Action by a Purchaser of Land claiming Specific Performance and Damages. 1. By an agreement in writing, dated the 1st of August, 1883, and made between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff the Swanley Estate at L—, in the county of Sussex, for the sum of £19,400. The sale was to be completed on the 15th of September, 1883. 2. By the agreement, the defendant further agreed to put the house upon the said estate in complete repair, which he has not done, whereby the plaintiff has suffered damage. 3. The cost of putting the said house in complete repair will be £550. The plaintiff claims (1.) Specific performance of the agreement; (2.) Execution by the defendant of a proper deed of conveyance to the plaintiff on payment of £18,850. The defendant says that Defence. 1. He entered into the agreement by mistake. 2. The said mistake was the defendant's belief that the estate contained only 194 acres. 3. The defendant has since discovered, and the fact is, that the Swanley estate contains over 400 acres. 4. The agreement is an unfair one. 5. The price was calculated at £100 per acre, on the assumption, by both the plaintiff and the defendant, that the estate contained 194 acres, and no more. Reply. The plaintiff joins issue upon the statement of defence. Action by Vendor against Purchaser claiming Specific Performance of a Verbal Contract partly Performed. 1. By a verbal agreement made at an interview between the plaintiff and the defendant on May 1, 1883, the defendant agreed to purchase the house and premises called the "Elms," at Hendon, in the county of Middlesex, for £2,000. The purchase was to be completed on the 24th of June, 1883. 2. The contract was afterwards part performed as follows:On June 24, 1883, the defendant took possession of the premises under the contract. The plaintiff claims 1. Specific performance of the above agreement. 2. Payment of the sum of £2,000. The defendant says that Defence. 1. He denies that he agreed to buy the said house and premises at all, or that he agreed as alleged. If the defendant. so agreed, the plaintiff induced the defendant to enter into the said alleged agreement by representing to him that the premises were in good repair, whereas in fact they were very much out of repair, and the defendant could not and did not discover that fact on an ordinary inspection of the premises, or at all, until after June 24, 1883; and 2. The plaintiff induced the defendant to enter into the said alleged agreement by representing to him that the premises were freehold, whereas in fact they were and are of copyhold tenure. 3. The defendant denies that he ever took possession of the premises, or otherwise did anything in part performance of the alleged agreement. Action by Lessor against Lessee for Specific Performance. By an agreement in writing, dated October 1st, 1883, and made between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant agreed to accept a lease from the plaintiff of the house No. 200, Cromwell Road, in the county of Middlesex, for twentyone years, from the 25th of December, 1883, at the annual rent of £4,000, and subject to the covenants therein mentioned. The plaintiff claims: (1) Specific performance of the above agreement; (2) That the defendant may be ordered to execute a counterpart of a proper indenture of lease under the above 1. The plaintiff induced the defendant to enter into the agreement by the representation that the house was brick-built, which it was not and is not. The defendant agreed as alleged in reliance upon that representation. 2. The plaintiff has only a term of years in the house, and he and his assigns are bound by the lease to him to observe unusual covenants whereof the defendant was ignorant when he agreed as alleged. The said covenants are, not to use the house as a school, or for the practice of a physician or dentist. Claim by the Purchaser of a Picture for Specific Performance. 1. On June 30th, 1883, the defendant in writing agreed to sell to the plaintiff an oil-painting by J. W. M. Turner, representing the passage of Hannibal over the Alps, for the sum of £15,000. 2. The said painting is unique and cannot be replaced. 3. The defendant refuses to complete the said agreement. The plaintiff claims specific performance of the said agreement, and that the defendant may be decreed, on payment of the sum of £15,000, to deliver the said painting to the plaintiff. Defence. The defendant says that :- 1. Neither on June 30th, 1883, nor at any time since, was the defendant nor is he now entitled to or possessed of the said oil painting, or able to deliver the same to the plaintiff. 2. The said painting is not worth £15,000. Stoppage in Transitu (a). Action against a Railway Company for failing to stop in 1. The plaintiff has suffered damage by defendants, on 5th of April, 1880, delivering to A. B. of C. certain goods which the plaintiff, as an unpaid vendor, had delivered to them as carriers consigned to the said A. B. 2. On the 3rd of April, 1880, the plaintiff gave the defendants notice that the said A. B. was insolvent, and required them not to deliver the goods to him, but to hold them for the plaintiff. Particulars of damage: 50 casks of composition pipes at £2 a cask, £100. The plaintiff claims £100. The defendants say : Defence. 1. They delivered the said goods on the morning of the 4th of April, 1880. 2. They did not receive the plaintiff's said notice until the afternoon of the said 4th of April, 1880. In (a) Stoppage in transitu is the right of an unpaid vendor to resume Stoppage the possession, with which he has parted, of goods sold upon credit in tranbefore they come into the possession of the vendee, who has become situ, what bankrupt, insolvent, or embarrassed in circumstances. (Dixon v. Yates, it is. 5 B. & Ad. 315; Bird v. Brown, 4 Ex. 786.) "The term 'insolvent' when it relates to the right of stoppage in transitu means a general inability to satisfy obligations evidenced by stopping payment. such a case the vendor is allowed to countermand delivery before or at the place of destination, and to resume the possession of the goods. but it is not an unlimited right, for the vendor cannot exercise it if he has parted with documents sufficient to transfer the property, and the vendee upon the strength of them has sold the goods to a bonâ fide purchaser without notice."-Houston's Stoppage in Transitu, p. 1. As to when the transitus is at an end so as to determine the vendor's When the right to stop, see Bolton v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail. Co., L. R. 1 right is C. P. 431; In re Whitworth, 1 Ch. Div. 101; In re Love, 5 Ch. D. 35; lost. Er parte Barrow, 6 Ch. D. 783; Grice v. Richardson, 3 Appeal Cases, 319. Where the purchaser of goods has resold them, though the vendor loses by the resale the right to stop the goods themselves in transitu, he is entitled, if he gives that which would, had there been no resale, have been a valid notice of stoppage, to intercept, to the extent of his own Surveyor. Claim by a Surveyor for Services in connection with a projected Railway. The plaintiff's claim is for commission as a surveyor and railway engineer, for services rendered for the defendant at his request. 1. The defendant never employed the plaintiff, or requested him to render any services. 2. If he did employ the plaintiff he did so as a director of the W. & M. Rail. Co. only, as the plaintiff knew, and upon the terms that he should not be personally liable to the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff's charges are excessive and unreasonable. Tenant (@). (See Landlord and Tenant.) 1. Claim by Landlord against Tenant for Rent, with Counterclaims by the Defendant and the Plaintiff. The plaintiff's claim is for £400, one year's rent up to Midsummer, 1880, of the M. farm, which the defendant holds from unpaid purchase-money, so much of the sub-purchaser's purchase-money as remains unpaid by him. (Kemp v. Falk, 7 Appeal Cases. 573; following In re West:inthus, 5 B. & Ad. 817; Spalding v. Ruding, 6 Beav. 376; 12 L. J. Ch. 503.) (a) In Toke v. Andrews (51 L. J. Q. B. 281) the plaintiff brought an action to recover arrears of rent of a farm held to Midsummer, 1881. The defendant, by his counter-claim delivered after the 29th of September, |