or assigns of the said A. B., if he should commit suicide, or die by his own hand.

2. The said A. B. did commit suicide, and died by his own. hands.

Reply.

The plaintiff joins issue upon the statement of defence.

2. Claim by a Creditor upon a Policy of Insurance on the Life of his Debtor.

1. On the 5th of May, 1860, the plaintiff was the creditor of C. D., of F., for more than £500.

2. On the said 5th of May, 1860, the plaintiff insured the

Where a policy of insurance against death contained a proviso that the insured should not be entitled to make any claim for any injury from any accident, unless such injury should be caused by some outward and visible means of which proof could be furnished, and that "this insurance shall not extend to any injury caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease; and the insured was seized with an epileptic fit whilst crossing a shallow stream, and fell down in the water and was drowned, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the circumstances of the insured's death were not such as to relieve the insurance company from liability. (Winspear v. Accident Ins. Co., 50 L. J. Ex. 292.) And so where in the policy there was a proviso excepting the liability of the insurance company when the death was caused by any "fit," &c., and the insured was seized with an epileptic fit, and falling down was killed by an engine passing over him, it was held that the company was still liable to pay the amount insured. (Lawrence v. The Accident Insurance Co., 50 Î. J. Q. B. 522.)

A policy of assurance does not bear interest, and a plaintiff can only recover it where the jury give it in the nature of damages for any improper delay on the part of the company in settling the claim. (Webster v. The British Empire Mutual Co., quoted supra.)

life of the said C. D. with the defendants, and the defendants agreed to pay to the plaintiff the sum of £500 upon the death of the said C. D., if the said policy was then subsisting, together with all bonuses which might accrue upon the said policy.

3. The said C. D. died on the 15th of June, 1880, during the continued subsistence of the said policy.

The plaintiff claims :

(1) £500, and

(2) £400 for bonuses accrued due on the said policy.

Defence.

1. The defendants say that it was a term of the said contract of assurance that the said C. D. should truthfully answer certain questions then submitted to him in writing by the defendants, and that, if the said answers were in any particular inaccurate, the said policy should be deemed to be void.

2. The said C. D. did not truthfully answer all the said questions, but, on the contrary, falsely stated that he had never applied to any other insurance company for a policy of insurance, whereas, in fact, he had previously applied to the Globe Insurance Company.

3. Claim by Assignee of a Life Policy.

1. By a policy of life insurance dated the 10th of August, 1880, the defendants agreed with M. O., of T., that they would pay to his executors, administrators or assigns, the sum of £1000 within three months of due notice received by them of his death.

2. On the 1st of September, 1880, the said M. O. assigned the said policy of insurance to the plaintiff, who forthwith gave notice in writing of such assignment to the defendants.

3. M. O. died on the 3rd of October, 1880, and the defendants have had three months' notice of his death.

The plaintiff claims £1000.

4. Claim by an Equitable Mortgagee of a Life Policy.

1. On the 2nd of March, 1847, the defendants, the "C" Company, by a policy of that date insured the life of Robert

Brown for £500, at a quarterly premium of £5 11s. 3d., and agreed that if the said premiums were duly paid, they would pay to the executors, administrators or assigns of the said Robert Brown, the sum of £500, with all bonuses which might have accrued upon the said sum, within two months of his death.

2. On the 3rd of March, 1847, the said Robert Brown deposited the said policy with the plaintiff as security for a debt of £435.

3. Robert Brown paid the quarterly instalments only down to the 3rd of August, 1848, and from that time to the death of the said Robert Brown, the said instalments were paid by the plaintiff.

4. Robert Brown died insolvent in December, 1874, by his will appointing the defendant, A. B., his executor, and the defendants, the "C" Company, have had two months' notice of his death.

The plaintiff claims :

(1) A declaration that the said policy was deposited with him, and remained as a security for the debt of £435, and the sum of £578 10s. paid for premiums;

(2) That the defendants, the "C" Company, be directed to pay over to him the said sum of £500, and £360 bonuses.

Insurance-III. Fire Policies (a).

