defences the money; (2) that if he did, he lent it to somebody other Inconthan the defendant; (3) that the defendant had paid the sistent money; and (4) that the plaintiff had released the defendant allowable. from the payment of it. Objection was taken that all these inconsistent defences could not be pleaded together; but Mr. Justice Lindley overruled the objection, remarking that when the old form of pleading is applicable there is no objection to it. The defendant was entitled to say that the money was never lent to him, and that if it was he has paid it or been released. In Spurr v. Hall (46 L. J. Q. B. 693; 37 L. T. 313; 26 Spurr v. W. R. 78; 2 Q. B. D. 615), the question for the decision of the Hall. Queen's Bench was whether payment into Court could be pleaded along with various other defences to a claim; but in the course of his judgment Mr. Justice Field expressed in clear and precise terms the general right of a defendant to plead inconsistent defences to the same cause of action. "This action," said his lordship, "is brought for three things; first, for permanent damage caused to the plaintiff's reversion by interfering with light; secondly, for interfering with a waterspout; and, thirdly, for taking away a stone from a wall belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants have pleaded, Judgment denying the plaintiff's right to sue as reversioner, denying that of Field, J. the dwelling-house in question is interfered with, denying the right to light, and denying that the plaintiff has been injured either by the interference with the water-spout or by the removal of the stone. All these defences the defendants have a perfect right to put on to the record together; but they have also pleaded in the following words. [The learned Judge then read the 9th paragraph of the defence, which pleaded a payment of £20 into Court.] The result, therefore, is that the defendants have paid £20 into Court in respect of the same causes of action as those the existence of which they deny. In the first place, the pleadings are clearly inconsistent, but ever since the statute enabling several pleas to be pleaded together (4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 4), it has been held to be no cause for objecting to pleas that they are inconsistent with each other, and such pleas have been habitually pleaded together. But this permission has never been extended to pleas of payment into Court, which stand upon a different footing. Before Inconsistent defences the Judicature Acts (except in certain instances specified in the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 4), leave was wanted to allowable. plead several pleas together, and payment into Court was never permitted to be pleaded together with any other plea to the same cause of action. The question before us now is whether any change has been introduced as to this by the Judicature Acts. Under those Acts, no leave to plead several defences together is wanted, and the only remedy which the plaintiff has when defences are improperly joined is to apply under Order XXVII. r. 1." When pay ment into court may with denial of liability. But while the general rule was, and is, as stated, that a defendant might plead inconsistent defences, there was a good deal of discussion upon the Rules of 1875 on the question whether a defendant might plead a payment into Court along with defences denying liability. The result of the cases was that this course was permissible even in actions for libel. be pleaded (Hawksley v. Bradshaw, 5 Q. B. D. 302; 49 L. J. Q. B. 333; 42 L. T. 285; 28 W. R. 557.) All controversy on these points is now set at rest by the Rules of 1883, which provide that a defendant may plead payment of money into Court along with a defence, denying liability in all cases except libel or slander. "Where any action is brought to recover a debt or damages, any defendant may, before or at the time of delivering his defence, or at any later time by leave of the Court or a judge, pay into Court a sum of money by way of satisfaction, which shall be taken to admit the claim or cause of action in respect of which the payment is made; or he may, with a defence denying liability (except in actions or counter-claims for libel or slander), pay money into Court, which shall be subject to the provisions of rule 6; provided that in an action on a bond, under the Statute 8 & 9 Will. III. c. 11, payment into Court shall be admissible to particular breaches only, and not to the whole action." (Order XXII. r. 1.) By rule 2, "payment into Court shall be signified in the defence and the claim or cause of action, in satisfaction of which such payment is made shall be specified therein." O. XXII. r. 1. In Paraire v. Loibl (49 L. J. Ch. 481; 43 L. T. 427) it was decided by the Court of Appeal upon the corresponding rule of the Rules of 1875, that where a plaintiff claims for distinct pieces of work and labour, alleged in separate para graphs of the statement of claim, a defendant who has paid money into Court generally, need not specify in his defence how much is paid in respect of each head of claim. "It Payment might," said Bramwell, L. J., "work a great injustice to the into court. defendant if he was compelled to specify how much he had paid into Court in respect of each item. He might be unable so to particularise where he had paid sums from time to time on account, and the plaintiff was suing for a balance. I doubt very much whether Order XIX. r. 9 has any application, because a plea of payment into Court is not a defence to the plaintiff's claim; on