plaintiff the sum of £5 in part payment of the debt due upon the said contract, for which sum the plaintiff has given credit in this action. Period of Limitation.-Statute or Within two incumbencies and six Twelve years; six years allowed Six years. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. Six years from judgment unless by Six years. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, They shall not be defeated after for Three calendar months. 7 & 8 Geo. Injuries. See Actions under various headings, e.g., Assault, &c. Injuries to testator's or intestate's real estate Six years from date of damnifica- If injury committed within six Table of Table of Defence of the Statute of Limitations to an Action on a Specially (mortgage debt). The defendant says that: 1. The debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57. Action. Actions of tort against executor Judgment, revival of. Period of Limitation-Statute or If done within six months of his Every six years. 15 & 16 Vict. Justices of the peace, actions | Six calendar months, and one Land, right of entry for the re- Twelve years. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. No descent cast or discontinuance after 31st Dec., 1833, shall defeat it. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 39. civil right of Crown in suits Sixty years. 9 Geo. 3, c. 16. Mortgaged lands, action to recover. Within twelve years next after the last payment of any part of the principal money or interest. 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 28, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 9. Reply. The plaintiff says that: 1. Within 12 years of the commencement of this action, that is to say, on December 12, 1875, the defendant, by his Two years when forfeiture goes to the party grieved; two years when forfeiture goes to Crown; one year when it goes to Crown and prosecutor, and in default, then within two years by Crown. 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 5, and 3 & 4 Wm. 4. c. 42, s. 3; and see 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 36, and Robinson v. Currey, 7 Q. B. D. 465. Twenty years after accruing of right to a person capable of giving a discharge; or if in meantime some part or interest in such estate has been accounted for or paid, or an acknowledgment in writing, signed by the person liable or his agent, has been given to the person entitled or his agent, twenty years after the last accounting, payment, or acknowledgment. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 13. Twelve calendar months after their death. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, s. 3; and see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, s. 1, which provides that where there is no executor, &c., or he does not bring an action within six months, the persons beneficially interested may do so. Six months. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 264. Two years, or in case of continuing damage, then within one year after such damage shall have ceased. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5. Twelve years. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. See Owen v. De Beauvoir, 16 M. & W. 547; 5 Exch. 166; and Chichester v. Hall, 17 L. T. 121. Table of agent A. B., paid to the plaintiff £10 on account of the interest on the mortgage debt. Table of Limitation. From what time statutes run in charge, proceeding for, secured Twelve years. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, by deed s. 1. Six years. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3. Twenty years. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, ss. 3 to 6. Six years. 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3. Slander, verbal (unless special Two years. Ibid. if special damage Six years. Saunders v. Edwards, 1 Sid. 95. Tithe, suit to recover the value of Six years from the time the tithes From what time statutes run.]-The statutes begin to run from the breach of the covenant or contract, and not from the discovery of it, as where a neglect of duty by an attorney was not discovered until after six years (Short v. McCarthy, 3 B. & A. 626; Colven v. Buckle, 8 M. & 2. On January 17, 1877, by letter to the plaintiff's agent C. D., the defendant acknowledged the right of the plaintiff to recover the said mortgage debt and interest. run. W. 680), but if the defendant has fraudulently concealed the cause of case of action the statute runs from the time of the discovery of the cause of contracts. action, or from the time when, with reasonable diligence, the plaintiff might have discovered it. See Gibbs v. Guild, 9 Q. B. Div. 59; 51 L. J. Q. B. 313; discrediting Hunter v. Gibbons, 1 H. & N. 459; and Imperial Gas Co. v. London Gas Co., 10 Ex. 39; 23 L. J. Ex. 303. In case of breach of contract to deliver goods, the statute runs from the breach, though there has been a subsequent request for delivery and a refusal. (East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. 85.) Where money is deposited with a banker the statute runs from the deposit, and not from demand for payment. (Pott v. Clegg, 16 M. & W. 321.) Quare when money has From been deposited with a private person. Where the drawee of a bill refuses what time to accept and the holder gives notice thereof to the drawer, the statute statutes runs from such notice, and not from non-payment when due. (White- begin to head v. Walker, 9 M. & W. 506.) Where an accommodation acceptor is sued on a bill and pays the amount, he has six years from such payment in which to sue the accommodation drawer, i.e., the statute runs from payment and not from the date of maturity of the bill. (Angrove v. Tippett, 11 L. T. N. S. 708.) Where a bill is deposited with a memorandum that it is to be a security for a balance due, the statute runs only from ascertainment of balance and demand for payment of such balance, and not from the mere creation of a debt to the holder. (Hartland v. Jukes, 32 I. J. Ex. 162.) In a recent case a promissory note payable three months after demand was found among the papers of the promisee after his death. The note was indorsed with two payments of interest. also more than twenty years old. The cause of action was held barred by statute, because (1) the payment of the interest was evidence of a demand, on which the statute would begin to run, and (2) after such a lapse of time payment must be presumed. (Brown v. Rutherford, 14 Ch. Div. 687; 49 L. J. Ch. 654.) See the tabular view, ante, pp. 374 to 380, for statement of time at which statutes begin to run in the case of bills and other causes of action. In the case of torts the date of the cause of action for the purpose of limitation is in general the committing of the injurious act, and not the occurrence of the damage resulting therefrom. (Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Ex. 259; Violett v. Sympson, 27 L. J. Q. B. 138; 8 E. & B. 344.) If the act is not in itself injurious, but only becomes so by reason of future consequences which cannot be foreseen, as in the case of excavation of land adjoining that of the plaintiff, which after a time causes a subsidence of the latter's land, the right of action dates from the actual damage. (Bonomi v. Backhouse, 9 H. L. C. 503 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 181.) Where, however, the injurious act is continuing, and causes continued damage, the right of action is also continuing. (Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 30 L. J. C. P. 305; 10 C. B. N. S. 765.) When statutes begin to run in case of torts. When currency of statutes suspended.]-The 7th section of 21 Jac. 1, When c. 16, conjointly with sect. 4 of 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, p ovides in effect that currency if the person entitled to bring an action within those statutes is, at the of statutes time the cause of action accrues, under twenty-one years of age, a married suspended. woman, or insane, the time is not to begin to run until the disability shall have ceased. By s. 11 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, in the case of joint debtors, the statutes Where of limitation now run as to such as are not beyond the seas, though some of one joint them may be beyond the seas; but a judgment recovered in such cases debtor will not per se be a bar to another action against the absent debtors after beyond |