1. Claim on a Fire Policy.

1. On the 13th of May, 1880, the plaintiff effected with the defendant a policy of insurance against loss or damage from

(a) A fire policy is, like a marine policy, a contract of indemnity, and the assured can only recover the actual loss or damage sustained according to the quality and value of the goods at the time of the fire. (Chap man v. Pole, 22 L. T. N. S. 306; Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. Div. 380; 49 L. T. 29); and it is necessary to show an interest in the subject insured, at the time both of insuring and of the fire. (Lynch v. Dalzell, 4 Bro. P. C. 431; Saddlers' Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554.) Warehousemen and wharfingers may insure their customers' goods in their custody. (Waters v. Monarch Assurance Co., 5 E. & B. 870 ; L. J. 25 Q. B. 102.) A carrier may insure the goods in his custody, and he may recover the whole value of the goods lost by fire, although the owner of the goods may be disabled from recovering from the carrier by reason of the value

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The insurable interest.

Effect of alteration

of property.

As to loss

by negligence of insured.

The insured entitled to all the rights of the assured.

fire upon the household furniture in the plaintiff's house, No. 16, Gaiford Terrace, Chelsea, for the sum of £500, and from the said 13th of May, 1880, until the 13th of May, 1881.

not being declared under the Carriers' Act. (London & North-Western Railway Co. v. Glyn, 1 E. & E. 652; L. J. 28 Q. B. 188; Ebsworth v. Alliance Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 596.) But anything the carrier recovers over and above his own beneficial interest he holds in trust for the owners (ibid.). A person who has a limited interest in the subject-matter of insurance, as a tenant for life, or remainderman, or a mortgagee, can if he likes insure for the full value of the thing in question, but if he intended merely to cover his own interest he can only recover the amount of it. On the other hand, if he intended to cover the other persons interested, he may recover the whole value from the insurance office, but he holds the surplus in trust for the persons beneficially interested. (Per Bowen, L.J., in Custellain v. Preston, supra.) This results from the principle which was laid down in the last case in its most inflexible form, that a contract of fire insurance can never be anything more than an indemnity.

The property intended to be insured must be described in the policy, and there is generally a condition against any alteration in the premises after the making of the policy; and when this is the case any material alteration will avoid the policy. But where there is no condition of the kind a subsequent change, as by setting up a more hazardous trade in them, if without fraud, will not destroy the policy. (Pim v. Reid, 6 M. & Gr. 1.) The policy covers a loss by fire owing to the negligence of the assured himself, if there be no fraud." (Shaw v. Robberds, 6 Ad. & E. 75.) In Collingridge v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 3 Q. B. D.1173, it was held that though at the time of the loss the assured had contracted to sell the property in question, he was still entitled to recover the whole amount insured from the defendants; but where between the date of sale and completion the insured premises were damaged by fire, and the vendor received the insurance money from the company, it was held that upon the completion of the purchase and the receipt by him of the whole amount of the purchase money, the insurance company were entitled to recover back again the insurance money they had paid. (Castellain v. Preston (C. A.), supra.)

It was laid down clearly in the case of Darrell v. Tibbets, 5 Q. B. Div. 560, following North British Ry. Co. v. London, Liverpool, & Globe Insurance Co., 5 Ch. Div. 569, that a policy of fire insurance being only a contract of indemnity upon payment of the amount insured, the insurer is entitled to be put in the place of the assured; and if at a subsequent time the assured receives compensation from other sources for the loss sustained, the insurer is entitled to recover from the assured any sum which he may have received in excess of the loss actually suffered by him. Castellain v. Preston is in full accordance with this principle. A house insured by the vendor was, after the date of the contract for sale, but before completion partly burnt down, and the vendor received the insurance money. In these circumstances it was held by majority of the Court of Appeal that the purchaser as against the vendor could not recover the insurance moneys either as an abatement of his purchase money or for the reinstatement of the premises. (Rayner v. Preston, 50 L. J. Ch. 472.)

Unlike life and marine policies, a fire policy is not assignable under any statute; but in equity even a fire policy may be assigned so as to give the assignee the right to sue upon it in his own name (per Brett, L.J., in Rayner v. Preston, supra); and where by agreement between the parties the beneficial interest in a property has passed from the

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