the contrary, it is a statement by the defendant that, to a certain extent, the claim is well founded. I say nothing about the plaintiff's right to particulars from the defendant as to the money he has paid into Court." Where money has been brought into Court as a condition of leave to defend, the defendant may, unless the Court or a judge otherwise order, "by his pleading appropriate the whole or any part of such money and any additional payment if necessary, to the whole or any specified portion of the plaintiff's claim; and the money so appropriated shall thereupon be deemed to be money paid into Court pursuant to the preceding rules of this Order, relating to money paid into Court, and shall be subject in all respects thereto." (Order XXII. r. 11.) A defendant will wish either to admit, to deny, or to confess and avoid the allegations contained in the statement claim. Where he wishes to deny them, he may wish either to deny that the contract or tort sued on was made or committed in fact, or to deny the sufficiency in law of the contract with reference to the way it was entered into, or the evidence by which it is proved. taken as The course of a defendant who desires to admit any averment Allegations is perfectly clear. "Every allegation of fact in any pleading, not denied not being a petition of summons, if not denied specifically or admitted. by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party, shall be taken to be admitted, except as against an infant, lunatic, or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition." (Order XIX. r. 13.) rule is subject to an exception in the case of the tion of damages in a claim or counter-claim. defence a denial of the damages claimed is implied, unless they This Except allega- averments In every of damages. How aver ments may be admitted. How they are denied. Denials must be specific. are expressly admitted. (Order XXI. r. 4.) With this excep- The case of a defendant who wishes to deny the allegations in the statement of claim is necessarily the most common case. In the first place the pleader must take care that he does deny the averments he is not prepared to admit. Otherwise they will be taken as admitted. An exception to this rule was stated by the Master of the Rolls in Chilton v. The Corporation of London (7 Ch. Div. 735; 47 L. J. Ch. 433; 38 L. T. 498; 26 W. R. 474), where he held that the mere admission or nondenial by the defendant of a right asserted by the plaintiff, but which has in fact no existence in law, is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to judgment. Subject to this exception the rule is that an averment not specifically denied is taken to be admitted. But any form of denial is not sufficient. It must be a denial in strict conformity with a series of rules, to be presently mentioned. There are three rules, viz., rules 17, 19, and 20, of Order XIX. which deal with the general method of denying matters sought to be put in questions; and four other rules, viz., rules 1, 2, 3, and 5, of Order XXI., which provide for denials in particular classes of actions. Coming first to the form of denials in all actions, the following are the rules that call for attention : 1. "It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his statement of defence to deny generally the grounds alleged by the statement of claim but each party must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages." (Order XIX. r. 17.) be evasive 2. "When a party in any pleading denies an allegation Denials of fact in the previous pleading of the opposite party, he must must not not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it be alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with divers circumstances it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances." 3. "When a contract, promise, or agreement, is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract, promise, or agreement alleged, or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied by law, and not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract, promise, or agreement, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds or otherwise." Rules 20, 21, and 23, Order XIX., of the Rules of 1875, were substantially the same as the above rules, and upon them a series of cases were decided, to which it is now necessary to advert. Holds worth. In Thorp v. Holdsworth (3 Ch. Div. 637; 45 L, J. Ch. 406), Thorp v. the action was brought by the plaintiffs for the purpose of obtaining a dissolution of their partnership with the defendant. The statement of claim alleged that in August, 1875, the plaintiffs and defendant agreed to take a lease of a brickfield and carry on in partnership the business of brick manufacturers, and that in pursuance of such agreement the plaintiffs procured to be granted to them a lease of the premises, and had since purchased the plant and stock-in-trade. In paragraph 3 they went on to allege that early in the same month they and the defendant caused draft articles of partnership to be prepared for the purpose of defining the terms of the partnership; that the said draft articles were considered and approved by the plaintiffs and defendant at an interview between them on the 17th September, subject to their being submitted by the defendant to his solicitor, and being revised and finally settled by him; that the said draft had not yet been revised, and the articles had not yet been executed; that although the draft articles were only settled subject to revision, the terms of the arrangement between the plaintiffs and defendant as |